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05-31-2019, 10:30 PM

2018 GOLDEN BEACON LEGAL ETHICS

By: Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

P R E L I M I N A R I E S

LEGAL ETHICS - it is a branch of moral science which treats of the duties which attorney owes to the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public as embodied in the Constitution, Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibilities, Canons of Professional Ethics, jurisprudence, moral laws and special laws.

BAR vs. BENCH

BAR refers to the whole body of attorneys and counselors, collectively, the members of the legal profession.

BENCH denotes the whole body of judges

PRACTICING LAWYER vs. TRIAL LAWYER

Trial Lawyer - A lawyer who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or boards which means engaging in actual trial work either for the prosecution or for the defense of clients.

Practicing Lawyer - one engaged in the practice of law. All trial lawyers are practicing lawyers but not all practicing lawyers are trial lawyers.

OTHER TERMS TO REMEMBER

Counsel de officio - a counsel, appointed or assigned by the court, from among members of the Bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, may adequately defend the accused.

Attorney of Record or Counsel de Parte - one who has filed a notice of appearance and who hence is formally mentioned in court records as the attorney of the party.

Of Counsel - to distinguish them from attorneys of record, associate attorneys are referred to as “of counsel”

Amicus Curiae - a friend of the court, not a party to the action; is an experienced and impartial attorney invited by the court to appear and help in the disposition of the issues submitted to it, it implies friendly intervention of counsel to call the attention of the court to some matters of law or facts which might otherwise escape its notice and in regard to which it might go wrong.

PRACTICE OF LAW

Q: What is “practice of law”?

A: Practice of Law means any activity in or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. (Cayetano vs. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210). The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. (Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 223 SCRA 378).

**** The title “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, having been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing, and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. As to the case of Alauya, the Supreme Court has declared that persons who passed the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” (Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628, February 24, 1997).

ECO vs. CHOA
B.M. 1217, January 18, 2005

FACTS: Complainants are students of the FEU Institute of Law who learned that respondent has been holding himself out as a lawyer for many years without obtaining a license from the Supreme Court to practice law. Complainants likewise allege that respondent has been advertising the name of his supposed law firm, Choa Montilla Albeza & Associates Law Offices, with himself as senior partner. Respondent has also been representing himself as a full-fledged lawyer by signing official documents as “Atty. John L. Choa.” In his comment, respondent admitted that his use of “Atty.” although he is not a member of the bar, is done so in good faith, believing that the title is synonymous with the word “lawyer.”

ISSUE: Whether good faith is a defense for an unauthorized and contumacious use by the respondent of the title “Atty.” without having actually been admitted to the Philippine bar.

HELD: NO. Respondent, although a law graduate of the FEU Institute of Law, never took the bar. He has no right to use the title “Atty.” which others have earned through rigorous and serious efforts. Likewise, he has no right to represent himself as a law practitioner with a law firm under his name. Respondent’s defense that he used the title “Atty.” in good faith does not exonerate him from liability. Respondent should know that a mere law graduate is not entitled to use the title “Atty.” and practice law unless and until he passes the bar and meets the requirements of the Rules of Court. Lastly, his voluntary desistance from using the title does not mitigate his liability either. False claiming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes contempt of court.

Q: Does a lawyer have the right to represent himself?

A: YES. A party has the right to represent himself. Even if the lawyer is suspended or disbarred, he can appear for himself. This right, however, is limited to criminal cases concerning grave or less grave offenses.

UNATHORIZED   PRACTICE    OF    LAW

ALVIN   S.   FELICIANO    vs.   ATTY.   CARMELITA   BAUTISTA - LOZADA
A.C.   No.   7593,    March   11,   2015,   752   SCRA   245

FACTS: On December 13, 2005, Atty. Lozada was found guilty by the court for violating Rules 15.03 and 15.04 of CPR and she was suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

However, on June 5, 2007, Atty. Lozada was forced by circumstance to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute before the RTC of Valenzuela City.

The complainant who is the defendant in that legal dispute filed a complaint against Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel for her husband while still suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

Atty. Lozada claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is a victim of injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake, thus, she has no choice but to give him legal assistance.

ISSUE: Whether Atty . Lozada’s appearing as counsel for her husband is within the prohibition of practice of law.

HELD: YES. Practice of law embraces “any activity in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.”

It is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband and actively participated in the proceedings therein within the two (2) year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada’s defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she represented her husband, she still serving her two (2) years suspension order.

She would have deserved a harsher penalty but the fact that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada’s actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, The SC deems it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.

SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW INCLUDES SUSPENSION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE

VICTOR C. LINGAN vs. ATTY. JIMMY P. BALIGA
A.C. No. 5377, June 30, 2014, 727 SCRA 341

FACTS: On June 15, 2006, Atty. Baliga was found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR for allowing his secretary to notarize documents in his stead. The SC suspended him for one year and revoked his notarial commission.

The Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his function as Regional Director during the period of suspension.

Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his function as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director as his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Baliga’s suspension from the practice of law includes his suspension from public office.

HELD: YES. Practice of law is “any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

Work is government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.

When the Supreme Court orders a lawyer suspended from practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice of law.

MISCONDUCT OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL

LIANG FUJI vs. ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ
A.C. No. 11043, March 8, 2017, 819 SCRA 602

FACTS: Complainant Liang Fuji, a Chinese national, was ordered to be deported for overstaying for one (1) year and six (6 ) months in violation of immigration laws upon a formal charge issued by Atty. Dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor of the Bureau of Immigration (BID).

Complainant was arrested and detained at the BI detention facility for more than nine (9) months, but was released when the Board of Commissioners dismissed the deportation charge against him on the ground that he has still valid working visa.

In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was not afforded any hearing or summary deportation proceedings before the deportation order was issued against him. He further alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably in discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not overstaying because his Section 9 (g) work visa was valid until April 30, 2016.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Dela Cruz be disciplined for misconduct as a member of the bar in the discharge of her duties as a government official.

RULING

YES, respondent may be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a government official.

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined in the discharge of her duties as government official. However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), then she may be subjected to disciplinary sanction by the Court.

In this case, Atty . Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the CPR, which mandates that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” As a Special Prosecutor in the BID, she is the representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her task was to investigate and verity facts to determine whether a ground for deportation exists, and if further administrative action -- in the form of a formal charge -- should be taken against an alien.

Lawyers in the government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent with the time-honored of public office being a public trust. The ethical standards under the CPR are rendered even more exacting as to government lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the state to promote a high standard of ethics, competence and professionalism in public service.

Here, respondent’s negligence show her indifference to the fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to due process and to the consequence of her action.

Q: What constitutes Moral Turpitude?

