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05-31-2019, 10:23 PM

2018 GOLDEN BEACON
CIVIL LAW

By: Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

1. HUMAN RELATIONS

ARTICLE 19

Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

DART PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO CALOGCOG
G.R. No. 149241, August 24, 2009, 596 SCRA 614

FACTS: Dart entered into Distributorship Agreement with Spouses Calogcog. Following the expiration of the agreement, Dart was only convinced to extend the period of distributorship upon the written promise of the Calogcogs that they will observe and comply the terms and conditions thereof. Dart subjected the spouses to an audit review by an auditing firm. However, Spouses Calogcog disallowed the auditing firm from inspecting their books and records. As a result, Dart only accepted the spouses’ purchase order on a prepaid basis.

ISSUE: Whether Dart acted in bad faith or intended to injure the Spouses Calogcog when it caused the auditing of the latter’s account and when it implemented the prepaid basis in treating the latter’s order.

HELD: NO. Bad faith cannot be attributed to the acts of Dart which was supported by legitimate reasons, principally to protect its own business. The exercise of its rights was not impelled by any evil motive designed, whimsically and capriciously, to injure or prejudice the Calogcogs.

HSBC vs. CATALAN
G.R. No. 159590, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 498

FACTS: A complaint was filed seeking to compel the bank to pay the value of checks issued to her by Thompson as it refused to pay the same despite repeated directives of the drawer to recognize the check he issued. The bank filed motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action under Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, a check itself does not operate as an assignment of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank and the latter is not liable to the holder unless and until it accepts or certifies it.

ISSUE: Whether the bank is liable for damages on the basis of its inaction on the drawer’s instructions.

HELD: YES. The bank can be held liable for damages. It was not a suit on the value of the check itself, but how it acted in relation to the claim for payment. The allegations in the complaint that there was gross inaction of the bank on Thompson’s instructions as well as its evident failure to inform her of the reason are insouciance (lack of concern) on its part.

The complaint was anchored on Article 19 of the New Civil Code. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he

acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts

with prudence and in good faith; but when he acts with negligence or abuse.

Thus, in order to be liable under the abuse of right principle, three elements must concur, to wit:

(a) that there is a legal right or duty;

(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and

SOLEDAD CARPIO vs. LEONORA VALMONTE
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 38

FACTS: Leonora is a wedding coordinator. Michelle and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding.

On that day, Leonora went to the Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the suite, several persons were already there including Soledad, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion.

After reporting to the bride, Leonora went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held.

She went back to suite after, and found several people staring at her when she entered. It was at this juncture that Soledad allegedly uttered the following words to Leonora: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha!”

Soledad then ordered one of the ladies to search Leonora’s bag.

It turned out that after Leonora left the room to attend to her duties, Soledad discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost.

A few days after the incident, Soledad received a letter from Leonora demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlywed’s relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of Soledad’s imputation against her. Soledad did not respond to the letter.

Thus, on 20 February 1997, Leonora filed a suit for damages against Soledad.

ISSUE

Whether Leonora is entitled to damages.

RULING

YES. Leonora is entitled for damages.

In the case at bar, Soledad’s verbal reproach against Leonora was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag.

True, Soledad had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign Leonora without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible.

Soledad had willfully caused injury to Leonora in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose but to prejudice Leonora.

Certainly, Soledad transgressed the provision of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.

One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. A person should be protected

only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

G.F. EQUITY, INC. vs. ARTURO VALENZONA
G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466

FACTS: There was a contract whereby Valenzona was hired as a coach of the Alaska Basketball Team in the PBA for a period of two years. Paragraph 3 of the contract provides that “if at anytime during the contract, the Coach, in the sole opinion of the Corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skills or competitive ability to coach the time, the Corporation may terminate the contract.” During his stint as head coach, the team placed third in both Open and All Filipino PBA Conferences in 1988. He was later on served with notice that the management was terminating his services. Six years thereafter, he filed a complaint for damages asking for payment of his compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment.

ISSUE: Whether paragraph 3 of the contract is a legitimate exercise of the right of petitioner to terminate respondent’s employment.

HELD: NO. The assailed condition clearly transgressed the principle of mutuality of contracts, hence, it is null and void. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity.

When one party in an employment contract is given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness, reasonableness or even lack of basis of its opinion, it must be struck down. To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate of arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefore. Consequently, since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law and GF Equity negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, the latter failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona, thus, entitling the latter to damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code.

2.    CIVIL   PERSONALITY

CONTINENTAL   STEEL   MFG.   CORP.   vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
G.R.   No. 182836,   October   13,   2009,   603   SCRA   621

FACTS: Hortillano’s wife, Marife, had a pre-mature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy which resulted to the death of Hortillano’s unborn child.

ISSUE: Whether Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.

HELD: YES. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.

It was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception, thus, Hortillano was entitled to bereavement benefits.

3. FAMILY CODE

Article 26 paragraph 2 - DIVORCE OBTAINED ABROAD

REPUBLIC vs. OBRECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114

FACTS: Cipriano and Lady Miros got married in 1981 and thereafter were blessed with two children. Miros went to the United States and eventually acquired American citizenship. Later, she obtained a divorce decree of her marriage with Cipriano and got married to Stanley. By reason thereof, Cipriano filed a petition for authority to marry invoking paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that paragraph 2 of Article 26 is not applicable to Cipriano because it applies only to a valid mixed marriage, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.

ISSUE: Whether the Filipino spouse is legally capacitated to re-marry after the other party is naturalized as a foreign citizen and later on obtained a valid divorce decree.

HELD: YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to re-marry as if the other party was a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

- - - To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

- - - There are two (2) elements for the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26, namely,: (1) a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (2) a valid divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to re-marry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but rather, their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to re-marry.

- - - Moreover, it is necessary that the naturalization of the other spouse and the foreign divorce decree be proven. The party pleading it must prove the divorce law as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Likewise, it must be shown that the divorce decree allows the former spouse to re-marry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO
G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018

FACTS: Manalo, a Filipina, married Yoshino, a Japanese national, in San Juan City, Metro Manila, Philippines.

While living in Japan, Manalo initiated a divorce proceeding and obtained a favorable judgment against her alient spouse who is capacitated to remarry.

Upon her return in the Philippines, Manalo filed a petition for recognition of foreign divorce with the RTC and the same was favorably granted. However, the OSG opposed the petition as it was the Filipina spouse who obtained the divorce decree and not the alien spouse.

ISSUES

1. Whether a divorce decree initiated and obtained abroad by a Filipino spouse can be recognized by Philippine court under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Court.

2. Whether the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

3. Differentiate vinculo matrimonii from mensa et thoro.

RULINGS

1. YES, a validly obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of a validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained.

Assuming for the sake of argument, that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.

The purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the married bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result - the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or a wife.

A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.

Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.

2. YES, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

It is well settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.

The burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer whey they introduce new matters.

3. Vinculo Matrimonii or Absolute Divorce is a divorce which terminates the marriage while Mensa et Thoro or Limited Divorce is a divorce which suspends the marriage and leaves the bond in full force.

MINORU FUJIKI vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY et. al.
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013, 790 SCRA 69

FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents, thus he could not bring his wife to Japan. Eventually, he lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekera, without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekera were married on May 15, 2008 in Quezon City. Maekera brought Marinay to Japan, however, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekera. She left Maekera and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.

In 2010, Marinay with the help of her first husband, Fujiki, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan’s family court, which declared the marriage between her and her second husband Maekera, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy.

Upon coming to the Philippines, Fujiki filed with the RTC a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that Fujiki has no personality to file the petition as he is neither a husband nor a wife of the subsequent marriage.

I S S U E

Whether Fujiki, the first husband, has the personality to file a petition to recognize the divorce decree obtained abroad.

R U L I N G

YES, Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason, he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which comprises the public record of his marriage.

DOREEN GRACE MEDINA vs. MICHIYUKI KOIKE
G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 733

FACTS: Doreen and Koike, a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City.

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Koike jointly filed for divorce in Japan, which was granted.

Subsequently, Doreen filed before the RTC a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven.

ISSUES

1) Whether a divorce decree jointly filed and obtained by the Filipino and Japanese can be recognized by RTC under paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.

2) Whether our courts can take judicial notice of a foreign judgment of divorce.

3) Whether the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the divorce decree is a question of fact.

RULINGS

1) YES, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.

2) NO, our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence.

Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.

3) YES, considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Koike, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.

The question of fact involved in the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further proceedings.

It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the courts.

GERBERT R. CORPUS vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 266

FACTS: Corpus was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He was married to Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. When he returned to the Philippines. he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. He went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

Desirous to marry another woman he now loved, he registered the divorce decree in the civil registry office and was informed that the foreign decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent court.

Corpus filed for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC where respondent Sto. Tomas failed to submit any response.

The RTC denied the petition on the basis that the petitioner Corpus lacked locus standi.

ISSUE

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction from the recognition of a foreign divorce.

RULING

The alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip the petitioner Corpus of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce.

Petitioner Corpus being a naturalized Canadian citizen now, is clothed by the presumptive evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce with conformity to alien’s national law.

Article 40

LUCIO MORIGO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004, 422 SCRA 376

FACTS: When Lucio and Lucia got married, they merely signed the marriage contract without the presence of solemnizing officer. Since Lucia has been working in Canada for many years, she was able to obtain a divorce decree in 1991 from Canadian Court. The following year, Lucio contracted a second marriage with Maria. On September 21, 1993, Lucio filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. In October 1993, he was charged with bigamy and was later on convicted by the lower court. The first marriage was nullified by the court after the celebration of the second marriage.

ISSUE: Whether judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is necessary before the spouse may validly contract a second marriage.

HELD: NO. In this case, it was found out that the first marriage is void ab initio in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with and such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void as initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.

The first element of bigamy requires that the accused must be legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the accused was never married. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. Accordingly, accused was not married to his wife at the time he contracted the second marriage with another woman.

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which accused might be held liable for bigamy unless he secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

What is contemplated by Article 40 of the Family Code as the void marriage that must be declared void before a party may contract a subsequent marriage is one that must exist although, it is void.

Article 41

EDUARDO MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. 165842, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 461

FACTS: Eduardo was married to Rubylus on July 28, 1975. Later, Rubylus was charged with estafa and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again.

In 1996, he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

When Tina discovered that Eduardo was previously married to Rubylus, she charged him of bigamy. During the trial, Eduardo alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married Tina, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time he married Tina, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.

ISSUE: Whether a judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary before the other spouse may legally re-marry.

HELD: YES. There must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse. Otherwise, the spouse who contracted the second marriage may be convicted of the crime of bigamy. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof that he acted in good faith and would negate criminal intention on his part when he married the complainant. According to Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to remarry. Parties should not be permitted to

judge for themselves such matter. The latter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution.

The requirement for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage precisely because he or she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible. It is also for the benefit of the State. Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON
G.R. No. 165545, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 376

FACTS: On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon, who was a member of SSS and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage. More than 15 years later, Bailon filed before the CFI a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The CFI granted the petition. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead, Bailon contracted marriage with respondent Teresita Jarque.

Upon Bailon’s death, respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits and was granted P12,000 by the SSS. Cecilia Bailon-Yap, who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona, contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice Diaz, the second with her mother Elisa Jayona and the third with respondent, all of whom are still

alive. In the meantime, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian of “Aliz P. Diaz,” filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death.

ISSUE: Who between Alice Diaz and the herein respondent is entitled to the death benefits?

HELD: Respondent is entitled to the death benefits. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.

Under Art. 83 of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid “until declared null and void by competent court.” If follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second marriage. In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice has been absent for 15 consecutive years when Bailon sought declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a requirement then for purposes of remarriage.

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, specifically Art. 42, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance even if made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of the presumption that the former spouse is dead, such

presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical reappearance and by fiction of law, he or she still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent rightfully the defendant spouse - beneficiary of Bailon.

Article 36 - PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

REPUBLIC vs. LAILA TANYAG - SAN JOSE et. al.
G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123

FACTS: Laila and Manolito were married on June 12, 1988 when Laila was 19 years old and Manolito was 20 years old.

For nine (9) years, the couple stayed with Manolito’s parents. Manolito was jobless, drug user and spent time with his friends drinking intoxicating substances and gambling while Laila was selling fish at the wet market.

On August 20, 1998, Laila left Manolito and transferred to her parents’ house.

On March 9, 1999, Laila filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

ISSUES

1) Who has the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage.

2) What is psychological incapacity?

3) Whether a person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be examined by a physician or psychologist.

RULINGS

1) Laila, as petitioner, had the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage.

2) The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bonds one is about to assume.

3) There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration. If it can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be credited.

MA. TERESA TANI – DELA FUENTE vs. RODOLFO DELA FUENTE, JR.
G.R. No. 188400, March 8, 2017, 819 SCRA 638

FACTS: While they were still sweethearts, Ma. Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy.

On June 21, 1984, Ma. Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City.

Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on their marital life. At first, Rodolfo only inflicted non-physical forms of mistreatment on Ma. Teresa by alienating her from her family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into physical violence when on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin and at Ma. Teresa.

On June 3, 1999, Ma. Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Rodolfo before the RTC of Quezon City.

On August 14, 2002, the trial court held that the marriage between Ma. Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was grave, serious and incurable.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that the findings of psychologist Dr. Lopez on Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity is a hearsay as it was based solely on information given by Ma. Teresa to Dr. Lopez.