A: Moral Turpitude imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one person owes to another or to society in general which is contrary to the usual accepted and customary rule of right and duty which a person should follow.

Q: What are the acts involving moral turpitude?

A: The following acts have been declared by the court as involving moral turpitude:

1. Abduction with Rape

2. Violation of BP 22

3. Bigamy

4. Murder

5. Falsification of public documents

6. Smuggling

7. Participation in fatal “hazing” of a fraternity neophyte

CONVICTION FOR HOMICIDE CONSTITUTES MORAL TURPITUDE
AND A GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

MELVIN G. GARCIA vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREÑO
AC. Nos. 7973 & 10457, February 3, 2015, 749 SCRA 1

FACTS: Amparado and his companion, Yapchangco, were walking and just passed by Atty. Sesbreño’s house when the latter, without any provocation from the former went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them.

According to Yapchangco, they were about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Atty. Sesbreño, when they heard screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño’s aiming his rifle at them. They ran away but Amparado was hit which led to his death.

The RTC of Cebu found Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On appeal, the SC downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Sesbreño’s conviction for homicide constitutes moral turpitude which warrants his disbarment.

HELD: YES. Atty. Sesbreño’s conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude. Section 17, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good moral character.

The conviction of Sesbreño for the crime of homicide have found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral turpitude.

Neither victim Amparado nor Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of Atty. Sesbreño and neither the victim Amparado or Yapchangco shown to have wronged Atty. Sesbreño. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning June 3, 1993.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those possessing good moral character.

A violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of disbarment.

NAZARIA HERNANDEZ vs. ATTY. JOSE C. GO
A.C. No. 1526, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 1

FACTS: Petitioner sought the services of respondent to aid her in settling her accounts with various creditors to prevent her property from being foreclosed. Respondent persuaded her to give him her land titles and to execute deeds of sale in his favor without any valuable consideration so he could sell the lots and the proceeds pay her creditors. Instead of selling to buyers at higher price, respondent paid petitioner’s creditors with his own funds and registered the land titles in his name, depriving petitioner of her real properties worth millions.

ISSUE: Whether respondent engage in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts.

HELD: YES. Obviously, had he sold the lots to other buyers, complainant could have earned more. Records show that she did not receive any amount from respondent. Clearly, respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly in his duty as complainant’s counsel.

Respondent did not adhere faithfully and honestly to his obligation and duty as counsel when he took advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by petitioner. Respondent is duty bound to render a detailed report to petitioner on how much he sold the latter’s lots and the amounts paid to her creditors. His acts of acquiring for himself

petitioner’s lots entrusted to him are, by any standard, acts constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction in duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.

Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and the public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege. Respondent, by his conduct, blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also the legal profession. He is hereby DISBARRED.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment

MICHAEL P. BARRIOS vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ
A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the victims of the Doña Paz tragedy for free. The plaintiff in the said civil case was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation for the deaths of his wife and two daughters. Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse said check, which was then deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez’s wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total of P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as his attorney’s fees. The trial court held that it was absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service, respondent would collect 2/3 of the money claim. Respondent Martinez was convicted by final judgment of violation of BP Blg. 22.

ISSUES: 1) Is violation of BP 22 a crime involving moral turpitude?

2) What is the appropriate penalty?

HELD: 1) YES. Moral turpitude “includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense. The act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.

2) In Co. vs. Bernardino and Lao vs. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one year’s suspension for non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. However, in these cases, for various reasons, none of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers for either estafa or BP 22. In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. He is hereby DISBARRED.

CONTEMPT OF COURT

EPIFANIA Q. BANTOLO vs. ATTY. EGMEDIO B. CASTILLON, JR.
A.C. No. 6589, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 443

FACTS: Castillon is the lawyer and one of the defendants in a case involving a parcel of land in Valderrama, Antique. The case was decided in favor of the complainant and her co-plaintiffs, with the decision of the RTC having been affirmed by the CA and defendant’s petition for certiorari denied by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, a writ of execution was issued, by virtue of which, defendants were ejected from the property. However, respondent, with his co-defendants, subsequently entered the disputed property and harvested palay thereon. Plaintiffs were prompted to move out that defendants be declared in contempt of court because of their “open defiance and willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the court, which were abetted by the acts of Atty. Egmedio Castillon, Jr. who is an officer of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Castillon is guilty of the said acts.

HELD: YES. Castillon is guilty of indirect contempt for disobeying the writ of execution and for attempting to mislead the Commission into believing that the contempt charge is still pending by submitting an Order of the trial court which pertains to a second contempt charge. Respondent’s defiance of the writ of execution is a brazen display of disrespect of the very system which he has sworn to support.

Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer not only to punishment of contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. A lawyer is first and foremost an officer of the court. Thus, while he owes his entire devotion to the interest and causes of his client, he must ensure that he acts within the bounds of reason and common sense, always aware that he is an instrument of truth and justice. More importantly, as an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes.

**** Contempt of court is a willful disregard or disobedience to the court’s authority and dignity, and includes the means of delaying proper administration of justice. Under the Rules of Court, contempt is classified into either direct or indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same. Indirect contempt is one not committed in the presence of a court. It is an act done at a distance which tends to belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice. Atty. Quevedo’s disobedience and desistance to lawful writ and judgment as he prevented its execution constitutes indirect contempt of court. (Macario Y. Siy vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158971, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 154).

Q: When may refusal of a counsel to act as counsel de oficio be justified on grounds aside from reasons of health, extensive travel abroad, or similar reasons of urgency?

A: Other justified grounds for refusal to act as counsel de oficio are:

a) Too many de oficio cases assigned to the lawyer.

b) Conflict of interest.

c) Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

d) Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his public office which prohibits appearances in court; and

e) Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell prejudice to the new clients.

Q: Should a lawyer accept a losing case?

A: It depends. If it is a criminal case, he may not decline to represent the accused solely on his opinion regarding the guilt of said person (Rule 14.01, CPR). The Supreme Court has held that a counsel de officio has the duty to defend his client no matter how guilty he perceives him to be. But if the case is a civil case, he should decline to accept the same. In a civil action, the rules and ethics of the profession enjoin a lawyer from taking a bad case. The attorney’s signature in every pleading constitutes a certification that there is good cause to support it and that it is not interposed for delay. It is the attorney’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appeared to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

Q: Atty. A is offered professional engagement to appear before Judge B who is A’s relative, compadre and former office colleague. Is A ethically compelled to refuse the engagement? Why?

A: A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of the cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court. There is no ethical constraint against a lawyer appearing before a judge who is a relative, compadre or former office colleague as long as the lawyer avoids giving the impression that he can influence the judge. On the other hand, the judge is required by the Code of Judicial Conduct not to take part in any proceeding where his impartiality may be reasonably questioned. Among the grounds for mandatory

disqualification of the judge is if any of the lawyers is a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree.