ISSUE

Whether the non-examination of the defendant party invalidate the findings of the examining psychologist.

RULING

NO, the Court found sufficient compliance with Molina ruling to warrant the nullity of Ma. Teresa’s marriage with Rodolfo. Ma. Teresa was able to discharge the burden of proof that Rodolfo suffered from psychological incapacity.

In the case of Reyes vs. Reyes, it states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychologist since “marriage, by its very definition,” necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally witnessed mainly by the other.

Marcos vs. Carlos case emphasizes that Molina ruling does not require a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence presented establishes the party’s psychological condition.

Dr. Lopez’s testimony, as corroborated by Ma. Teresa, sufficiently proved that Rodolfo’s paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.

RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO vs. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 222541, February 15, 2017, 818 SCRA 83

FACTS: Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose’s tuition fees for his college education.

Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on December 28, 1989 and were blessed with a son named Wesley on December 1, 1993.

In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC alleging that Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that during their marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid his duties as husband and father; that he was hot tempered and violent; that he would represent himself as single and flirt openly; and would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart.

She also presented the testimony of Dr. Tayag who prepared the Pschological Report in which she primarily based on her interviews with Rachel and Wesley and stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD).

The RTC granted the petition, relying on the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag and declared that Jose’s APD interfered with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties.

On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE

Whether the totality of evidence in this case demonstrate the existence of psychological incapacity.

RULING

NO, based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exist insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.

In Santos vs. CA, the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. Additionally, an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability can be duly established.

In this case, Dr. Tayag’s assessment when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage.

Psychological incapacity must be more than a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of the marital obligations. It is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person which must be linked with the manifestation of the psychological incapacity. These were not proven in this case.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. CA & ISABEL SING BUENAVENTURA
G. R. No. 127449, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 261

FACTS: Petitioner Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The trial court decreed the marriage null and void ab initio. It likewise ordered petitioner to pay private respondent moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the award of moral and exemplary damages are proper.

2. Whether petitioner’s acts and omissions justify the award of

attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

HELD: 1. NO. Article 21 of the New Civil Code is one of the instances when moral damages may be recovered. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. However, the marriage was declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. The latter is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

2. NO. The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act of filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.

Art. 45 - VITIATED CONSENT - Ground for Annulment of Marriage

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 564

FACTS: Orlando married Lilia. The former filed a petition for annulment of their marriage stating that he was under threat and duress when he contracted the said marriage since Lilia was already pregnant. In her answer with compulsory counterclaim, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition contending that the petitioner married her voluntarily and he even wrote letters to her to check on the progress of her pregnancy.

ISSUE: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent.

HELD: NO. To begin with, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took a serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense in the criminal case for bigamy. Viewed in this perspective,

the instant appeal is, therefore, understandable. But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have fail. The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelmingly at that time, being a security guard, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense.

Orlando’s excuse that he could not have impregnated Lilia because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with Lilia. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with Lilia.

Article 120 - CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY

JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPOUSES MANUEL FERRER
G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006, 508 SCRA 570

FACTS: The late Alfredo Ferrer acquired a piece of land. Through a loan he introduced several improvements including a residential house and a 2-door apartment building. However, it was only during his marriage with petitioner Josefa that he was only able to pay the loan using the couple’s conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, Josefa claimed, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel Ferrer occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, he stopped paying rentals, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.

It is petitioner’s contention that when her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purportedly to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo’s lot and the improvement thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents. The RTC dismissed the same and ruled that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court reaffirmed the CA’s decision, herein petitioner filed another case claiming that, based on the RTC decision, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo’s lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo’s lot.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have the obligation to reimburse petitioner.

HELD: YES. Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, the said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.

PROPERTY RELATIONS - Consent of the Spouse in the disposal of their conjugal property

DAVID AND LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI E. PEREZ
G. R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 475

FACTS: David Pelayo, thru a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to Melki Perez, two parcels of agricultural lands. The sale was witnessed by David’s wife, Lorenza, who signed only on the third page in the space provided for witnesses of which Perez’ application for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale was null and void for lack of marital consent.

HELD: By affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, Lorenza is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale. A wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, as long it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval was indeed given.

In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental witness, evidence shows that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale. Under Article 173, in relation to Article 166 of the New Civil Code, the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable.

HOMEOWNER AND SAVINGS LOAN BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 283

FACTS: Miguela and Marcelino were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot from certain Sandra.

The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.

On December 1, 1993, Marcelino executed a SPA in favor of one Lilibeth, authorizing the latter to obtain loan from Homeowners Bank to be secured by the Spouses Marcelino & Miguela’s house and lot,

Pursuant to the SPA, Lilibeth obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000 from Homeowners Bank. As a security therefor, Lilibeth executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property. The above-mentioned transaction took place without the knowledge and consent of Miguela.

.

Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, Homeowners Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclose proceeding on the mortgaged property.

After the lapse of one year without the property being redeemed, Homeowners Bank consolidated the ownership by executing Affidavit of Consolidation and a Deed of Absolute Sale.

In the meantime, Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that Homeowner’s Bank had already employed a certain Roldan to clean its premises and that her car was razed because Roldan allowed a boy to play with fire in the premises

Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela instituted with the RTC a complaint for Nullity of Real Estate, Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and Deed of Sale and Reconveyance.

In its answer, Homeowners Bank prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property in question of the late Marcelino.

ISSUE

Whether the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is valid in so far as the husband’s share is concerned.

RULING

NO. The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. The absence of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.

The rules of co-ownership do not apply to the property relations of the husband and wife even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. VENANCIO C. REYES, JR.
G.R. No. 212483, October 5, 2016, 805 SCRA 327

FACTS: Venancio is married to Lilia since 1973. During their union, they acquired three (3) parcels of land in Malolos, Bulacan.

The said properties were mortgaged to Philippine National Bank (PNB) on August 25, 1994 to secure a loan..

According to PNB, the Reyes Spouses contracted and duly consented to the loan. When the Reyes Spouses failed to loan obligations, PNB foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.

Venancio assailed the validity of the mortgage, claiming that his wife undertook the loan and the mortgage without his consent and his signature was falsified on the promissory notes and the mortgage. Since the lots involved were conjugal properties, he argued that the mortgage constituted over them was void.

During trial, Flores, a NBI handwriting expert, testified and proved that Venancio’s signatures on the bank documents were falsified.

ISSUES

1) Whether the mortgage constituted over the properties is void.

2) Whether the conjugal partnership can be held liable for the loan contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. Reyes.

3) Whether Venancio is guilty of laches and whether his claim is barred by estoppel.

RULINGS

1) YES, real estate mortgage over a conjugal property is void if the non-contracting spouse did not give consent.

Article 124 of the Family Code is the applicable provision regarding the administration of their conjugal property. It provides that the written consent of the spouse who did not encumber the property is necessary before any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property can be valid.

Flores, a handwriting expert of the NBI, compared the signature on the loan documents with the standard signature of Venancio. He concluded that they were not written by the same person. The PNB loan division chief admitted that he merely relied on the documents presented to him, and he never actually saw Venancio sign the documents.

Hence, having established that Venancio’s signature was forged, Venancio proved that he did not consent to the real estate mortgage.

2) YES, while the mortgage is void, the principal obligation is not affected.

In Article 122 of the Family Code, the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership, except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.

It is settled how Article 122 should be applied: there are two scenarios considered: one is when the husband, or in this case, the wife, contracts a loan to be used for the family business and the other is when she acts as a surety or guarantor. If she is a mere surety or guarantor, evidence that the family benefited from the loan need to be presented before the conjugal partnership can be held liable. On the other hand, if the loan was taken out to be used for the family business, there is no need to prove actual benefit. The law presumes the family benefited from the loan and the conjugal partnership is held liable. Although PNB cannot foreclose the mortgage over the conjugal property in question, it can still recover the loan amount from the conjugal partnership.

Also, if the conjugal properties of the Reyes Spouses are not enough to answer for the loan, PNB can then recover the remaining unpaid balance from the separate properties of either Venancio or his wife, Lilia. This is based on the last paragraph of Article 121 of the Family Code which provides that if the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance from their separate properties.

3) NO, laches does not apply where the delay is within the period prescribed by law.

It is well settled that a delay within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered as one that would bar relief. Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period.

Records show that upon learning about the mortgage, Venancio immediately informed the bank about his forged signature. He filed the complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Sale and Real Estate Mortgage against PNB on September 22, 1998 which was still the prescribed period to redeem a mortgaged property.

JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS
G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494

FACTS: Josefina Castillo married Eduardo G. Francisco, who at that time was already married to Carmelita Carpio. On August 31, 1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon. On the basis of the said deed of sale, the Register of Deeds issued TCT Nos. 87976 and 87977 in the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.” On February 15, 1985, the Register of Deeds made of record Entry No. 85-18003 at the dorsal portion of the said titles. This referred to an Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property.

On June 11, 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading International, bought bags of cement from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him in the court. After the judgment in favor of MIWCC has become final, the court issued a writ of execution against the aforementioned parcels of land. In the

light of this, Josefina executed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her paraphernal properties and that her husband Eduardo had no propriety

right or interest over them as evidenced by his Affidavit of Waiver. She

alleged that she was the sole owner of the property levied on execution by Sheriff Alejo. Hence, the levy on execution of the property was null and void.

ISSUE: Whether the subject properties are conjugal properties of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco.

HELD: NO. Article 148 of the Family Code provides: “In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution

of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall, likewise, apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

Indeed, the Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article 148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. The petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in question. Since the subject property was acquired during the subsistence of marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article 148 of the Family Code also debilitates against the petitioner’s claim since, according to the said article, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that the parties prove their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. We agree with the findings of the appellate court that the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and, hence, is not a co-owner of the property.

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY

ELENITA M. DEWARA vs. SPOUSES RONNIE & GINA LAMELA
G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483

FACTS: Eduardo and Elenita were married before the enactment of the Family Code and thus the New Civil Code governed their marital relations. They were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, USA, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City. On January 20, 1985, while Eduardo was driving the private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit Ronnie. As a result, MTCC found Eduardo guilty of reckless imprudence and sentenced him to pay civil indemnities. The judgment became final and executory and the sheriff levied the real property registered to Elenita married to Eduardo. Elenita claimed that the said property was her paraphernal property or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal liability of her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita.

HELD: NO. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it can be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.

Moreover, the presumption of conjugal partnership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear,

categorical, and convincing evidence -- there must be strict proof of

the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

NULL    AND    VOID    OR    INEXISTENT    MARRIAGE

SALLY   GO - BANGAYAN   vs.   BENJAMIN    BANGAYAN,    JR.
G.R. No.   201061,   July   3,   2013,   700   SCRA   702

FACTS: Benjamin married Azucena and they had three (3) children. When Azucena left for USA, Benjamin had romantic relationship with Sally where they lived as husband and wife. In order to appease her father, Sally asked Benjamin to sign purported marriage contract without marriage license knowing well that of Benjamin’s marital status. Their cohabitation produced two (2) children and Benjamin acquired several properties.

As the relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended, Sally left for Canada bringing their two (2) children. She then filed a bigamy case against Benjamin using the simulated marriage contract as evidence. In retaliation, Benjamin filed an annulment of non-existent marriage against Sally.

ISSUES: (1) What is the nature of the marriage of Benjamin

and Sally?

(2) What is the property relations governing the marriage

Benjamin and Sally?

HELD: (1) The marriage of the parties is not bigamous because there was no marriage license, therefore, the crime of bigamy was not committed and the marriage was null and void ab initio and inexistent.

(2) Since Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage while the first marriage is still existing, their property relation is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code where only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. Since there is no proof of Sally’s contributions to their cohabitation, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

NO   MARRIAGE   -    APPROPRIATE   REMEDY

REPUBLIC    vs.    MERLINDA   L.    OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538,   February   10,   2014,   715   SCRA   605

FACTS: Merlinda requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years.

Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, on June 24, 2002 at the office of the MTCC Palace of Justice.

She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed before the RTC a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion.

The RTC granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of Melinda and Ye Son Sune.

The OSG, however, filed an appeal assailing the Decision on the ground that (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, in effect, nullifies the contract.

(2) Whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

RULINGS

(1) NO. Melinda indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak about, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence presented.

Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by canceling the entries in the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

(2) YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

The proceeding may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed whereas opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of Melinda. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such marriage.

JO-ANN DIAZ - SALGADO vs. LUIS G. ANSON
G.R. No. 204494. July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 541

FACTS: Luis alleged that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina, with whom he was married in a civil ceremony in 1966. During the marital union, they acquired several real properties, which Luis claimed pertained to the conjugal partnership.

Without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three (3) separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. Jo-Ann secured new certificates of title over the said property while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina.

Claiming that he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties, and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina, Luis filed a complaint to annul the deeds of sale.

On the other hand, Jo-Ann contends that she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis, only knowing theirs to be a common-law relationship which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement by virtue of which Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him.

Jo-Ann disputed the validity of Luis and Severina’s marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license. The marriage contract presented to court contained an equivocal declaration that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the time of marriage.

The RTC nonetheless ruled that the marriage is valid. It noted that the marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive to the fact of marriage.

The CA sustained the RTC ruling because Jo-Ann did not present any evidence to controvert the evidence presented by law.

ISSUES

1) Whether the presumption of regularity attached to public document stand in the presence of prima facie evidence of the non-existence of the marriage license.

2) Whether the partition agreement is valid.

RULINGS

1) NO, the presumption of regularity does not hold water vis-à-vis a prima facie (marriage license), which on its face has established that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.

Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage itself, with a false statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab ignitio.

2) YES, the provision on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina.

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is void from the very beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of law governing their properly relations.

Article 147 of the Family Code “applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a marriage license. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s effort consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.

It is stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that “partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value.

As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is precise that “partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by Judicial proceedings x x x,” The law does not impose a judicial approval for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the Partition Agreement.

PROPERTY   OWNED   IN   COMMON   TO   BE    DIVIDED    UNDER   THE   RULES    ON     CO-OWNERSHIP

MARIETTA   N.   BARRIDO   vs.   LEONARDO   V.   NONATO
G.R.   No. 176492,   October   20,   2014,    738   SCRA    510

FACTS: In the course of their marriage, Leonardo and Marrieta were able to acquire a parcel of land.

Eventually, their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property over the property, Leonardo asked Marietta for partition, but the latter refused.

ISSUE: Whether the action for partition is proper.

HELD: YES. Leonardo and Marrieta’s marriage had been declared void for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

During their marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, however, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations.

This particular kind of co-ownership under Article 147 applied when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.

Here, the former spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have obtained by their joint effort, work or industry and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares.

Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in common by Leonardo and Marietta, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

PATERNITY AND FILIATIONS

GERARDO CONCEPCION vs. CA & MA. TERESA ALMONTE
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 438

FACTS: Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa’s relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

ISSUE: Can a child born during a marriage subsequently annulled be declared as an illegitimate child on the basis of his mother’s statements?

HELD: NO. The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against his legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The import of Ma. Teresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresa’s husband, Mario, or in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 168 (1) (b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI “CORAZON” ANGELES MAGLAYA
G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 363

FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building.

Respondent Corazon claims that as the legitimate child of the deceased Francisco and Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the disqualification required of an administrator.

Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made administratrix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent Corazon could not be the daughter of Francisco, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further, she said that Corazon, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union.

Corazon offered as evidence a certification from Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She testified having been in open and continuous possession of a legitimate child.

ISSUE: Is a child presumed legitimate in the absence of any concrete proof of a lawful marriage between her parents?

HELD: NO. A legitimate child is a product of, and therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more empathic on the matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate,

VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 166

FACTS: Virgilio and Dita are spouses who once had a blissful married life and were blessed with a son.

However, their one sugar coated romance turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour. Thus, prompted him to file an adultery case against Dita and her paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged.

Thereafter, Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains against Virgilio. During the pre-trial, both parties entered into a Compromise Agreement for the liquidation of conjugal partnership of gains.

Subsequently, Virgilio filed a motion for the repudiation of the Agreement on the ground that the conviction of Dita of the crime of adultery disqualifies her from sharing in the conjugal property.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the partial voluntary separation of property by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.

(2) Whether the conviction of Dita of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property..

RULINGS

(1) YES. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed by law. This conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.

(2) Finally, the conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction. Article 43 of the RPC enumerates the accessory penalties of prision correccional and civil interdiction is not one of them and does not deprive the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.

GLORIA ZOLETA – SAN AGUSTIN vs. ERNESTO SALES
G.R. No. 189289, August 31, 2016, 801 SCRA 683

FACTS: On March 14, 1994, brothers Teodoro and Ernesto Sales filed an action for the judicial approval of their recognition as the illegitimate children of the late Louis Fernandez and his common-law wife Epitacia Sales who was a housekeeper in the Fernandez household. Louis and his legal wife Marie Louise did not have any child.

According to the Sales brothers, Louis formally recognized them as his children by Epitacia in two public documents bearing his thumb marks, viz: (1) a notarized document dated November 11, 1980 jointly executed by Louis and Epitacia formally recognizing the Sales brothers as their children and (2) a document solely executed by Louis on December 2, 1980, dominated as Acknowledgment of Children.

Petitioner Gloria raised her opposition and alleged that the Spouses Fernandez informally adopted her as their child when she was only 2 years old as she was treated as their own child by showing photographs. She insisted that the father of the Sales brothers is Corpus, the former houseboy of the Fernandez household.

Gloria asserted that the documents presented by the Sales brothers were spurious as Louis could still write, rendering incredible the mere affixing of his thumbprints to the contested documents.

Palad, a fingerprint examiner of the NBI, compared the thumbprint of Louis on the documents of recognition with the other documents containing his thumb marks. Thereafter, he concluded that all the thumbprints in the disputed documents belong to Louis.

ISSUE

Whether the documents submitted by the Sales brothers sufficiently established their recognition as illegitimate children of Louis Fernandez.

RULING

YES, the documents submitted by the Sales brothers sufficiently established their recognition as illegitimate children of Louis Fernandez.

The legitimate filiation of a child may be established, among others, by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. The same requirement applies in establishing the filiation of illegitimate children.

In the case at hand, although Louis’ thumb mark appears in the notarized document, a thumb mark has been repeatedly considered by the Court as a valid mode of signature.

The Court, in the case of Yason vs. Arciaga, held that a signature may be made by a person’s cross or mark.

Moreover, a notarized document is a public document and as such, it enjoys the presumption of regularity, which can be only be overthrown by clear and convincing evidence. It serves as a prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due execution.

The bare allegations of Gloria cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence to overturn such presumption.

ROMEO F. ARA et. al. vs. DRA FELY S. PIZARRO et. al.
G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017, 817 SCRA 518

FACTS: Romeo, William, Dr. Pizarro and Henry all claimed to be children of the late Josefa who died on November 18, 2002.

The late Josefa left properties in Dr. Pizarro’s possession and so Romeo, William and Henry filed for judicial partition of the properties before the RTC.

Dr. Pizarro averred that she was the only legitimate and only child of Josefa. She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings.

Petitioners Ramon and William argued that during Josefa’s lifetime, she acknowledged all of them as her children directly, continuously, spontaneously and without concealment and that in the absence of any record of birth in the civil register, filiation may be established on admission of filiation in a public or handwritten document.

ISSUE

Whether filiation be proved through open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children after the death of the putative parent.

RULING

NO, it is clear that any action seeking to prove filiation sought under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

To establish filiation as illegitimate children after the death of a putative parent, the only evidence allowed is a record of birth appearing in the civil register, or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation made in a public document or a privately signed handwritten instrument by Josefa.

After Josefa’s death in 2002, petitioners could no longer be allowed to introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. Petitioners also did not present the kind of evidence contemplated under Article 172 of the Family Code. They did not present evidence of an admission of filiation as a public document or a privately handwritten instrument signed by the putative parent.

PARENTAL CONSENT

JOCELYN GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO GUALBERTO
G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 450

FACTS: During the pendency of an action for declaration of nullity of marriage of the spouses, the husband, Crisanto Gualberto, moved that the custody of their child below age of seven be transferred to him. He alleged that his wife was a lesbian. The trial court awarded custody to the mother, but was reversed by the appellate court.

ISSUE: Whether lesbianism per se is a sufficient ground to remove custody of the child below seven years old from the mother.

HELD: NO. It is not enough that the woman is a lesbian. He must also demonstrate the she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development.

Sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental care.

Article 213 of the Family Code takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code which prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless a separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.

CONSENT   TO    ADOPTION

DIWATA   RAMOS   LANDINGIN vs.   REPUBLIC
G.R. No.   164948, June 27,   2006,   493   SCRA   415

FACTS: Diwata, a US citizen, filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel, the former’s brother and Amelia.

In her petition, she alleged that when her brother died, the children were left to the care of their paternal grandmother as their biological mother Amelia went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicate with them from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption proceedings.

After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by Diwata and her children abroad who gave their written consent for their adoption.

ISSUE

Whether minors be adopted without the written consent of their biological mother.

RULING

NO. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.

FAMILY HOME
Article 153

JOSE HONRADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 166333, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 280

FACTS: The Family Home of the petitioner therein was levied upon to answer for his judgment debt, and the sale of the said property was set. Petitioner was served with a copy of the notice of sale which he opposed. Petitioner, however, allowed the sale at the public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent therein. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the Court until one year from the date of the auction sale when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution. But even in the said motion, petitioner failed did not present evidence that the property was a family home.

ISSUE: Whether or not a family home may not be exempt for execution.

HELD: YES. While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

PERLA G. PATRICIO vs. MARCELINO G. DARIO III
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006, 507 SCRA 438

FACTS: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Perla and their two (2) sons: Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III. Among the properties left by the late Marcelino was a residential house covering an area of 755 square meters.

On August 10, 1987, Perla, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino. Accordingly, a new title was issued in the names of Perla, Marcelino Marc and Marcelino III.

After ten (10) years on August 10, 1997, Perla and Marcelino Marc formally advised Marcelino V to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Marcelino III refused the partition of the subject property on the ground that it that the subject property is being used as the Family Home by his son Marcelino III that should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary residing in the premises. The minor beneficiary is the son of Marcelino III, who is the grandson of Spouses Marcelino and Perla.

ISSUE

Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.

HELD

NO. The family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10 years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall be preserved only until the minor beneficiary reaches the age of majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor beneficiary until reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three (3) requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

ALBINO JOSEF vs. OTELIO SANTOS
G.R. No. 165060, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 57

FACTS: Albino was held liable by the trial court to pay to Otelio the sum of P400,000 representing the shoe materials he bought on credit. Otelio moved for the issuance of writ of execution and to satisfy the judgment award, Albino’s house and lot was attached, auctioned and awarded to Otelio as the highest bidder. Albino protested and claimed that he had no other property to answer for the judgment credit and the house and lot in which he was residing was his family home thus exempt from execution.

ISSUE: Whether the judgment or judicial order is legal for the attachment and sale on public auction of the family home to satisfy the judgment award.

HELD: NO. The judgment or judicial order to attach and sell on public auction of the family home to satisfy the judgment award is null and void and it may be said to be a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head.

The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases under Article 155 of the Family Code.

SIMEON CABANG vs. MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY
G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 172

FACTS: Simeon had established his family home over the property of registered owner Felix Odong and he had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to present. Mr. & Mrs. Guillermo Basay bought the subject property from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that Simeon was actually occupying the lot, they filed a complaint for recovery of property.

ISSUE: Whether the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home.

HELD: NO. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. It is likewise a given fact that the family home must be constructed on property owned by the persons constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged family home stands is owned by the Odongs, their continued stay on the subject land is by mere tolerance of the late Felix Odong.

SUPPORT     PENDENTE     LITE

MA.   BELEN   B. MANGONON   vs.   COURT   OF   APPEALS
G.R.   No.   125041,   June   30,   2006,   494   SCRA   1

FACTS; Belen and Federico were married. But the same was later annulled because it was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code. Seven (7) months after said annulment, petitioner gave birth to twin daughters which she later raised in the U.S. with the help of her second husband. A petition for declaration of legitimacy and support, with application for support pendente lite was filed by petitioner against Federico since they were no longer capable of paying the college education of the twins.

Because the parents are no longer capable of providing support, petitioner alleges that the twins’ grandfather should be ordered to provide the support. On the other hand, respondent Francisco avers that the order of liability for support under Art. 199 is not concurrent such that the obligation must be borne by those related to the recipient and in this case petitioner and her second husband. He also alleges that even if he is responsible for said support, he could not be made to answer beyond what petitioner and the father could afford.

ISSUE: Whether the obligation to give support devolves on the grandfather in default of the financial capacity of twin daughters’ parents.

HELD; YES. Respondent Francisco is liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by twin daughters as support pendente lite. The petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins’ entitlement to support pendente lite thus the next question is who should be made liable for said award.

Anent respondents Francisco and Federico’s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support the twins. Art. 204 provides that “the person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.” Under the said provision, Francisco could not avail for himself of the second option.

Articles   175   &   176   -   PROOF    OF    FILIATION

JENIE   SAN   JUAN   DELA   CRUZ vs. RONALD PAUL GARCIA
G.R.   No.   177728,   July   31,   2009,   594   SCRA   648

FACTS: Jenie and Dominique were living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage and resided with Dominique’s parents. Thereafter, Dominique died. After almost two month, Jenie gave birth to Christian. Jenie applied for the registration of the child’s birth using the surname of Dominique in support of which she submitted affidavit to use the surname of the father and affidavit of acknowledgement executed by Dominique’s father. Attached to the affidavit is a document entitled “Autobiography” which was handwritten by Dominique. The Civil Registrar denied Jenie’s application because the child was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge the paternity of the child.

ISSUE: Whether the unsigned handwritten statement by the deceased father can be considered as recognition of paternity.

HELD: YES. A father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature. It is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. However, special circumstances exist to hold that the unsigned Autobiography of Dominique substantially satisfies the requirement of law. First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by Dominique. Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child give life to his statements in his Autobiography.

3.   PROPERTY

FEL   ENERGY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF   BATANGAS
G.R.   No.   168557,   February   16,   2007,   516   SCRA   186

ISSUE:     Whether      power      barges     are      considered     personal      properties.

HELD: NO. Power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work.

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL vs. HON. ZEUS ABROGAR
G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009, 576 SCRA 108

FACTS: Luis was charged of the crime of theft by stealing and using the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or airwave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined. Luis claimed that international long distance calls and the business of the providing telecommunications or telephone services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether the business of providing telecommunications and the telephone services are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: YES. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it can be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of “asportation” which is defined as “carrying away.” Jurisprudence is settled that to “take” under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.

Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature. Luis was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined.

4. CO-OWNERSHIP

Article 487
RESUENA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
454 SCRA 42, G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005

* * * It was held that anyone of the co-owners may sue for ejectment.

- - this is an unqualified and categorical authority of anyone of the co-owners to evict possessors or lessees.

When the action is brought by one of them for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit the co-owners, but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.

ARNELITO ADLAWAN vs. EMETERIO ADLAWAN
479 SCRA 275, G. R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006

FACTS: Arnelito Adlawan was acknowledged illegitimate son of Dominador Adlawan who died without an issue and survived by his wife Graciana. Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, petitioner executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the house

built thereon. Arnelito filed an unlawful detainer suit to eject respondents from the property in his own name and as the sole owner of the property.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.

HELD: NO. The late Dominador Adlawan was survived not only by petitioner but also by the legal wife of the decedent, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.

- - - By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226 under Article 998 of the New Civil Code.

- - - the death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations.

- - - Article 487 provides that “any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.”

- - - this article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession: forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).

A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit if presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners.

- - - Where the suit for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed. (Baloloy vs. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, G. R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004).

- - - It is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property.

- - - It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his late father Dominador.

PUBLIC DOMINION

DOMALSIN vs. SPOUSES VALENCIANO
G.R. No. 158687, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 114

Q: What is the property of public dominion?

A: Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:

(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the state, banks, shores, roadsteads and other of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Q: Who owns property of public dominion?

A: Properties of public dominion are owned by the general public. Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but open to the indefinite public.” As the land in controversy is a portion of Kennon Road which is for the use of the people, there can be no dispute that same is part of public domain. This being the case, the parties cannot appropriate the land for themselves. Thus, they cannot claim any right of possession over it.

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

HEIRS OF ZOSIMO MARAVILLA vs. PRIVALDO TUPAS
G.R. No. 192132, September 14, 2016, 803 SCRA 1

FACTS: Privaldo, along with the other heirs of the late Asisclo, has maintained their occupation and possession of the subject property located in Boracay island.

The heirs of the late Zosimo claimed ownership over 10,000 square meters of said property by a virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 8, 1975 betweem Zosimo and Asiclo.

The heirs of Zosimo filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession and the RTC ruled in their favor.

While the motion for execution was pending, the Supreme Court declared Boracay island as government property.

The CA ordered the decision of the RTC granting the motion for execution as null and void and ruled that the Boracay Decision was a supervening event and the RTC erred in not declaring null and void the sale of unregistered land considering that Boracay island has been classified as an inalienable land.

The heirs of Zosimo argued that the Boracay Decision is not a supervening event and the settled dispute between the parties as to who has the better right to the property is distinct and separate from the issue of titling sought in the Boracay decision.

ISSUE

Whether private individual may acquire vested right of ownership over the Boracay island, considering that they have been in open and continuous possession for several years.

RULING

NO. In the present case, the basis of Zosimo’s claim over the subject property is the Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land.

This Deed of Sale has been acknowledged and adjudged by the RTC to be binding between the parties and in fact, has attained finality.

The SC in the Boracay Decision ruled that the entire island of Boracay as state owned except for lands already covered by existing titles.

Therefore, the Boracay island, being owned by the State, can only be declared or made subject of private ownership by the government.

Only the government can determine the manner in which the Boracay island should be disposed of or conveyed to private individuals, pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine which dictates that all lands not clearly within private ownership shall be presumed to be part of the public domain belonging to the State.

Thus, all lands that have not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, remain part of the inalienable public domain.

In this case, at the time of the sale of the subject property, the late Asisclo had no right to sell a property that has not been declared alienable by the State. One cannot dispose of a thing he does not own.

Therefore, the “Sale of Unregistered Land” is void ab initio for having an object outside the commerce of men.

5. S U C C E S S I O N

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF DELGADO & RUSTIA vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN
G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 334

FACTS: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without descendants. Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and respondents are their respective relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate.

The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia were never married. According to petitioners, sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed marriage to Josefa. They eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners pointed out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as “Señorita” or unmarried.

Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa’s estate. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Ocampo which was admitted one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.

The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation between legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.

ISSUE

1) Are grandnephews and grandnieces entitled to inherit by the right of representation in the collateral line?

2) Whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and between Felisa and Ramon.

RULINGS

1) NO. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces), Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and nieces, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.

2) YES. In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred them as spouses.

FELIX AZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 119

FACTS: Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo.

However, this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the deceased.

According to her, the will was forged and imbued with several defects.

Particularly, the issue relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public Petronilo Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotaryo ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.

ISSUE

Whether the will is fatally defective.

RULING

YES. The notarial will is fatally defective.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. The attestation clause is “a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will” required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear the signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.

And perhaps most importantly, a will, which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her; the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching by judicial rejection. There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of notarial will.

CELESTINO BALUS vs. SATURNINO BALUS
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 178

FACTS: Rufo, the father of Celestino and Saturnino, mortgaged a parcel of land he owns as a security for a loan with the Rural Bank. For his failure to pay his loan, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder. The property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law and a new title was issued in the name of the bank.

Later, Celestino and Saturnino executed an Extrajudicial Settlement where they intended to redeem the property mortgaged by their father with the Bank.

Saturnino bought the subject property from the bank and thereafter, he filed a complaint for recovery of possession against Celestino.

ISSUE: Whether there ever a co-ownership between Celestino and Saturnino over the subject property at any given point of time.

HELD: NONE. At the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father. The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. Since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate.

RAFAEL C. UY vs. ESTATE OF VIPA FERNANDEZ LAHAYLAHAY
G.R. No. 200612, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 382

FACTS: Vipa is the registered owner of land situated in Jaro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her husband, Levi, have two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances.

A contract of lease was executed in 1990 between Vipa and Rafael over the subject property and the improvement thereon.

On March 5, 1994, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever. Grace Joy became the de facto administrator of the Estate of Vipa.

In June 1998, Rafael stopped paying the monthly rentals. Consequently, on June 12, 2003, the Estate of Vipa, through Grace Joy, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC against Rafael. At the time of filing of the complaint, Rafael’s unpaid rents amounted to P271,150.00.

In his answer, Rafael denied that he refused to pay the rent for the lease of the subject property. He claimed that Patria, Vipa’s sister, demanded for the payment of the rents, claiming that she is the rightful heir of Vipa.

Since Rafael had no idea who is entitled to receive the rent for the subject property, he deposited the amount of P10,000 with the Office of the Clerk of Court on November 20, 1998 and that Grace Joy was informed of such consignation.

The MTCC rendered a Decision in favor of the Estate of Vipa.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC’s decision and dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer.

The RTC held that the MTCC erred in including the entire subject property as part of the Estate of Vipa. The RTC explained that the subject property was acquired by Vipa during the subsistence of her marriage with Levi, and as such, is part of their conjugal properties.

Accordingly, the RTC ruled that Rafael, as co-owner of the subject property, having bought Levi’s one - half share thereof, had the right to possess the same.

However, the CA reversed RTC’s decision on the ground that the issue of ownership of the subject property was raised for the first time on his appeal with the RTC.

ISSUES

1) Whether Rafael is barred from raising the claim that he owns Levi’s one-half undivided share in the subject property for the first time on appeal to RTC.

2) Whether Rafael becomes a co-owner and has the right to possess the subject property as an incident of ownership.

3) Whether Rafael could still be directed to vacate property and be not obliged to pay the unpaid rents.

RULINGS

1) NO. It is true that fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal issues that they could have raised but never did during trial.

However, before a party may be barred from raising an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that the issue could have been raised during trial.

What escaped the CA’s attention is that the sale of the one-half undivided share in the subject property to Rafael was consummated only on December 29, 2005, more than two years after Rafael filed with the MTCC his answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer on July 18, 2003.

Obviously, Rafael could not have raised his acquisition of Levi’s share in the subject property as an affirmative defense in the answer he filed with the MTCC.

Thus, the CA should have exerted efforts to resolve the said issue instead of dismissing the same on the flimsy ground that it was not raised during the proceeding before the MTCC.

2) YES. The sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property to Rafael effectively transferred his right as a co-owner thereof thus making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property.

Upon Vipa’s death, one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa’s share, was transmitted to Vipa’s heirs - Grace J oy and Jill Frances.

Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, a co-owner could sell his undivided share, hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.

Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half share in the subject property was not necessarily void, for the right as a co-owner thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of the subject property.

3) NO. Rafael could no longer be directed to vacate the property since he became a co-owner of the subject property on December 29, 2005 - the time when Levi sold his one-half undivided share over the subject property to Rafael.

Otherwise stated, prior to his acquisition of Levi’s one-half undivided share, Rafael was a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus obliged to pay the rents for his possession thereof.

RESERVA    TRONCAL

MARIA    MENDOZA   vs.   JULIA   P.   DELOS   SANTOS
G.R.   No.   176422,   March   20,   2013,    694   SCRA    74

FACTS: Placido and Dominga had four (4) children: Antonio, Exequiel married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Three (3) parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan were registered in the name of Exequiel married to Leonor in which Exequiel was in possession of the properties. After Exequiel’s death, the properties passed to his spouse Leonor and only daughter Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue and these properties were adjudicated to Julia, Leonor’s sister, as the sole surviving heirs of Leonor and Gregoria.

On the other hand, the heirs of Antonio: Apolonio and Valentin claimed that these properties should be reserved by Julia in their behalf and must now revert back to them applying Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal.

ISSUES: (1) Who are the person involved in reserve troncal?

(2) Whether Julia, sister of Leonor and aunt of Gregoria,

qualifies as reservoir or reservista.

(3) Whether the heirs of Antonio, namely: Apolonio and Valentin
as reservees or reservatarios.

HELD: (1) As contemplated in Article 891 of the New Civil Code, the following persons are involved in reserva troncal:

a) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;

b) the descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the property;

c) the reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and

d) the reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the prepositus and who belongs to the line from which the property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.

The ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from Exequiel as he was the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute as the descendant who received the properties by gratuitous title.

(2) YES. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,

her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative within the third degree and not her ascendant.

(3) NO. They cannot be considered reservee/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. They are first cousins of the propositus who are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees/reservatarios.

COLLATION   -   Article   1061

CORAZON   M.   GREGORIO   vs.   ATTY.    JOSE    R.   MADARANG
G.R.   No.   185226,   February   11,    2010,   612   SCRA   340

FACTS: During the lifetime of Casimiro, he transferred one lot by way of Deed of Donation to his son, Vicente. Upon the death of Casimiro, an inventory report of the properties of the decedent was made before the probate court excluding the donated lot to Vicente.

ISSUE: Whether the donated lot be excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.

HELD: NO. Article 1061 of the New Civil Code expressly provides that “every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition.

By express provision of law then, the lot which was donated by the decedent to his son, Vicente, should be included in the inventory of the properties of the decedent.

AMELIA P. ARELLANO vs. FRANCISCO PASCUAL
G.R. No. 189776, December 15, 2010, 638 SCRA 826

FACTS: Angel died intestate and single leaving as heirs his three (3) siblings: Amelia, Francisco and Miguel.

During the settlement of estate of the decedent, Francisco & Miguel claimed that the parcel of land donated by Angel during his lifetime to Amelia is subject to collation and considered the same as advance legitime.

ISSUES: (1) Whether the collateral relatives of the

decedent are entitled to legitime.

(2) Whether the property donated by Angel to Amelia should be formed part of his estate at the time of his death.

(3) Whether the property donated is subject to collation.

(4) Whether the estate of Angel be partitioned equally among the three (3) siblings as his legal or intestate heirs.

HELD: (1) NO. The decedent was survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and therefore, are not entitled to any legitime which the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.

(2) NO. The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties to anyone, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to his sister Amelia is valid as is deemed as donation to a “stranger.”

(3) NO. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs and one of its purposes is to determine the legitime and the free portion. There being no compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject to collation.

(4) YES. The decedent’s remaining estate should be partitioned equally among his heirs-siblings-collateral relatives pursuant to Articles 1003 and 1004 of the New Civil Code which provides that “the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased . . . and

should the only survivors be brother and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.

NULLITY   OF    MARRIAGE   AND   INTESTATE   SUCCESSION

JUAN    DE    DIOS    CARLOS    vs.    FELICIDAD    SANDOVAL
G.R.   No.   179922,   December   16,   2008,   574   SCRA   116

FACTS: Teofilo died intestate and was survived by his compulsory heirs, wife Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. He was predeceased by his parents and he had no other siblings except Juan. Upon Teofilo’s death, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of his inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. Later, Juan filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license; declaration of nullity of the status of a child as the latter was

neither natural or adopted son of his late brother; and recovery and reconveyance of the property. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Juan based on summary judgment, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment.

ISSUES

1) Whether or not the summary judgment is applicable in an action for annulment of marriage.

2) Whether or not the brother has the legal personality to file the declaration of nullity of marriage.

HELD: 1) NO. Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgment have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and annulment of marriage.

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence and to make sure the evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.

2) Generally, NO, because the rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, however, the compulsory heir in order to protect his successional right has the right to question the validity of the marriage of the spouses in the settlement of estate proceedings filed in regular court.

The legal personality of Juan to bring the nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not legitimate, adopted or illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then Juan has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be protected. The presence of descendant, illegitimate or even an adopted child excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.

LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS
G.R. No. 224144, June 28, 2017, 828 SCRA 482

FACTS: Andres and Pedro Bas acquired Lot 2535 with an area of 6,120 square meters on May 12, 1937.