GARY P. ROSAURO vs. JUDGE ALFREDO KALLOS
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 149

FACTS: Rosauro orally agreed to buy the unregistered piece of land in Legaspi City of respondent Judge Kallos provided that the respondent would take care of its registration in complainant’s name, at no additional cost. After making several payments to the respondent, the latter obtained a loan from the former, which was payable in 2 months. The respondent failed to pay for the loan. Moreover, the complainant learned that a receipt and the Deed of Absolute Sale which the respondent gave him, that a certain Esplana-Guerrero owned the said property and that Guerrero had sought the reconstitution of her alleged title to the same in the RTC of Legaspi City, but her petition was dismissed. Respondent judge also failed to register the property in complainant’s name. As a result, the complainant sought to rescind the contract but the respondent replied, using his sala’s official stationary, that he needs more time as Guerrero was still raising the amount to refund the complainant.

ISSUE: Should the judge be held liable for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and impropriety?

HELD: YES. Respondent judge violated Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as he took part in a commercial transaction falling delineated that tend to interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, and increased his involvement with persons likely to come before his sala regarding the said property, thus, increasing the chances of his disqualification from future litigation concerning the same. As held in Berin vs. Judge, the respondent judge increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the event that a dispute involving the said contract of sale arises. Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale might plead before his court is not remote and his business dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to his fairness and impartiality, and also as to the judge’s integrity. Respondent judge also violated Rule 5.08 of the Code when he served as Guerrero’s attorney-in-fact. As such, the judge was within the purview of other fiduciary as used in the rule. He should not serve as fiduciary of another, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.

Finally, respondent violated Rule 2.03 by using the official stationery for his correspondence with complainant as it should only be used for official correspondence. By using his sala’s stationery other than for official purposes, respondent judge evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guerrero and himself. He is also liable for impropriety for the non-payment of the loan.

Q: May a lawyer withdraw from a case?

A: YES. The lawyer may withdraw from a case with the consent of the court, provided that:

1. There is a failure to pay legal fees;

2. Client pursues an illegal cause of conduct;

3. Client insists pursuance to an act violative of the Conduct of Professional Responsibility;

4. Appointment of lawyers to public position except when it is prejudicial to the client;

Q: What is meant by compensation based on “quantum meruit”?

A: The term “quantum meruit” as used in attorney’s fees means the fee which as much as the lawyer deserves considering the reasonable value of the services he has rendered. (Teerthdass vs. Pohoomul Brothers, 15 Phil. 607).

Q: Is indefinite suspension of a lawyer a cruel punishment?

A: NO. Indefinite suspension gives the lawyer the key to the restoration of his right by giving him a change to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt of misconduct by acknowledging his misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance, and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards required of every lawyer. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, February 1, 1989).

RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA
A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA

FACTS: Atty. Sorreda, who identified himself as a member of the Philippine Bar, wrote a letter to the Chief Justice, expressing his frustrations over the unfavorable outcome of the manner by which the Court resolved the cases filed by him. Atty. Sorreda wrote several letters regarding the unfair resolution of the cases filed by him. They were addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of the SC, the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the Court. The letters were considered as degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court with the use of vile, offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against the Court. He persistently imputed to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks in his letters.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sorreda is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: YES. Atty. Sorreda’s conduct violated the CPR, specifically Canon 11, which states that: “A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his client’s genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised responsibly.

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the CPR.

Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Supreme Court. But, certainly, this does not give him unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and bring it into disrepute. Thus, Atty. Sorreda is found guilty of contempt of court and violation of the CPR amounting to gross misconduct. He is hereby suspended indefinitely.

ATTY. FIDELA Y. VARGAS vs. JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES ASDALA
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1436, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 579

Q: In an affidavit-complaint, the complainant-lawyer alleges that the posting of the Manila Standard news items at the door of respondent - judge’s courtroom, which constitutes libel, brought dishonor and great embarrassment to complainant. Is the respondent judge guilty of serious misconduct?

A: NO. There is no evidence to support the charge of Oral Defamation and there is no evidence that respondent judge committed a misconduct for the posting of the newspaper clipping at the door of the courtroom. There is no evidence that she posted said clipping or that she ordered its posting. She was not the writer of the news items nor is there a showing that she supplied what was written thereon.

JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO vs. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CABEBE
444 SCRA 382, A.M. No. 03-1800-RTJ, November 26, 2004

Q: In a criminal case, a judge issued motu propio an order granting bail to the accused on the ground that the accused invoked his right to speedy t rial without objection on the part of the prosecution. Is the act of the respondent judge proper?

A: NO. Respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the accused. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his office. He must render justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up to these standards.

FELIX E. EDQUIBAL vs. ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER, JR.
A.C. No. 5687, February 3, 2005, 450 SCRA 406

Q: May the respondent lawyer be held liable considering his defense that he did not agree to represent the complainant in the appellate court?

A: YES. If it is true that respondent never agreed to handle the appeal upon receipt of said notice, respondent should have immediately manifested to the Court of Appeals that he is not handling the appeal on behalf of said defendant-appellants. Section 2, Rule 44 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that “the counsel and guardian ad litem of the parties in the court of origin shall be respectively considered as their counsel and guardians ad litem in the Court of Appeals.” By failing to do so, the Court of Appeals had every reason to assume that he was likewise representing defendants-appellants in the appeal. Accordingly, his failure to timely file the required appellants’ brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

ATTY. ANTONIO D. SELUDO vs. JUDGE ANTONIO J. FINEZA
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1864, December 16, 2004, 447 SCRA 73

Q: During the hearing, respondent judge uttered the following vitriolic language against complainant: a) Putang ina mo; b) If respondent knows how to read English; c) Let it be put on record, that he has a moronic attitude; d) If Your Honor please, I don’t know if this guy is really stupid. The respondent judge explained that he has been suffering from a heart ailment and diabetes causing him considerable anxiety and pain and that this must be the reason why he could not control his outburst. Does the respondent’s behavior fall short of the standards expected of a magistrate of the law?

A: YES. That respondent was suffering from heart ailment and diabetes is not an excuse. He could have asked the assistance of a lawyer to represent him in prosecuting the case. Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every judge. A judge should be the last person to be person as petty, sharp-tongued tyrant. Sadly, respondent judge failed to live up to such standards of judicial conduct.

SALVADOR G. VILLANUEVA vs. ATTY. RAMON F. ISHIWATA
A.C. No. 5041, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 401

Q: In the course of the proceedings at the NLRC, the parties entered into a compromise agreement whereby for a consideration of P225,000, complainant agreed to release J. T. Transport from all its obligations to him. J. T. Transport delivered four checks to respondent as full payment of complainant’s claims. However, respondent gave complainant only P45,000 as “first installment,” without advising him that the settlement award had been paid in full. Complainant learned about it and demanded the balance but the respondent refused. Is the act of the respondent improper?”

A: YES. Obviously, respondent’s failure to return the balance to complainant upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him. His act is indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to something not his and which he had no right.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature. Under his oath, a lawyer pledges himself not to delay any man for money and he is bound to conduct himself with good fidelity to his clients. A lawyer should thus refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain, he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Accordingly, any money collected for the client or other trust property coming into the lawyer’s possession should promptly be reported by him.

VALERIANA DALISAY vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR.
A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508

Q: Dalisay alleged that she engaged the services of respondent Batas Mauricio as her counsel. Respondent asked her to pay an acceptance and filing fees in the total amount of P56,000.00. Despite her payments, respondent never rendered any legal services to her. As a result, she terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents. However, he refused to do so. Was an attorney-client relationship established?

A: YES. When respondent accepted P56,000.00 from complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latter’s case and that an attorney-client relationship between them as established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant with confidence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion.

A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to protect his client’s case, for his unwavering

loyalty to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Indeed, the entrusted privilege of every lawyer to practice law caries with it his corresponding duties not only to his client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

CARLOS B. REYES vs. ATTY. JEREMIAS R. VITAN
A.C. No. 5835, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 87

Q: Reyes hired the services of respondent Atty. Vitan for the purpose of filing appropriate complaint. He alleged that respondent after receiving the amount of P17,000 did not take any action on his case. Did Atty. Vitan violate the rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he received payment as counsel but had done nothing in behalf of his client?

A: YES. A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client’s cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice. Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

PAGCOR vs. ATTY. DANTE A. CARANDANG
A.C. No. 5700, January 30, 2006, 480 SCRA 512

FACTS: Bingo Royale Inc. (Bingo Royale) was represented by respondent Atty. Carandang as its president. when Pagcor had granted an Bingo Royale authority to operate Bingo Games. In the course of its operations, Bingo Royale incurred arrears the amount of P6,064,833.14 with Pagcor. As payment to the said obligation, Bingo Royale issued to Pagcor twenty four (24) checks in the sum of P7.2M signed by the respondent.

However, as the checks were deposited after the end of each month, they were all dishonored by the drawee bank by reason of “closed account.” Despite Pagcor’s demand letters, respondent failed to pay the amount of the checks.

Respondent averred that he is not liable for issuing bouncing checks because they were drawn by Bingo Royale and his act of doing so is not related to the office of a lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether respondent is guilty of serious misconduct by issuing checks in violation of BP 22.

HELD: YES. Misconduct has been defined as “wrong or improper conduct” and “gross” has been held to mean “flagrant and shameful.”

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially BP 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provision of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

A lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity.

Respondent likewise violated the Attorney’s Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

PETITION TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW
B.M. No. 1678, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 424

Q: May a Filipino lawyer who became a Canadian citizen resume his practice of law in the Philippines? What are the requirements?

A: YES, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines may resume his practice of law provided he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225.

He must secure from the SC the authority on the following conditions:

1. updating and payment in full of his IBP annual membership dues;

2. payment of professional tax;

3. retaking of lawyer’s oath and pledge of allegiance to the Constitution.

Rule   1.01
Violation     of     Lawyer’s     Oath

MARY   JANE   VELASCO & ATTYS. CHARLIE DOROIN &   HECTOR CENTENO
560   SCRA 1,    A.C.   No.    5033,   July    28,    2008

FACTS: Mary Jane was appointed by the RTC as administratrix in the settlement of estate of her late father, Dr. Eduardo Doroin. Atty. Charlie Doroin fooled Mary Jane by deceitful means into making her sign an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Partition allotting P1.2M as her share; giving Josephine, her father’s paramour, P7.2M; allotting her alleged 3 illegitimate siblings of P1.2M alleging such sharing is in accordance with law. No share was assigned to her mother who was the legal wife of Dr. Eduardo Doroin.

When Mary Jane visited the lot owned by her father situated at Kingspoint Subdivision sometime in June 1996, there was no house constructed thereon, but when she visited it again in January 1999, there was already a four-door townhouse constructed. She was informed by the caretaker at the site that the owner is one Evangeline. She also learned later that the said property was one of the properties submitted to the intestate court and was sold by Atty. Doroin to Evangeline by forging the signature of her father. Atty. Centeno, being a Notary Public, knowing well that Dr. Eduardo Doroin was already dead as of 21 January 1996, made it appear in the said Deed of Absolute Sale that Dr. Doroin appeared before him on 17 January 1997.

ISSUE: Whether the acts of Attys. Doroin & Centeno for forgery & falsification constitute violation of lawyer’s oath and justifies imposition of penalty of suspension and disbarment.

HELD: YES. Attys. Charlie Doroin & Hector Centeno violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that:

“A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful.”

In the case at bar, complainant claims that respondent lawyers forged the deed of sale and forced her to sign the deed of extra-judicial settlement by explaining to her that it was “in accordance with law.”

The complained actuations of the respondent lawyers constitute a blatant violation of the lawyer’s oath to uphold the law and the basic tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility that no lawyer shall engage in dishonest conduct.

Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.

FAILURE TO RETURN CLIENT’S FUNDS

CLEO   B.   DONGGA-AS    vs.    ATTYS.    ROSE   BEATRIX
CRUZ – ANGELES   &   WYLIE   M.   PALER
A.C,   No.   11113,   August   9,   2016,   799   SCRA   624

FACTS: Complainant Cleo engaged the law firm of respondents Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler to handle the annulment of his marriage with his wife.

In their meeting, Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler told complainant that the case would cost P300,000, with the first P100,000 payable immediately. Accordingly, complainant paid the respondents P100,000, which was duly received by Atty. Trexie Angeles.

Afterwards, Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler asked for an additional P250,000 for them to continue working on the case. However, to complainant’s dismay no appreciable progress took place.

When complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty. Trexie Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft petition was already submitted to the judge for editing and that the petition will soon be finalized.

Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment, complainant went to respondents’ law office to terminate their engagement and demanded the refund of the aggregate amount of P350,000 he earlier paid them. However, Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler refused to return the said amount and to complainant’s surprise, received two (2) billing statements from the respondents in the amounts of P258,000 and P324,000, respectively.

ISSUE

Whether Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler be held liable for failure to return their client’s funds on demand in violation of Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the CPR.

RULING

YES, Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler should be held liable for failure to return their client’s funds on demand.