On November 28, 1939, Pedro Bas sold to Faustina his portion of Lot 2535 as evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale.

After the death of Faustina and her husband, their heirs executed a notarized Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Sale where Lot 2535 was conveyed to one of their heirs, Alejandra.

Alejandra sold the land to Edith Deen, who in turn sold it to Atty. Eddie Deen.

Upon the death of Atty. Deen, an Extra-judicial Settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale was executed and they sold the land to Norberto Bas, who took possession of and built a house on it.

On December 15, 1995, Norberto Bas died without a will and succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca (Lolita).

In October 1996, Josefina Bas Espinosa (Josefina), representative of Heirs of Pedro Bas, filed a complaint for Clarification of Ownership of Lot 2535 against Lolita before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, but it was not resolved.

Lolita sought to register her portion in Lot 2535 but was denied by the Register of Deeds citing the need for a court order. She learned that the TCT in favor of Andres and Pedro Bas on Lot 2535 has been cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the Heirs of Pedro Bas.

On December 16, 1997, Lolita filed a complaint before the RTC for the cancellation of titles thereon.

In their answer, the Heirs of Pedro Bas claimed that “the sale between Pedro Bas and Faustina in 1939 was fake, spurious and invalid because Pedro who was an illiterate never learned how to write his name so that the signature thereon could not have been made by Pedro.

Lolita’s claim is anchored on a sale of the property to his predecessor-in-interest and not any filiation with the original owner Pedro Bas.

ISSUES

1) Whether the dispute in this case is the heirship of Lolita to Norberto or the validity of sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina that culminates to Norberto.

2) Whether Lolita should be declared first as the sole heir for a separate proceeding in a proper special proceeding to resolve her action for cancellation of titles of the property.

RULINGS

1) The dispute in this case is not about the heirship of Lolita to Norberto but the validity of the sale of the property in 1939 from Pedro to Faustina, from which followed a series of transfer transactions that culminated in the sale of the property to Norberto.

For with Pedro’s sale of the property in 1939, it follows that there would be no more ownership or right to property that would have been transmitted to his heirs.

Lolita’s claim is anchored on a sale of the property to her predecessor-in-interest and not on any filiation with the original owner. What Lolita is pursuing is Norberto’s right of ownership over the property which was passed to Lolita upon the latter’s death.

2) NO, the Court finds no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order to resolve Lolita’s action for cancellation of titles of the property.

In Bordalla vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has stated that no judicial declaration of heirship is necessary in order that as heir may assert his or her rights to the property of the deceased.

In this case, there is no necessity for a separate special proceeding and to require it would be superfluous considering that Lolita had already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to Norberto which the heirs of Pedro never disputed. Moreover, to dismiss the case and require Lolita to institute a special proceeding to determine her status as heir of the late Norberto would hamper, instead of serve, justice.

6. CONFLICT OF LAWS

Article 15 - Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of person are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.

0

Article 16 - Real properties as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Article 17 - The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

Article 1039 - Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Domiciliary Theory posits that the personal status and rights of a person are governed by the law of his domicile or the place of his habitual residence.

Nationality Theory postulates that it is the law of the person’s nationality that governs such status and rights.

OBLIGATION   OF    A   FOREIGN   NATIONAL   TO   SUPPORT   MINOR CHILD

NORMA   DEL SOCORRO   vs.   ERST   JOHAN BRINKMAN JAN WILSEM
G.R.   No.   193707,    December   10,   2014,     744    SCRA    516

FACTS: Norma and Brinkman contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990 and thereafter were blessed with a son, Roderigo.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.

Brinkman made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the amount of 250 Guildene which is equivalent to Php17,500.00. However, since the arrival of Norma and her son in the Philippines, Brinkman never gave his promised support.

Not long thereafter, Brinkman came to the Philippines and remarried. Norma sent a letter demanding for support, however, Brinkman refused to receive the letter.

Norma filed a complaint against Brinkman for violation of RA 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child.

According to Brinkman, under to the laws of Netherlands, he is not obliged to support his son, however, he never proved it in court.

ISSUE: Whether a foreign national is obliged to support his minor child under Philippine law.

HELD: YES. Under private international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law.

In the present case, Brinkman hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.

While Brinkman pleaded the laws of Netherlands that parents are not obliged to support their child after the issuance of a divorce decree, he failed to prove the same.

In view of Brinkman’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.

Under the doctrine of processual presumption, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine Law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

DIVORCE   OBTAINED   ABROAD   OF    FOREIGN    NATIONAL

MA.   REBECCA    MAKAPUGAY    BAYOT   vs.    COURT   OF    APPEALS
G.R.   No.   163979,   November   7,    2008,   570   SCRA    472

FACTS: Rebecca was born in Guam, U.S.A. to parents both of American citizenship, married Vicente in the Philippines. They begot a daughter in 1982. In 1996, Rebecca initiated a divorce proceeding before the Dominican Republic court which it granted ordering the dissolution of the couple’s marriage and “leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements,”

ISSUE: Whether the divorce granted by the foreign court binds Rebecca and Vicente.

HELD: YES. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente was an American citizen. The divorce granted by the foreign court during which Rebecca is an American citizen is valid and binds her and her Filipino husband.

In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country’s policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.

EDGAR SAN LUIS vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 294

FACTS: During his lifetime, Felicisimo San Luis contracted 3 marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit out of which were born six children. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American citizen with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee filed a Complaint for Divorce before the court in the State of Hawaii, U.S.A., which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody.

Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad then surnamed Sagalongos in the U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed

a petition for letters of administration. Petitioner Rodolfo, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground, inter alia, asserting that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code (FC) cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the FC.

ISSUE: Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry in the Philippines considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized before the FC took effect.

HELD: YES. Firstly, in the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), the SC held that after a valid divorce had been obtained by the foreign husband, the Filipino wife should no longer be considered married to alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations.

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of disassociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”

FELICITAS AMOR – CATALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607

FACTS: Felicitas married Orlando. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced.

Two months after the divorce, Orlando married respondent Merope. Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy.

HELD: YES. Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matirmonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et toro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and the leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. If this is done, the SC remanded the case to the trial court for its proper disposition for the determination of whether a divorce decree was indeed obtained in accordance with American law and will thus, NOT restrict marriage.

7. OBLIGATIONS

Civil Obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do and not to do. It gives the creditor the legal right to compel by an action in court the performance of such obligation.

A natural obligation is based on equity and natural law. There is no legal right to compel performance thereof but if the debtor voluntarily pays it, he cannot recover what was paid.

Article 1182 - When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with the provisions of this Code.

Article 1197 - If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.

The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor.

In every case, the courts shall determine such period as may be under the circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the courts, the period cannot be changed by them.

CONCHITA SONLEY vs. ANCHOR SAVINGS BANK
G.R. No. 205623, August 10, 2016, 800 SCRA 108

FACTS: Conchita agreed to purchase a parcel of land from Anchor Savings Bank. She, however, defaulted in paying her monthly obligations which prompted Anchor to rescind the Contract to Sell.

In filing the complaint, Conchita averred that the rescission of the contract to sell was null and void because she had already substantially paid her obligations to the bank. Anchor contended that the post-dated checks issued by Conchita in its favor covering her monthly obligation were all dishonored.

During the pre-trial, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement. On the basis thereof, the trial court rendered a Judgment whereby Conchita agreed to repurchase the subject property from Anchor.

However, Conchita failed to comply with her obligations. Thus, Anchor prayed that a writ of execution be issued in its favor ordering, among others, that the Contract to Sell entered into between the parties rescinded. This was granted by the trial court.

Conchita now argues that Anchor is not entitled to execution as the Compromise Agreement does not specifically provide that in case of default, a writ of execution may issue; that the remedies available to Anchor are to charge penalties and/or rescind the agreement as provided for under the Contract to Sell; and that before a writ of execution may issue, Anchor must first institute an action for rescission and secure a judicial declaration that the Contract to Sell is rescinded, which were not done in this case.

ISSUE

Whether an action for rescission required for a party aggrieved by the breach of compromise agreement to be able to enforce the compromise or insists on his original demand.

RULING

NO, an action for rescission is not required.

Under Article 2041 of the Civil Code, “if one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

The language of this Article 2041 denotes that no action for rescission is required, and that the party aggrieved by the breach of a compromise agreement may, if he chooses, bring the suit contemplated or involved in his original demand as if there had never been any compromise agreement, without bringing an action for rescission thereof. He need not seek, a judicial declaration of rescission, for he may ‘regard’ the compromise agreement already ‘rescinded.’

Conchita may be right in arguing that Anchor has the option to proceed with the sale and charge corresponding penalties instead, pursuant to the stipulations in the Contract to Sell.

However, Anchor chose to rescind the same, an option to which it is equally entitled to by contract and under the law, and thus evict Conchita from the premises.

8. DOUBLE SALES

Article 1544 - If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith who in good faith was first in the possession; in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA vs. MANILA MISSION
G.R. No. 130223, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 415

FACTS: Spouses Soliven sold the subject property to Manila Mission. However, it was only on 28 April 1994 when title was transferred in the name of Manila Mission. In the meantime, on 15 April 1993, Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara filed an action for sum of money before the RTC against Spouses Soliven. The RTC issued a writ of attachment on 21 May 1993 attaching the subject property which was still then in the name of Spouses Soliven.

ISSUE: Which is superior, a previous but unregistered sale or a subsequent but duly annotated attachment?

HELD: The settled rule is that levy on attachment, but duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the property involved was duly covered by the Torrrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative which gives validity to the transferor creates a lien upon the land.

SPOUSES SABITSANA vs. JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI
G.R. No. 181359, August 5, 2013, 703 SCRA 145

FACTS: On September 2, 1981, Alberto executed an unnotarized deed of sale in favor of Juanito over a parcel of unregistered land.

On October 17, 1991, Alberto sold the lot to Juanito’s family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana, through a notarized deed of sale of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and correspondingly paid real property taxes and introduced concrete improvements.

In 1998, Juanito applied for registration of the lot under the Public Land Act with the DENR, however, Atty. Sabitsana opposed the application claiming that he was the true owner of the lot.

On April 11, 2000, Juanito filed an action for quieting of title against Atty. Sabitsana claiming that the latter bought the lot in bad faith and was exercising acts of possession and ownership over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.

ISSUES: 1) Whether Article 1544 on double sales applies in this case.

2) Whether Juanito has a better right with unnotarized deed of

sale over the subsequent notarized deed of sale of Atty.

Sabitsana.

3) Whether the sale is valid in the absence of marital consent.

4) Whether Juanito is entitled for the award of attorney’s fees

and litigation expenses.

HELD: 1) NO. The provision of Article 1544 of the Civil Code does not apply to sales involving unregistered land.

The issue of the buyer’s good or bad faith is relevant only where the subject of the sale is registered land, and the purchaser is buying the same from the registered owner whose title to the land is clean.

The purchaser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser in good faith for value.

2) YES. The sale to Juanito was executed on Septemer 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to Atty. Sabitsana was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991 or ten (10) years thereafter.

Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to Atty. Sabitsana is null and void because when it was made, the seller Alberto was no longer the owner of the lot.

The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and Alberto remains valid nevertheless. Notarization or the requirement of a public document under the Civil Code is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability.

3) YES. Even admittedly the lot was a conjugal property, the absence of the wife’s signature and consent to the deed did not render the sale to Juanito absolutely null and void, but merely voidable.

Since Alberto and his wife were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 173 of the Civil Code should apply. Under the said provision, the disposition of conjugal property without the wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable. In the absence of a decree annulling the deed of sale in favor of Juanito, the same remains valid.

4) YES. Atty. Sabitsana’s actual and prior knowledge of the first sale to Juanito makes him purchaser in bad faith.

Moreover, as Juanito’s family lawyer, Atty. Sabitsana was under obligation to safeguard his client’s property and not jeopardize it. Such is his duty as an attorney, and pursuant to his general agency.

9. MACEDA LAW (RA 6552)

(Buyer’s Protection on Sales of immovable property on installments)

Most important features:

(1) After having paid installments for at least two years, the buyer is entitled to a mandatory grace period of one month for every year of installment payments made, to pay the unpaid installments without interest.

If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five years of installments, an additional five percent (5%) every year but not to exceed ninety percent (90%) total payments made.

(2) In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the seller shall give the buyer period of not less than 60 days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act.

MOLDEX REALTY, INC. vs. FLORA SEBERON
G.R. No. 176289, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 331

FACTS: Moldex entered with a Contract to Sell of a certain property at Metrogate Cavite with Flora despite of its lack of license to sell.

Flora had made installment payments from March 11, 1992 to July 19, 1996 in the aggregate amount of P375,295.49. She had defaulted in her succeeding payments.

Moldex sent notices to Flora to update her account but to no avail. Finally, Moldex sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Contract to Sell.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the contract to sell despite the lack of license

to sell is valid.

2) What is the right available to Flora under the Maceda Law?

HELD: 1) YES. PD 957 provides that the lack of license to sell on the part of a subdivision developer does not result for the nullification or invalidation of the contract to sell it entered into with a buyer.

Thus, the contract to sell entered into between Flora and Moldex remains valid despite the lack of license to sell on the part of the latter at the time the contract was entered into.

2) Since Moldex had already sent Flora a Notarized Notice of Cancellation of Contract to Sell, the only option available is Section 3 (b) under Maceda Law or RA 6552, whereby Moldex shall refund to Flora the cash surrender value of her payments on the property equivalent to the 50% of the total payments made or P187,647.75.

GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC. vs. EVELYN M. ANGELES
G.R. No. 202358, November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 163

FACTS: Angeles purchased a house and lot under a Contract to Sell from Gatchalian payable for a period of ten years.

After 48 monthly installment payments, Angeles failed to satisfy her monthly installments with Gatchalian.

Several demands were made by Gatchalian but the same were continually disregarded by Angeles. Finally, Gatchalian served Angeles with a Notice of Notarial Rescission thru registered mail.

Consequently, Angeles was furnished by Gatchalian a demand letter demanding her to pay the outstanding reasonable rentals for her use and occupation of the house and lot to date and to vacate the same. She was informed in said letter that the 50% refundable amount that she is entitled to has already been deducted with the reasonable value for the use of the properties.

ISSUES: 1) Whether there is a valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell.

2) Whether Angeles is entitled to the benefit of Maceda Law or

RA 6552.

3) Whether Angeles can be ejected for non-payment of monthly

installments.

HELD: 1) NO. A valid and effective cancellation under RA 6552 must comply with the mandatory twin requirements of a notarized notice of cancellation and a refund of the cash surrender value.

Although there was a notarial rescission sent thru registered mail but it was not accompanied by the refund of the cash surrender value equivalent to 50% of the total payments made.

For failure to refund the cash surrender value to the defaulting buyer Angeles, Gatchalian cannot deduct the same for the amount of the rentals due to Gatchalian as there was nothing in the contract to apply compensation under Art. 1279 of the New Civil Code.

2) Angeles is entitled to receive the cash surrender value equivalent to 50% of the total payments made as provided for by Section 3 (b) of RA 6552.

3) In the absence of a valid cancellation of the Contract to Sell between Gatchalian and Angeles, the contract remains valid and existing. Thus the complaint for unlawful detainer would be a violation of the mandate of RA 6552.

OPTIMUM DEVELOPMENT BANK vs. SPOUSES JOVELLANOS
G.R. No. 189145, December 4, 2013, 711 SCRA 548

FACTS: Spouses Jovellanos entered into a Contract to Sell with Palmera Homes for the purchase of a residential house and lot payable for a period of 10 years.

Later, Palmera Homes assigned all its rights, title and interest in the Contract to Sell in favor of Optimum.

A year later, Optimum issued a Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of Contract to Sell to Spouses Jovellanos for their failure to pay their monthly installments despite several written and verbal demands.

A month later, a final Demand Letter by Optimum required Spouses Jovellanos to vacate and deliver possession of the subject property within seven (7) days, which however remained unheeded.

Optimum instituted the action for unlawful detainer within one year from the final demand to vacate.

ISSUE: Whether the validity of the cancellation of the Contract to Sell under RA 6552 lies within the competence or jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).

HELD: YES. Under RA 6552, the mechanics of cancellation of Contract to Sell is based on the amount of installments already paid by the buyer under the said contract.

Since Jovellanos had paid less than two years in installments, Section 4 of RA 6552 provides for three (3) requisites before the seller may actually cancel the subject contract: first, the buyer shall give the buyer a 60-day grace period to be reckoned from the date the installment became due; second, the seller must give the buyer a notice of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act if the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of the said grace period; and

third, the seller may actually cancel the contract only after 30 days from the buyer’s receipt of the said notice of cancellation/demand for rescission by notarial act.

There was a valid and effective cancellation of the Contract to Sell in accordance with Section 4 of RA 6552 and since Spouses Jovellanos had already lost their right to retain possession of the subject property as a consequence of such cancellation, their refusal to vacate and turn over possession to Optimum makes out a valid case for unlawful detainer.

SPOUSES FAUSTINO & JOSEFINA GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 172036, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 280

FACTS: On May 28, 1993, Spouses Garcia and Dela Cruz entered into a Contract to Sell wherein the latter agreed to sell to the former for P3M the five (5) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT).

The Contract to Sell entered into contains a proviso that failure of Spouses Garcia to pay the purchase price in full shall cause the rescission of the contract and forfeiture of one – half (1/2%) percent of the total amount paid to Dela Cruz.

At the time of the execution of the said contract, three (3) of the subject lots were registered in the name of Abelida from whom Dela Cruz allegedly acquired said properties by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.

As agreed upon, Spouses Garcia shall make a down payment upon signing of the contract. The balance shall be paid in three (3) installments.

On its due date December 31, 1993, Spouses Garcia failed to pay the last installment in the amount of P1.672M.

Sometime in July 1995, Spouses Garcia offered to pay the unpaid balance, which had already been delayed by one and half year, which Dela Cruz refused to accept.

On September 23, 1995, Dela Cruz sold the same parcels of land to Atty. Bartolome for P7.793M.

In order to compel Dela Cruz to accept Spouses Garcia’s payment in full satisfaction of the purchase price and thereafter, execute the necessary document of transfer in their favor, Spouses Garcia filed a complaint for specific performance before the RTC.

ISSUES: 1) Whether Spouses Garcia may compel Dela Cruz to

accept the payment in full and execute a Deed of Absolute Sale.

2) Whether Dela Cruz has the power to rescind the contract

upon the failure of the Spouses Garcia to pay the balance

of the purchase price.

3) Whether judicial intervention is necessary despite the automatic

rescission provided for in the contract to sell.

4) Whether the provisions of RA 6552 otherwise known as the

Maceda Law are applicable in the present case.

5) Whether Atty. Bartolome is a buyer in bad faith for having

knowledge of the previous contract to sell.

HELD: 1) NO. Contracts are law between the parties, and they are bound by its stipulations.

It is clear from the provisions of the contract that the parties intended their agreement to be a Contract to Sell: Dela Cruz retains ownership of the subject lands and does not have the obligation to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale until Spouses Garcia’s payment of the full purchase price.

Payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.

Strictly speaking, there can be no rescission or resolution of an obligation that is still non-existent due to the non-happening of the suspensive condition.

Dela Cruz is not obliged to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in Spouses Garcia’s favor because of their failure to make full payment on the stipulated date.

2) YES. Pursuant to Art. 1191, the law makes it available to the injured party alternative remedies such as the power to rescind or enforce

fulfillment of the contract, with damages in either case if the obligor does not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

There is nothing in this law which prohibits the parties from entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would cause its cancellation even without court intervention.

The vendor’s right in contract to sell with reserved title to extrajudicially cancel the sale upon failure of the vendee to pay the stipulated installments and retain the sums and installments already received has long been recognized by the well-established doctrine.

The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for automatic recession upon non-payment cannot be doubted.

It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach without need of going to court.

Thus, rescission under Article 1191 was inevitable due to Spouses Garcia’s failure to pay the stipulated price within original period fixed in the agreement.

3) YES. Judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.

Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.

4) NO. The Maceda Law applies to contracts of sale of real estate on installment payments including residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and sales to tenants.

The subject lands, comprising five (5) parcels do not comprise residential real estate within the contemplation of the Maceda Law.

Even it we apply the Maceda Law to the present case, Spouses Garcia’s offer of payment to Dela Cruz was made a year and a half after the stipulated date.

This is beyond the sixty-day grace period under Section 4 of the Maceda Law.

5) NO. It is undeniable that Spouses Garcia failed to pay the balance of the purchase price on the stipulated date of the Contract to sell.

Thus, Dela Cruz is within her rights to sell the subject lands to Atty. Bartolome.

Neither Dela Cruz nor Bartolome can be said to be in bad faith.

10.   PRESCRIPTION   AND   RECONVEYANCE

SPOUSES   SOFRONIO   SANTOS     vs.   HEIRS   OF    DOMINGA   LUSTRE
G.R.   No.   151016,   August   6,    2008,   561    SCRA   120

FACTS: Dominga Lustre mortgaged her residential lot to Spouses Santos. She then sold the property to Natividad Santos. The cancellation of the mortgage and the sale of the property were both inscribed in the title. Thereafter, the Spouses Santos transferred the property, by way of sale, to their son, Froilan. The heirs of Dominga Lustre filed a complaint for Declaration of inexistence of contract, annulment of title and reconveyance, averring that the sale to Natividad was simulated as Dominga’s signature was forged and that the spouses Santos also simulated the Deed of Sale transferring the property to their son, Froilan. The Santoses allege that the heirs of Dominga Lustre’s right of action had prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the heirs of Dominga Lustre is barred by prescription.

HELD: NO. The action for reconveyance on the ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of sale is an action for the declaration of its nullity, which does not prescribe.

A person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years.

The prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. Otherwise, if plaintiff is in possession of the property, prescription does not commence to run against him.

When an action for reconveyance is nonetheless filed, it would be in a nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.

ANICETO UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 173186, September 16, 2015, 770 SCRA 491

FACTS: In 1979, Carmencita acquired ownership of a parcel of land from her brother.

The land was later subdivided into Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9 covered by TCT # T-58334 and T-58335.

Subsequently, Carmencita sold Lot No. 54-B-8 to a certain Bobby Adil on installment, on the condition that the absolute deed of sale will be executed only upon full payment.

Adil failed to pay the amortization, and he was forced to sell his unfinished building on the property to spouses Omandac.

Meanwhile, Carmencita borrowed money from a certain Grace Ng and as a security, she delivered TCTs No. T-58334 and T-58335.

Grace Ng, on the other hand, borrowed money from Aniceto and also delivered to the latter the two TCTs to guarantee payment of the loan.

Sometime thereafter, Carmencita learned that Aniceto filed a case for recovery of possession against spouses Omandac before the RTC which ruled in favor of Aniceto.

The decision became final and executory in 2001 and the spouses Omandac were ejected from the property and Aniceto gained possession of the property.

In July 1999, Carmencita filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed with Damages against Aniceto.

The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale allegedly executed between Carmencita and Aniceto involving Lots # 54-B-8 and 54-B-9. Carmencita prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void because the alleged sale between her and Aniceto was a forgery considering that she never sold the lots and her signature in the purported deed of sale is spurious.

On July 29, 1999, an Amended Complaint was filed and the same was not signed by Carmencita but by her counsel.

Aniceto, on the other hand, claimed that the action is a collateral attack on the title which is prohibited by law under the principle of indefeasibility of the title after the lapse of one year from registration.

He further claimed that the action for annulment of deed of sale is already barred by the statute limitation, guilty of estoppel and laches and the certification against forum shopping is defective.

ISSUES

1) Distinguish whether an action is a direct attack or

a collateral attack

2) Whether an action for annulment of the deed of sale is

either a direct attack or a collateral attack on the title.

3) What is the nature of the action for reconveyance?

4) Whether an action for reconveyance may be based on a void

contract.

5) What is laches? How can it be proved.

6) Whether there is a substantial compliance with the requirements

against forum shopping.

HELD: 1) An action is a direct attack when the object of an action is to annul or set aside the judgment in the registration proceedings.

On the other hand, a collateral attack is when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or registration proceeding is nevertheless made as incident.

2) NO. Carmencita is seeking a relief for an annulment of the deed of sale, which is not an attack on the judgment or registration proceeding pursuant to which the titles were decreed.

It does not seek to set aside the judgment of registration of titles nor does it seek to nullify the title by challenging the judgment or proceeding that decreed its issuance.

The action is in reality one for reconveyance, which is imprescriptible when based on a void contract.

3) An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him.

In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right.

However, such recourse cannot be availed of once has passed to an innocent purchaser for value.

For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

Here, Carmencita does not only seek to annul the purported deed of sale but also to cancel the titles in the name of Aniceto.

If the reliefs are granted and the TCTs are cancelled, the titles to the lots will revert to Carmencita as she was the previously registered owner.

Thus, a ruling in favor of Carmencita would be equal to what an action for reconveyance seeks to accomplish.

Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, a contract is voidable when the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

When the consent is totally absent and not merely vitiated, the contract is void.

4) YES. An action for reconveyance may also be based on a void contract.

When the action for reconveyance is based on a void contract, as when there was no consent on the part of the alleged vendor. The action is imprescriptible.

The property may be reconveyed to the true owner, notwithstanding the TCTs already issued in another’s name. The issuance of a certificate of title in the latter’s favor could not vest upon him or could it validate the purchase thereof which is null and void.

Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. Being null and void, the sale produces no legal effects whatsoever.

Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore determined by the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of an implied or constructive trust or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract.

There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a void contract is imprescriptible.

5) Laches is a doctrine in equity, and applied only in the absence of, and never against statutory law.

The positive mandate of Article 1410 of the Civil Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity.

The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings.

Therefore, at this stage, the dismissal as to the ground of laches would be premature. The issues must be resolved in the trial on the merits.

6) YES. The original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against forum shopping duly signed by Carmencita.

What was signed by Carmencita’s counsel was the Amended Complaint dated July 29, 1999, who was not authorized to sign on her behalf. However, its verification and certification specified the statement that this amended complaint should be taken and read together with the original complaint which the CA took this as “cautionary move” on the part of Carmencita which is tantamount to substantial compliance.

A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.

It is recognized rule that the certification must be executed by the party-pleader, not by her counsel, however, the Court chose to overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial justice and the existence of prima facie merit of the petition.

LUCIA CARLOS ALIÑO vs. HEIRS OF ANGELICA LORENZO
G.R. No. 159550, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 139

An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the reckoning point is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.

If the person claiming to be the owner is in actual possession thereof, the right to seek to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.

One in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.