They violated Rule 18.03 of the CPR which the case law exhorts that “once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

The lawyer owes fidelity to such a cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable as in this case.

In this relation, Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler also violated Rule 16.01 and 16.03 of the CPR to return to complainant the amount of P350,000 representing their legal fees.

Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well, as of professional ethics.

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that “as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Clearly Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler fell short of such standard when they committed the afore-described acts of misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Their acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful and dishonorable to the legal profession, they also reveal basic moral flaws that make Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler unfit to practice law.

Attys. Trexie Angeles and Paler are found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR and accordingly each of them is suspended from practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

WITHHOLDING CLIENT’S FUNDS

ADEGORE R. PLUMPTRE vs. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA
A.C. No. 11350, August 9, 2016, 799 SCRA 639

FACTS: Complainant Adegoke engaged the services of respondent Atty. Rivera in order to help him in his application for a work permit from the Bureau of Immigration.

Complainant paid the respondent P10,000 as professional fees. They met again and complainant gave respondent another P10,000. As they met for the third time, respondent asked P8,000 in order to pay a Las Piñas judge to reverse the motion for reconsideration against complainant.

After which, complainant never received any updates on the status of his working permit and pending court case.

Further, he called respondent for updates but the latter hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his wife. After tracking respondent’s whereabouts, complainant demanded the return of the P28,000 endorsed to him, to which the latter refused.

ISSUE

Whether respondent Atty. Rivera be held liable for withholding such client’s funds and for bribing the judge.

RULING

YES, respondent Atty. Rivera should be held liable for withholding client’s funds and for bribing the judge.

The unjustified withholding of funds belonging to the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer.

By absconding with the money entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a manner not befitting a member of the bar, respondent violated the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 16.01 of Canon 16, Canon 17, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18.

As his client’s advocate, a lawyer is duty - bound to protect his client’s interests and the degree of service expected of him in this capacity is his “entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. The lawyer also a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with utmost trust and confidence.

Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided in complainant’s favor, Atty. Rivera’s act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the judge and the judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won by the party with deepest pockets and not on the merits.

This gross disrespect of the judicial system shows that the respondent is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the lack of integrity in his character, the practice of law is a privilege and respondent has repeatedly shown that he is unfit to exercise it and is suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years.

A   LAWYER    MUST   ACT    WITH   HONESTY    AND    INTEGRITY

CONDONING    LAWYER’S    MALPRACTICE
IS    NOT   ALLOWED

SPOUSES   ROGELIO   &   AIDA   AMATORIO   vs.   ATTY.   FRANCISCO   D.   YAP
A.C.   5914,    March   11,    2015,   752   SCRA   230

FACTS: Atty. Yap sued the spouses Amatorio to collect the amount of P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was, however, stricken off the record for the reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its filing.

Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the Amatorio’s decided to seek an out – of - court settlement.

On May 23, 2001, Aida Amatorio went to Atty. Yap’s law office. She appealed for his reconsideration and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and on the same day, Aida tendered the first payment of P20,000 which was duly received and acknowledged by Atty. Yap in the written letterhead of Yap Law Office.

When Aida asked Atty. Yap if they should still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001, Atty. Yap assured her that they need not attend anymore as he will be moving for the dismissal of the case. Relying on Atty. Yap’s assurance, spouses Amatario did not attend the scheduled hearing.

Subsequently, Spouses Amatorio were surprised to receive copies of the decision of the trial court filed by Atty. Yap, declaring them in default for non-appearance during the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the amount of their indebtedness with damages. The decision, however, did not mention the out – of - court settlement between the parties.

Nonetheless, the spouses continued tendering installment payments to Atty. Yap’s upon the latter’s assurance that he will disregard the decision of the trial court.

Again, the spouses were surprised to learn, however, that Yap filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution and, in fact, the trial court issued that writ.

The spouses filed a disbarment case against Atty. Yap with the IBP where Atty. Paras served as their counsel.

The IBP commissioner recommends that Atty. Yap should be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Upon review by the IBP Board of Governors, it was approved that Atty. Yap be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

On August 9, 2007, the spouses terminated the services of Atty. Paras for reason that they can no longer afford the services of a private lawyer.

Suspiciously, on the same day, the spouses executed a Judicial Affidavit forgiving and exonerating Atty. Yap for his malpractice.

ISSUE: Whether the statements of the spouses Amatorio, especially contesting the truthfulness of the allegations against Atty. Yap in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily results to Atty. Yap’s absolution.

HELD: NO. The Court cannot just aside the finding of culpability against Atty. Yap merely because the spouses Amatorio have decided to forgive him or settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP.

The spouses’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Atty. Yap. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the spouses to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof.

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.

Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public faith in the legal profession.

Because of the misconduct of Atty. Yap, it is deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined.

It is clearly established that Atty. Yap received P20,000 as initial payment for their out – of - court settlement. He told the Spouses not to attend the pre-trial and he did not inform the court of the settlement. The trial court granted the motion for execution of the decision filed by Atty. Yap, thus, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE “Noli” EMMANUEL EALA
529 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007

The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Thus, it is considered grossly immoral conduct which is a ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.

REGIDOR R. TOLEDO vs. ATTY. JERRY RADAM TOLEDO
544 SCRA 26, A.M. No. P-07-2403, February 6, 2008

With respect, however, to the allegation of immorality, this Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral and the same must be established by clear and convincing proof.

ROSA YAP PARAS vs. ATTY. JUSTO PARAS
529 SCRA 81, G.R. No. 147824, August 2, 2007

FACTS: Rosa filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against Justo on the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC rendered a decision upholding the validity of marriage.

In the meantime, Rosa filed a disbarment case against Justo premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court suspended Justo from the practice of law after finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in bank documents, immorality and abandonment of his family.

ISSUE: Whether the factual findings in the disbarment case are conclusive in the case of annulment of marriage.

HELD: NO. Jurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.

Accordingly, one’s unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one’s unfitness as a husband or vice versa. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

While Rosa’s charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, “the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still fit person to be allowed the privilege as such.”

REFUSING THE UNLAWFUL CLAIM

BUDENCIO DUMANLAG vs. ATTY. JAIME M. BLANCO, JR.
A.C. No. 8825, August 3, 2016, 799 SCRA 207

FACTS: Under TCT No. 79146, El Mavic Company (EMIDCI) appears to be the registered owner of the land it occupies.

Complainant Dumanlag sent a letter to EMIDCI president, claiming to be an agent of the Heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro predicated on a Spanish title T.P. 4136.

The matter was referred to Atty. Blanco, counsel of EMIDCI, who rejected complainant’s claim on the ground that the Supreme Court decision held that the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro were specifically prohibited from exercising any act of ownership over the lands covered by T.P. 4136.

Dumanlag argues that Atty. Blanco had unjustly prevented the exercise of his rights over the land.

ISSUE

Whether the act of Atty. Blanco of rejecting Dumanlag’s claim was done maliciously and in violation of the CPR and Lawyer’s Oath.

RULING

NO, the act done was not malicious and it did not violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

A lawyer should always defend the cause of his client but only within the bounds of law. A lawyer should never pursue the claims of a client if he is fully aware that such claim is erroneous or illegal.

Such is the case here. Atty. Blanco validly denied Dumanlag’s claim as the rejection is validly based on jurisprudence validly decided by the Court. Atty. Blanco performed his duty to his client without exceeding the scope of his authority. There was no misconduct to speak of on the part of Atty. Blanco.

In fact, Atty. Blanco should even be commended as he remained steadfast in maintaining the cause of his client even as he was subjected to harassment.

A lawyer is charged with a duty to defend “the cause of his client with wholehearted fidelity.”

MOTIONS NOT INTENDED TO DELAY

JOSEPH A. CHUA vs. ATTY. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO
A.C. No. 10671, September 5, 2016, 811 SCRA 534

FACTS: Complainant Chua’s company, Nemar Computer Resources Corporation (NCRC) filed a collection case against Dr. Concepcion Aguila Memorial College, represented by its counsel, respondent Atty. De Castro.

Respondent initially moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter (principal amount) and the court granted the dismissal, however, it was reversed on complainant’s motion.

Since the filing of the collection case, it took more than 5 years to present one witness of NCRC. Complainant alleged that such delays were due to respondent’s propensity to seek postponements of agreed hearing dates for unmeritorious excuses.

Respondent countered that his pleas for continuance and resetting were based on valid grounds and were not objected to by the counsel for NCRC. He asseverates that he will soon be a septuagenarian, he has been active in the academe, teaching law subjects and preparing bar candidates. His record as a lawyer is untarnished.

ISSUE

Whether the motions for postponements filed by respondent were deliberate, dishonest, malicious and with ill motives.

RULING

NO, the motion for postponements if indeed committed by the respondent was merely professional lapses in his schedules, and they were not deliberate, dishonest, malicious and with no ill motives.

There is no debate that lawyers are instruments of the Court in the administration of justice throughout the country. Accordingly, they are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of ethics, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Only in this way will the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system be ensured.

A lawyer indubitably owes fidelity to the cause of his clients, and is thus expected to serve the clients with competence and utmost diligence. He is enabled to utilize every honorable mean to defend the cause of his client and secure what is due to the latter.

In this case, the delay in the disposition of the civil case was not solely attributable to Atty. De Castro. The trial court itself, either at its own initiative or at the instance of Chua’s counsel, allowed the delays. Consequently, if not all of such delays were attributable to Atty. De Castro’s doing, it would be unfair to hold him solely responsible for the delays caused in the case.

Moreover, it appears that the trial court granted Atty. De Castro’s several motions for resetting of the trial and that at no time did the trial court sanction or cite him for contempt of court for abuse on account of such motions.

CANON   7

TAN   TIONG   BIO   vs.   ATTY.   RENATO   L.   GONZALES
530   SCRA   748,   A.C. No. 6634,   August   23,   2007

For all legal intents and purposes, Atty. Gonzales, by performing through the yea0rs notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized has indulged in deliberate falsehood.

NICOLAS TAN vs. ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR.
531 SCRA 645, A.C. No. 6483, August 31, 2007

Respondent Balon is liable for indirect contempt because notwithstanding his disbarment on October 28, 2003, he continued to represent himself as a lawyer, not only before the IBP but also before the Supreme Court.

DIANA RAMOS vs. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG
530 SCRA 759, A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007

Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices. As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney’s fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office’s mission. Respondent violated against accepting legal fees other than his salary.

Rule   20.04
CONTROVERSY   WITH   CLIENTS   INVOLVING   COMPENSATION

VINSON   PINEDA   vs.   ATTY.   CLODUALDO DE JESUS et. al.
499   SCRA   608,    G.R.   No.   155224,   August   23,   2006

FACTS: Respondents were the counsels of Vinson Pineda in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage filed against him by his wife. He and his wife agreed to a settlement regarding visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties which the trial court granted.

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated. They, including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from Dr. Vinson’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed Dr. Vinson additional legal fees amounting to P16.5M which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, Dr. Vinson issued them several checks totaling P1.12M as “full payment for settlement.”

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court a motion for payment of lawyers’ fees for P50M, representing 10% of the value of the properties granted to petitioner in the case for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether respondent counsels are entitled to additional legal fees.

HELD: NO. Respondents’ claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not charge petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from petitioner’s business --- all of which were not denied by respondents -- more than sufficed for the work they did. The “full payment for settlement” should have discharged petitioner’s obligation to them.

The practice of law is a decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a mere incident. As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents’ despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the mind of some people. The vernacular has a word for it, “nagsasamantala.”

NOTABLE CASES ON LEGAL ETHICS

Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate language during the hearing of a case. A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. (Atty. Melvin Mane vs. Judge Arnaldo Belen, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 555).

Judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law while holding judicial office. Those who have been merely suspended and not dismissed from the service are still bound under the prohibition. (Atty. Florencio Binalay vs. Judge Elias Lelina, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-09-2132, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 547).

Fighting between court employees during office hours is disgraceful behavior reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards the seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one another in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not only towards co-workers, but to the court as well the behavior of the parties was totally unbecoming members of the judicial service. (Judge Rizalina Umali vs. Judge Paulita Villarante, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 240)

A lawyer who contracted a second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting is liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the CPR as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes “conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.” Gross immoral conduct on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Juan Dulalia vs. Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Jr., A.C. No. 6854, April 25, 2007, 522 SCRA 244).

CANON   1 -   DUTY TO   UPHOLD   THE     CONSTITUTION   AND   THE   LAWS

LIGAYA   MANIAGO   vs.    ATTY.   LOURDES   I.   DE   DIOS
A.C. No.   7472,   March   30,   2010,   617   SCRA   142

FACTS: Atty. De Dios was meted by the SC the penalty of six months suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon the receipt of the Court’s resolution. At the end of six month – period, she formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law which she actually did.

ISSUE: Whether the lifting of the suspension order was automatic after the expiration of the period.

HELD: NO. The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic at the end of the period stated in the Court decision. An order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order for him to resume the practice of her profession. Thus, a suspended lawyer must first present proofs of his compliance by submitting from the IBP and from the Executive Judge that she has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension.