RECONVEYANCE NOT INDIRECT ATTACK
ON VALIDITY OF TITLE

MARIFLOR T. HORTIZUELA vs. GREGORIA TAGUFA
G.R. No. 205867, February 23, 2015, 751 SCRA 371

FACTS: Spouses Epifanio Tagufa owned an untitled property containing an area of 539 square meters. They mortgaged the property to DBP.

For failure to redeem the property, DBP foreclosed the same and sold it to Atty. Romulo Marquez.

On April 4, 2002, Mariflor, the daughter of Epifanio and an American citizen, purchased the subject property from Atty. Marquez by executing a SPA in favor of her brother, Runsted, with an agreement that the latter will reconvey the said property to his sister when demanded.

Mariflor discovered that the same unregistered property was titled in the name of Gregoria, wife of Runsted, under OCT No. P-84609 by virtue of a free patent application before the DENR.

Because of fraud, Mariflor instituted an action for reconveyance and recovery of property of the subject property.

Gregoria claimed that the action for reconveyance would amount to a collateral attack on the title, which was proscribed under the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title.

ISSUE: Whether the action for reconveyance constitutes an indirect or collateral attack on the validity of the title.

HELD: NO. In a complaint for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible and is not being questioned.

An action for reconveyance is a recognized remedy, an action in personam, available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another’s name.

What is being sought is the transfer of the property wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better right.

If the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee, and the

real owner is entitled to file an action for reconveyance of the property.

The fact that Gregoria was able to secure a title in her name does not operate to vest ownership upon her of the subject land.

Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership.

A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described thereon. It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, neither it permits one to enrich himself at the expense of others.

Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with person not named in the certificate or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.

11.    ADVERSE   CLAIM

SPOUSES   JESUS     CHING    vs.     SPOUSES    ADOLFO    ENRILE
G.R.     No.     156076,     September     17,   2008,     565    SCRA    402

FACTS: Spouses Jesus Ching purchased from Raymunda a property in Las Piñas City. The sale was perfected upon delivery of a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with the owner’s duplicate copy of the TCT and they immediately took physical possession of the subject property.

The couple failed to register the sale and instead they executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and the same was annotated at the back of the title.

Three years after the sale, Spouses Ching received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution on account of court decision in favor of Spouses Adolfo against the vendor Raymunda. Spouses Jesus Ching filed a petition to remove cloud or quiet title to real property, however, it was countered by Spouses Adolfo that the Annotated Adverse Claim had already prescribed after a lapse of thirty (30) days from the date of registration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the levy on attachment later annotated shall prevail over the Adverse Claim earlier annotated at the back of the title by the mere lapse of 30 days and even without any petition in court for its cancellation.

HELD: NO. A notice of Adverse Claim remains valid even after the lapse of the 30-day period as provided by Section 70 of PD 1529. As long as there is yet no petition for cancellation for its cancellation, the notice of adverse claim remains subsisting. After the lapse of 30 days, the annotation of the adverse claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition by the party in interest.

The law does not require a person dealing with the owner of registered land to go beyond the certificate of title as he may rely on the notices of the encumbrances on the property annotated on the certificate of title or absence of any annotation. Here, the adverse claim is annotated at the back of title coupled with the fact that the Spouses Ching are in possession of the disputed property. Spouses Adolfo should have put in guard and required them to ascertain the property offered to them has already been sold to another to prevent injury to prior innocent buyers.

NAVOTAS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs. GERMAN D. CRUZ
G.R. No. 159212, September 12, 2005, 469 SCRA 530

The annotation of an adverse claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a part of real property, and serves as a notice and warning to third parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an interest over it or has a better right than the registered owner.

ROGELIA P. DIAZ - DUARTE vs. SPOUSES BEN & ESTHER ONG
G.R. No. 130352, November 3, 1998, 298 SCRA 388

In a petition for cancellation of adverse claim, a hearing must first be conducted. The hearing will afford the parties an opportunity to prove the propriety or impropriety of the adverse claim. Petitioner was unlawfully denied this opportunity when the Register of Deeds automatically cancelled the adverse claim. Needless to state, the cancellation of adverse claim in ineffective.

ALFREDO SAJONAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 79

The general rule it that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. However, such person is charged with notice on the face of the register or certificate of title.

A person who deals with registered land is bound by the liens and encumbrances including adverse claim annotated therein.

12. RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL

PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO vs. SPOUSES NORMA & DAMIANO GUDITO
G.R. No. 173166, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 330

FACTS: Estanislao family have been renting and occupying the lot owned by Gaspar since 1934. The former built the house on the subject lot in accordance with the lease agreement with Gaspar.

When Gaspar died, the subject property was inherited by his son, Victorino married to Esther.

In the 1980s, Victorino wanted the Estanislao family to vacate the said property, but the tenants refused because of laws allegedly prohibited their ejectment therefrom. Resultantly, Estanislao, with due notice to Victorino, deposited the amount of monthly rentals at Allied Bank under the savings account in the name of Victorino.

In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Victorino couple in favor of their daughter Norma married to Damiano Gudito. Hence, in October 1994, Spouses Gudito notified Estanislao family to remove their house and vacate the premises within 3 months.

When Estanislao family failed to comply with the demand to vacate, the Spouses Gudito filed a complaint for unlawful detainer/ejectment against them.

ISSUES

1) Whether the right of possession is established by virtue of

the Deed of Donation.

2) Whether the right of first refusal applies to Estanislao.

HELD: 1) YES. The Deed of Donation had been prepared and acknowledged before a notary public is vested with public interest, the sanctity of which deserves to be upheld unless overwhelmed by clear and convincing evidence.

Thus, the donation made by the Victorino couple is a valid exercise of their right as owner of the subject property and the Spouses Gudito are legally entitled to the said property as donees.

2) NO. The right of first refusal applies only to a case where the owner of the property intends to sell it to a third party.

Since the subject property was donated by the Victorino couple to their daughter Norma and her husband, Damiano Gudito, their right to possess the subject property for their own use as family residence cannot be denied.

13. QUIETING OF TITLE

SEVERINO BARICUATRO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 105902, February 9, 2000, 325 SCRA 137

FACTS: On October 16, 1968, Severino bought two (2) lots on an installment basis from Galeos. The two lots are part of Spring Village Subdivision.

After the sale, Severino introduced certain improvements on said lots and started to reside therein in 1970. Since then he has been in actual and physical possession of the said two (2) lots.

However, on December 7, 1968, two months after the sale, Galeos sold the entire subdivision including the two (2) lots to Amores. Subsequently, Galeos informed Severino about the sale to Amores and advised him to pay the balance of the purchase price of the two (2) lots directly to Amores.

On December 27, 1974, Amores sold the two (2) lots to Nemenio. Prior to the sale, Amores informed Severino about the impending sale of the two (2) lots, but the latter failed to respond.

Before Nemenio caused the transfer of the titles to the two (2) lots and issuance of tax declaration in his name, he visited the residence of Severino.

Thereafter, Nemenio demanded from Severino to vacate the said lots but the latter refused to do so.

A complaint for quieting of title was filed by Nemenio against Severino.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the action for quieting of title is the best remedy.

(2) Whether Amores is a purchaser in good faith.

(3) Whether Nemenio is also a purchaser in good faith upon his reliance in the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title.

HELD: (1) YES. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property.

Its purpose is to secure an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.

In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other

claimants not only to place things in their proper place but to

make the one who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not to disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use and even to abuse the property as he deems best.

(2) NO. Amores did not act in good faith when he bought two disputed lots, however, when he registered his title, the preponderance of evidence supports the finding that he already had knowledge of the previous sale of the disputed lots to Severino. Such knowledge tainted his registration with bad faith.

The prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property.

Under Article 1544, the ownership of an immovable property shall belong to the purchaser who in good faith registers it first in the registry of property.

For a second buyer to successfully invoke the protection by Article 1544 of the Civil Code, he must possess good faith until the registration of the deed of conveyance covering the same.

(3) NO. Nemenio cannot claim to be purchaser in good faith because he visited the residence of Severino before he registered the disputed lots on his name. The registration of Nemenio was done in bad faith. The defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens Title does not extend to a transferee who takes the certificate of title with notice of a flaw.

A holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the prosecution of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud.

ELIAS GALLAR vs. HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN
G.R. No. L-20954, May 24, 1967, 20 SCRA 186

FACTS: On January 9, 1919, Teodoro sold his land to Serapio for P30 with the right to repurchase within six years in a private document.

On January 28, 1919, shortly after the execution of the deed of sale, Serapio transferred his right to Graciana, sister of Teodoro.

Graciana subsequently transferred her rights to the land to Elias on April 2, 1919 in exchange for one cow in a private document.

On the same occasion, April 2, 1919, possession of the land together with the TCT was delivered to Elias.

On October 10, 1960, after 41 years, Elias filed a suit against the heirs of Teodoro to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title.

On the other hand, the heirs of Teodoro invoked prescription to bar Elias’ action.

ISSUES

(1) Is Elias’ suit one for specific performance or one for the quieting of title?

(2) Has the action prescribed?

(3) If the heirs of Teodoro had been the possessor of the property (instead of Elias) would the answer be the same?

HELD: (1) Elias’ suit should be considered an action to quiet title as it seeks to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on his ownership despite the fact that the transactions had all been merely in private document.

(2) As Elias is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible.

(3) If the heirs of Teodoro were in possession of the property, Elias’ action would have been prescribed for then the action would not be one to quiet title, but one to recover real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such action.

VICENTE SAPTO vs. APOLONIO FABIANA
G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958, 103 Phil 683

FACTS: On June 8, 1931, Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale of a portion of land covered by TCT # T-5701 in favor of Apolonio for P245.00.

The sale was never registered. Possession of the land was conveyed to Apolonio and the latter has been in the possession thereof since 1931.

Thereafter, Constantino died without any issue. Samuel upon his death was survived by his widow and children, Laureana and Vicente.

On October 19, 1954, the widow of Samuel, together with their two children, filed an action for the recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to Apolonio in 1931.

ISSUES

(1) Whether an action for quieting of title would compel the sellers’ successors-in-interest to execute the proper deed of conveyance in 1954 in favor of the buyer.

(2) Has the action prescribed?

(3) Whether the deed of sale over the land in question, although was never registered, is still valid and binding?

HELD: (1) YES. The action for quieting of title is to remove the cloud cast upon the buyer’s ownership by the refusal of the sellers’ successors-in-interest to recognize the sale by their predecessors.

Thus, Apolonio, being a buyer of the land in 1931 who possessed it from that date may still compel the sellers’ successors-in-interest to execute the proper deed of conveyance in 1954 so that the deed may be registered.

(2) NO. Since Apolonio has been in possession of the property, the action DOES NOT PRESCRIBE or IMPRESCRIPTIBLE.

(3) YES. Since the property has remained and still in the possession of the vendee of the property, it is clear that conveyance between buyer and his vendors is valid and binding upon the vendors, and is equally binding and effective against the heirs of the vendors. To hold otherwise would make of the Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs.

HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN vs. TABANGAO REALTY INC.
G.R. No. 154262, February 11, 2015, 750 SCRA 271

FACTS: Sometime in 1980, Serafin and Josefino de Guzman purchased on credit oil and lubricating products from FSPC, but they eventually failed to pay for their credit purchases from FSPC.

FSPC filed a complaint for sum of money against Serafin and Josefino before the RTC of Manila.

After trial, decision was rendered finding Serafin and Josefino liable to pay their outstanding obligation to FSPC and the judgment became final and executory.

On June 30, 1983, FSPC levied upon a parcel of land covered by TCT # 3531 in the name of Spouses Serafin & Amelia de Guzman.

At the public auction, the sheriff awarded the certificate of sale to Tabangao Realty as the highest bidder and the same was annotated on TCT # 3531 on April 13, 1988.

The Spouses De Guzman did not redeem the subject property within one year from registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale on TCT # 3531.

On October 19, 2001, upon the deaths of Spouses De Guzman, their heirs filed a complaint for quieting of title on the ground that the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale has lost its effectivity as it had been terminated and extinguished by prescription, laches and estoppel, since more than 13 years having elapsed from its registration on April 13, 1988 without the buyer taking any step to consolidate its ownership and/or take possession of the property.

ISSUE; Whether the action for quieting of title would prosper in the instant case.

HELD: NO. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action;

and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrances, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Complainants’ allegation that they were children and only heirs of the deceased Spouses De Guzman and that the subject property was still registered in Spouses De Guzman’s names under TCT # 3531. However, these allegations are insufficient to establish complainants’ title to the property.

Respondent Tabangao was already substituted to and acquired all the rights, title, interest, and claims of the Spouses De Guzman to the subject property on April 13, 1989, when the one – year redemption period expired. Upon the deaths of Amelia de Guzman on January 1, 1997 and her husband Serafin de Guzman on April 23, 2001, they had no more rights, title, interest and claim to the subject property on by succession to complainants as their heirs.

The execution of the final deed of sale and/or conveyance to Tabangao is a mere formality and confirmation of the title already vested in respondent under Rule 39, Section 33 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the rules requiring the institution of a separate action for execution of such a deed. Therefore, no prescription period for any action has begun to run.

CLT REALTY DEV’T CORP. vs. PHIL-VILLE DEV’T CORP.
G.R. No. 160726, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA 289

FACTS: A complaint for quieting of title was filed by Phil-Ville against CLT claiming that it has been in “actual, open, notorious, public, physical and continuous possession” of the 16 parcels of land before 1980 up to the present. It fenced said parcels of land in 1980 and 1991.