IMMORAL   CONDUCT

MAELOTISEA   GARRIDO     vs.     ATTYS.     ANGEL     E.     GARRIDO
&     ROMANA     P.     VALENCIA
A.C.   No. 6593,   February   4,   2010,   611   SCRA   508

FACTS: Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage with Constancia. Their union bore six (6) children. Upon the death of his first wife, Constancia, he married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong.

ISSUE: Whether both Attys. Garrido & Valencia committed gross immorality that would warrant their disbarment.

HELD: YES. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. They failed to adhere to highest standards of morality when Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affairs with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implication of his action on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. vs. ATTY. LEO J. PALMA
A.C. No. 2474, September 15, 2004, 438 SCRA 306

Atty. Palma secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. The Court found that Atty. Palma exhibited a deplorable lack of degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. The Court also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and immorality.

FLORENCE MACARRUBO vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO MACARRUBO
A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA 42

Atty. Macarrubo entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. The Court ruled Atty. Macarrubo’s pattern of misconduct undermined the institution of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up for the rearing of our children and for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, Atty. Macarrubo was disbarred.

LILIAN VILLASANTA vs. ATTY. HILARION M. PERALTA
G.R. No. L-9513, April 30, 1957, 101 Phil. 313

Atty. Peralta married Lilian while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. The Court ruled that the act of Atty. Peralta of contracting a second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified Atty. Peralta from admission to the Bar.

ELPIDIO P. TIONG vs. ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO
A.C. No. 4428, December 12, 2010, 662 SCRA 1

FACTS: Atty. George served as legal counsel and administrator of Elpidio’s business. He had illicit affair with his client’s wife and later both admitted their relationship. Seeking forgiveness, Atty. George and his client’s wife, executed an affidavit attesting their illicit relationship and seeking their respective spouses’ forgiveness.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. George is liable for gross immoral conduct.

HELD: YES. Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession. Atty. George’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.

TOMAS P. TAN, JR. vs. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA
A.C. No. 9000, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 327

FACTS: Atty. Haide obtained a loan of P350,000 from Tomas and by way of security, she offered a parcel of land covered by a TCT registered in her father’s name. She executed an “open” Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of Tan attaching thereto the SPA in the event she failed to pay the full amount of loan on due date. Respondent lawyer defaulted on her loan obligation and failed to pay the same despite complainant’s repeated demands. Left with no recourse, Tomas went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that Atty. Haide deceived him since the SPA did not give Atty. Haide the power to sell the property but only empowered him to mortgage the property solely to banks.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Haide exhibited conduct unworthy of the legal profession.

HELD: YES. Atty. Haide violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s action clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false representation and by taking advantage of her education and complainant’s ignorance in legal matters.

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA vs. ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA
A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011, 659 SCRA 1

FACTS: Atty. Omaña prepared and notarized a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay” of Espinosa and his wife Elena and that they could legally live separately and dissolved their marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Omaña’s act of preparing and notarizing void document warrant disciplining measures against her.

HELD: YES. A notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of marriage and family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership.

CANON   9
UNAUTHORIZED   PRACTICE   OF   LAW

RULE   9.01

RODRIGO TAPAY vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO
A.C. No. 9604, March 20, 2013, 674 SCRA 1

FACTS: A complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document and graft and corrupt practices was filed against Tapay before the Office of the Ombudsman by a certain Divinagracia. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had to meet him yet in person and his signature appearing in the complaint against Tapay was signed by his secretary in his law office.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bancolo violated Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional responsibility.

HELD: YES. With Atty. Bancolo’s admission that the complaint he filed against Tapay before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office is clearly a violation of Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides in Canon 9 that “A Lawyer Shall Not, Directly or Indirectly, Assist in the Unauthorized Practice of Law” and Rule 9.01 which states that “a lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.”

The lawyer’s duty to prevent or at the very least not to assist in the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individual found only qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred in the law is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice of law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading.

RULE   9.02

MIGUEL   VILLATUYA    vs.   ATTY.   BEDE   S.   TABALINGCOS
A.C. No.   6622,   July   10,   2012,   676   SCRA   37

FACTS: Miguel was employed by Atty. Bede as a financial consultant to assist in the technical and financial matter in the numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation where they had a verbal agreement that Miguel be entitled to P50,000 for every Stay Order and 10 (10%) percent of the fees. After Atty. Bede was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working together, Atty. Bede denied said agreement and proffered documents showing the salary of Miguel had been paid as his employee.

ISSUE: Whether the sharing of legal fees is violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. The agreement is violative of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is prohibited by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law.

An agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void and that the lawyer may be disciplined for unethical conduct.

CANON   21
RULE   21.01

DR.   TERESITA   LEE   vs.    ATTY.    AMADOR    L.   SIMANDO
A.C.   No.   9537,    June   10,    2013,   698   SCRA 20

FACTS: Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of Dr. Lee. One day, Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee and asked her to extend a loan of P1.4M to a certain Mejorado who was then awaiting his claim for informer’s reward from the Bureau of Customs. Upon persistence of Atty. Simando to act as co-maker, Dr. Lee finally gave in her lawyer’s demand.

When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee’s repeated demands, Mejorado failed and referred to comply with his obligation. Dr. Lee instructed Atty. Simando to initiate legal actions against Mejorado but her lawyer ignored and failed to bring legal actions.

A demand letter was sent to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of the loans of Mejorado but he denied his liability as co-maker and claimed that novation had occurred because Dr. Lee had given additional loans to Mejorado without his knowledge.

Dr. Lee accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence which she gave upon him as a lawyer and even took advantage of their professional relationship in order to get a loan for his client. Worse, when the said obligation became due, Atty. Simando was unwilling to help her to favor Mejorado. She lamented that Atty. Simando even divulged confidential information he had acquired while he was still her lawyer and even used it against her.

ISSUES

(1) Whether Simando is guilty of representing conflicting interest.

(2) Whether Simando is guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the CPR.

HELD: (1) YES. His representation of opposing clients in both cases though unrelated obviously constitutes conflict of interest or at least, invites suspicion of double dealing. Moreover, with the subject loan agreement entered into by Dr. Lee and Mejorado, who are both his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, more so when he signed as co-maker.

(2) YES. In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of Dr. Lee, Atty. Simando violated Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he divulged informations which he acquired in confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client relationship.

PRACTICE OF LAW

PETITION TO   SIGN   ROLL   OF   ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL   A.   MEDADO,   Petitioner,
B.M. No. 2540,   September   24,   2013,   706   SCRA   264

FACTS: In 1979, Medado graduated from UP College of Law and passed the bar examinations in the same year.

In 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the PICC, but failed to sign the Roll of Attorneys on his scheduled date as he misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the OBC when he went to his province for a vacation.