On the other hand, CLT claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate as evidenced by TCT No. 177013.

However, CLT’s TCT No. 177013, although apparently valid as effective, is in truth and in fact, invalid and ineffective and unless declared by the Court, will inevitably prejudice Phil-Ville’s title over its 16 parcels of land, as said title of CLT is a potential cause of litigation between Phil-Ville and CLT as both parties are claiming title to the subject properties when CLT’s TCT # T-177013 actually overlaps the 16 parcels of land of Phil-Ville’s 16 TCTs.

The RTC declared Phil-Ville as “the true, absolute and legitimate owner of the sixteen (16) parcels of land and CLT’s TCT # T-177013 was declared null and void. It was found out that CLT purchased or acquired its TCT # T-177013 on December 10, 1988 from its predecessor Estrellita Hipolito who acquired the land covered by her TCT # R-17994 by virtue of an approved Compromise Agreement between her and Atty. Jose B. Dimson wherein the latter transferred to Hipolito on September 2, 1976 Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate covered by TCT # R-15166, which property in turn appears to have been acquired by Dimson by virtue of an court order dated June 13, 1966 awarding to him as his attorney’s fees whatever remained undisposed of in Lots 25-A, 26, 27, 28 and 29 of the Maysilo Estate of Maria De La Concepcion Vidal. Finally, the LRTC Verification Committee found that “nothing more was left for the heirs

of Maria dela Concepcion Vidal to convey to Jose R. Dimson as his attorney’s fees and consequently, nothing at all was left for Jose R. Dimson to convey to Hipolito. In short, Hipolito’s TCT No. R-17974 is null and void as no land had been registered and TCT No. T-177013 which was derived from TCT # T-17974 is similarly null and void.

ISSUE: Whether TCT # T-177013 imposes a cloud on Phil-Ville’s titles to their 16 parcels of land.

HELD: YES. Quieting of title is common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property or any interest but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.

In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Both requisites in order for an action for quieting of title have been met: (1) Phil-Ville had established its equitable title or interest in the 16 parcels of land subject of the action; and (2) TCT No. T-177013, found to overlap titles to said properties of Phil-Ville, was previously declared invalid.

VILMA I. QUINTOS vs. PELAGIA I. NICOLAS
G.R. No. 210252, June 16, 2014, 726 SCRA 482

FACTS: Spouses Ibarra were owners of a parcel of land consisting of 281 square meters covered by TCT # 318717.

In 1990, Spouses Ibarra had already passed away, leaving to their ten (10) children ownership over the subject property.

Having failed to secure a decision for partition, the siblings instead resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication on September 21, 2004 to transfer the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings.

Subsequently, respondents (7 siblings) sold their 7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of the Spouses Candelario.

On June 1, 2009, the petitioners (remaining 3 siblings) filed a complaint for quieting of title against the respondents and Spouses Candelario and alleged that they have been in adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the property for over four (4) decades and there are entitled to equitable title.

However in 2005, the respondents entered into a Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor over the subject matter without the objection of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were able to prove equitable title or ownership over the property.

HELD: NO. Quieting of title in a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action, and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting doubt on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or efficacy.

IMELDA SYJUCO vs. FELISA D. BONIFACIO
G.R. No. 148748, January 14, 2015, 745 SCRA 468

FACTS: The Syjucos are the registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Caloocan City covered by TCT # T-108530 issued on March 26, 1984.

They have been in open, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the subject land, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest since 1926 and they have been paying the real property taxes over the subject land since 1949.

Sometime in 1994, Syjucos learned that the purported owner of the subject land was Felisa Bonifacio who was able to register the subject land in her name under TCT No. 265778 on March 29, 1993.

Bonifacio’s title was issued pursuant to an order dated October 8, 1992 by RTC, Branch 125 of Caloocan City in the Petition for Authority to Segregate.

For unexplained reasons, the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan issued TCT No. 265778 to Bonifqacio on March 29, 1993 even before RTC - Branch 125 declared its Order dated October 8, 1992 granting Bonifacio’s

petition for segregation final and executory on April 6, 1993.

On July 28, 1994, to protect their rights and interest over the subject property, the Syjucos lodged a special civil action for quieting of title especially praying for declaration of nullity and cancellation of Bonifacio’s TCT No. 265778.

Subsequently, the Syjucos discovered that Bonifacio sold the subject land to VSD Realty. Bonifacio’s TCT # 265778 was cancelled and replaced by TCT # 285313 in the name of VSD Realty.

As a result, the Syjucos amended their petition impleading VSD Realty on April 25, 1995.

ISSUES

(1) Whether an action for quieting of title is a direct attack on the certificates of title of Bonifacio and VSD Realty.

(2) Whether an action for quieting of title has prescribed.

RULINGS

(1) YES. The instituted action in this case is clearly a direct attack on a certificate of title to real property.

In their complaint for quieting of title, the Syjucos specifically pray for the declaration of nullity and/or cancellation of Bonifacio’s TCT # 265778 and VSD TCT # 285313 over the subject land.

The relief sought is certainly feasible since the objective of an action for quieting of title as provided under Article 476 of the Civil Code, is precisely to quiet title, remove, invalidate, annul and/or nullify a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein by reason of any instrument, record, claims, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable and may be prejudicial to the title.

(2) NO. It is an established doctrine in land ownership dispute that the filing of an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the disputed property is in the possession of the plaintiff. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for this rule being that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effects on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.

14.   A   VERBAL   CONTRACT    OF    SALE    IS    VALID

SPOUSES MAGDALINO &   CLEOPE   BADILLA   vs.   FE    BRAGAT
G.R.   No. 187013,    April   22,   2015,    757   SCRA   131

FACTS: On November 18, 1968, Spouses Pastrano sold their property consisting of 1,015 square meters to Ledesma thru Deed of Sale of Unregistered Land.

In 1970, Ledesma sold to Spouses Badilla “on installment basis” a 200 square meter portion of his property. The sale was not reduced in writing, however, but the Badillas took possession of the portion sold.

On April 18, 1978, Spouses Bragat bought 991 square meters of the property from Ledesma, thru a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Residential Lot.

On May 5, 1989, Spouses Pastrano executed another Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of Fe Bragat covering the entire area of 1,105 square meters of the subject property.

Alleging that Bragat is the absolute owner of the subject property, she is now demanding the Spouses Badilla to vacate the area which they are occupying.

ISSUE: Whether the ownership of the portion occupied by the Badillas of the subject property passed to Spouses Badilla upon their verbal purchase of said portion from Ledesma.

HELD: YES, the ownership of the portion occupied by the Badillas of the subject property passed to them upon their verbal purchase of said portion from Ledesma.

The Civil Code states that ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the same.

And the thing is understood as delivered when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. Delivery (traditio) operated to divest the vendor of title to the property which may not be regained or recovered until and unless the contract is revoked or rescinded in accordance with law.

The same is true even if the sale is a verbal one, because it is held that when verbal contract has been completed, executed or partially consummated, its enforceability will not be barred by the Statute of Frauds, which applies only to an executory agreement.

And, where it was proven that one party had delivered the thing sold to another, then the contract was partially executed and the Statute of Frauds does not apply. Hence, the ownership of the portion of the subject property in question has been validly and legally passed to Spouses Badilla upon their purchase of such portion.

It is undisputed that the spouses Pastrano had previously sold on November 18, 1968 their property to Ledesma. Therefore as early as such date, it is established that the Pastranos no longer had ownership over the property.

Then, as Ledesma subsequently sold in 1970 a portion of the property to the Badillas who immediately took delivery and possession, ownership of this portion had also been transferred to the said spouses.

Although the sale appears to be merely verbal, and payment therefore was to be made on installment, it is a partially consummated sale, with the Bandillas paying the initial price and Ledesma surrendering possession.

That the parties intended for ownership to be transferred may be inferred from their lack of any agreement stipulating that ownership of the property is reserved by the seller and shall not pass to the buyer until the latter has fully paid the purchase price. The fact is, Ledesma, even delivered to the Badillas the owner’s duplicate copy of the title.

15.   CONTRACT    OF   ANTICHRESIS

CHARITO & VILMA   MAGTALAS   vs. HEIRS OF   BENJAMIN   MALANCE
G.R. No. 219071,   August   24,   2016,   801   SCRA   485

FACTS: Malance obtained a loan of P600,000 from Magtalas Sisters evidenced by a Kasulatan which provides that the latter shall have the right to the fruits of the subject land owned by Malance for six (6) years or until the loan is fully paid.

After the death of Malance, his heirs filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Declaration of Nullity of the Kasulatan against Magtalas sisters.

During trial, the heirs questioned the validity of the Kasulatan claiming that the same was executed at the time when Malance was mentally incapacitated and that his signature thereon was simulated.

In their answer, Magtalas sisters averred, among others, that the Kasulatan was executed before a notary public at the time when Malance was of sound mind, though sickly, and the heirs must pay Malance’s indebtedness prior to recovery of possession.

ISSUE

Whether the heirs of Malance are entitled to the possession of the property.

RULING

NO, the heirs of Malance are not entitled to the possession of the property.

The evidence as to the genuineness of Malance’s signature and the consequent due execution and authenticity of the Kasunduan preponderance in favor of Magtalas sisters, who were likewise able to prove Melance’s receipt of the amount of P600,000.

A contract of antichresis exists if the following elements are present: (1) the creditor will have possession of the debtor’s real property given as a security; (2) such creditor will apply the fruits of the said property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount; (3) the creditor retains the enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid what he owes and (4) should the obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from the accessory character of the agreement.

In the case at hand, the language of the Kasulatan leaves no doubt that the loan was secured by an antichresis over the property of Malance, specifically authorizing the Magtalas sisters to receive the fruits of the subject landholding with the obligation to apply them as payment to his principal loan for a period of six (6) years.

As antichretic creditors, the Magtalas sisters are entitled to retain enjoyment of the subject land until the debt has been totally paid.

16. RECONSTITUTION -   TITLE   NOT   ACTUALLY   LOST

SPS. ERNESTO & GONIGONDA   IBIAS vs. BENITA   P.   MACABEO
G.R.   No. 205004,   August   17,   2016,   800   SCRA   694

FACTS: On August 13, 1999, Ernesto executed an Affidavit of Loss alleging that the owner’s duplicate of TCT # 24605 was missing among his files. The petition for reconstitution was granted and a new TCT # 24514 was issued to Spouses Ernesto & Gonigonda Ibias.

Benita filed a complaint for annulment of title. She averred that she is the heir of Albina and Marcelo, the registered owners of the parcel of land covered by TCT # 24604; and Ernesto knew that the title to the land was not lost but was in her possession, as proved by his letter dated 23 July 1999 where he asked her (Benita) for the whereabouts of TCT # 24605 which was in her possession.

In their defense, Spouses Ibias countered that Ernesto and his late brother, Rodolfo, are the only heirs of Marcelo and Albina Ibias. After the death of their parents, Ernesto inquired from Benita the whereabouts of the title but the latter failed to turn over the title. Believing in good faith that the title was lost, he applied for a reconstitution of the title.

ISSUE

Whether a prior knowledge of the certificate of title’s whereabouts a ground for cancellation of the reconstituted title.

RULING

YES, knowledge of the certificate of title’s whereabouts is a ground for cancellation of the reconstituted title.

In the case of Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club, Inc., it was held that “the reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and conditions. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

Reconstitution of title, under Sec. 109 of PD 1529, applies only if the owner’s duplicate certificate of title is indeed lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has not been lost and is in fact in possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the allegedly lost owner’s duplicate copy of TCT # 24605 was in the possession of Benita. The alleged lost of TCT # 24605 was offered in evidence during the trial, which was uncontested by the parties. There is no reason to justify the issuance of a constituted title in the name of Spouses Ernesto & Gorgonia Ibias.

Hence, there is no error in the cancellation of the same reconstituted title. It follows that the reconstituted title under the name of Spouses Ibias should be canceed.

17.   PROHIBITION TO FOREIGNER   TO   ACQUIRE   LAND

TAINA   MANIGQUE – STONE   vs.   CATTLEYA   LAND, INC.
G.R. No. 195975,   September   5, 2016,   802   SCRA   173

FACTS: On November 6, 1992, Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land, including the subject property.

However, while following up the registration of the August 30, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale at the Office of the Register of Deeds, Cattleya learned that the owner’s copy of the title to the land in question was with Taina.

The subject land had apparently been sold to Taina’s common-law husband, Michael Stone, by Spouses Tecson in 1985, but the title was placed in Taina’s name as Stone was a foreigner.

Cattleya instituted a civil action for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title.

Taina posits that while Michael’s legal capacity to own or acquire real property in the Philippines was not entirely unassailable, there was nevertheless no actual violation of the constitutional prohibition, because in this case no real transfer of ownership had been effected in favor of Michael from Col. Tecson. Taina claimed that she was not exactly dummy Michael’s dummy at all but his active partner.

Cattleya counters that the sale between Col. Tecson and Michael was absolutely null and void, as this was a flagrant violation of the constitutional provision barring or prohibiting aliens or foreigners from acquiring or purchasing land in the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether the sale of land by Spouses Tecson to Michael Stone, a foreigner although ostensibly made in Taina’s name, was valid, despite the constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners.

RULING

NO, the sale is null and void by reason of the constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners or aliens.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been held that “aliens, whether individual or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

In the case at bench, Taina admitted that it was Michael who paid with his own funds the subject lot, hence, Michael Stone was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the deed of sale proclaimed that she was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Michael wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from

acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines.

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