Several years later, when he was already involved in corporate and taxation work, he came across the aforementioned Notice and realized what he signed at the entrance of PICC was just an attendance record and not the Roll of Attorneys. Thus, he was operating under the mistaken belief that since he already took the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer.

In 2005, when he attended MCLE seminars, he was required to provide his Roll Number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited, but was unable to do since he had not yet signed the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE: Whether Medado commits an unauthorized practice of law.

HELD: YES. He committed unauthorized practice of law. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Medado has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.

As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, he cannot be suspended from the practice of law, it is best to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after the receipt of SC resolution.

SONIA C. DECENA vs. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON
A. M. No. RTJ-10-2217, April 8, 2013, 695 SCRA 284

FACTS: During a hearing for an administrative case against Dr. Amelita, where her daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina, a new practitioner, acted as counsel, her husband, Judge Malanyaon sat beside counsel, prompting her to rise from her seat and/or ask permission from the hearing officer to speak, and make manifestations while reading or glancing at the paper given by Judge Malanyaon.

Counsel for complainant questioned the propriety of Judge Malanyaon’s sitting with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a member of the Judiciary.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Malanyaon is guilty of exhibiting conduct unbecoming of a judge.

HELD: YES. First, by occupying a seat beside his daughter that was reserved for lawyers during the hearing, Judge Malanyaon displayed his presumptuousness and perhaps even his clear intention to exert his influence as an RTC Judge on the hearing officer in order for the latter to favor his wife’s cause.

Second, by Judge Malanyaon’s admission that his presence in the hearing was to advise daughter on what to do and say during the hearing to the point of coaching her, and claiming that it was his filial duty towards his wife and daughter that brought him there.

But the situation of Judge Malanyaon was different, for he was a judicial officer who came under the structure that uniformity applied to all judges of all level of the judicial hierarchy, forbidding him from engaging in the private practice of law during his incumbency, regardless of whether the beneficiary was his wife or daughter or other members of his own family.

UNLAWFUL,    DISHONEST    &     DECEITHFUL    CONDUCT
SIMULATING    TRANSACTIONS   -   Rule   1.01   of   CPR

LILIA   TABANG    vs.   ATTY.     GLENN   C.    GACOTT
A.C.   No. 6490,   July   9,   2013,   700   SCRA   788

FACTS: Lilia purchased seven parcels of agricultural land with a total area of 30 hectares and obtained the corresponding TCT under the names of fictitious persons.

Later, when Lilia was offering the parcels to prospective buyers, Atty. Gacott borrowed the seven (7) TCTs covering the parcels.

Atty. Gacott executed several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the fictitious owners. Also he caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale.

Subsequently, Atty. Gacott succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a sum of money of more than P3M from the proceeds of the sales.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Gacott is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

HELD: YES. Atty. Gacott is guilty of misconduct, dishonesty and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

The Rule provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

While it may be true that Lilia herself engaged in illicit activities, her own complicity does not negate or even mitigate the repugnancy of Atty. Gacott’s offense. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.

Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it.

BAR    DISCIPLINE

ATTY.     PHILIP SIGFRID     A.     FORTUN      vs.
ATTY.    PRIMA     JESUSA     B.   QUINSAYAS,    et.    al.
G.R.   No. 194578,   February   13,   2013,   690   SCRA   623

FACTS: Atty. Fortun is the counsel for the Ampatuans, the principal accused in the Maguindanao Massacre.

Atty. Quinsayas filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun for misleading the prosecution and trial court under the rules and muddled the issues and diverted the attention away from the main subject matter of the case.

Atty. Fortun filed an indirect contempt against Atty. Quinsayas and the media group for active dissemination of the details of the disbarment complaint against him in violation of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on confidential nature of disbarment proceedings.

The media group denied the posting and publication of the articles about the disbarment complaint. It would appear that only Atty. Quinsayas was responsible for the distribution of copies of the disbarment complaint to the members of the media.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Quinsayas is guilty of indirect contempt in violation of Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

HELD: YES. Atty. Quinsayas is bound by Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court both as a complainant and as a lawyer in the disbarment case against Atty. Fortun.

As a lawyer and an officer of the Court, Atty. Quinsayas is familiar with the confidential nature of disbarment proceedings. However, instead of preserving its confidentiality, she disseminated copies of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Fortun to members of the media which act constitutes contempt of court.

RULE   6.06   CANON   6    OF    CPR
Primary   Duty   of    the   Prosecutor

MARY   ROSE   A.   BOTO    vs.    PROS. VINCENT   L.   VILLENA
A.C.   No. 9684,   September   18,   2013,   706   SCRA   1

FACTS: Boto had filed a libel case against Tizon but the said case was dismissed by Prosecutor Villena without conducting preliminary investigation.

However, when Tizon filed a complaint for libel against Boto, Prosecutor Villena immediately acted and has shown interest from its filing to the issuance of the warrant of arrest on the same day the case was filed before the MeTC.

Boto posted bail and on the scheduled arraignment, she filed the Motion to Quash the information on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as the crime of libel falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, and not with the MeTC.

The MeTC, instead of dismissing the case, issued an Order requiring trial prosecutor Villena to file his comment within ten (10) days and reset the arraignment.

Prosecutor Villena failed to file his comment within ten (10) days and extended to five (5) months.

Finally, Prosecutor Villena opposed the motion to quash and contended that “the court had already determined probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest.”

ISSUE: Whether Prosecutor Villena is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: YES. When the motion to quash was filed by Boto for lack of jurisdiction, Prosecutor Villena should have immediately acted on it by not opposing the dismissal of the case.

Patently, the responsive pleading of Prosecutor Villena demonstrates that he did not know the elementary rules on jurisdiction. Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and it is no within the courts, let alone the parties themselves. As a responsible public servant, Rule 6.01 of the CPR provides that “the prosecutor’s primary duty is not simply convict but to see that justice is done.”

NON   COMPLIANCE   OF   MCLE

JUDGE   MARIBETH   MANAHAN   vs.   ATTY. RODOLFO   FLORES
A.C. No. 8954,   November   13,   2013,   709   SCRA   297

FACTS: Atty. Flores was the counsel for the defendant in a civil case before the sala of Judge Manahan.

During the preliminary conference, Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief.

Later, Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance, however, Atty. Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.

The preliminary conference was set several times and Atty. Flores was given several occasions to submit the brief with the proper MCLE compliance.

On the final instance, instead of submitting the promised proof of MCLE compliance, Atty. Flores filed a letter stating that he was no longer representing the defendant. Such was stated in what was deemed as intemperate language.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Flores is guilty of disrespect to court orders.

HELD: YES. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government.

Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. Furthermore, he used intemperate language in his pleadings and dealing with the court.

As an officer of the court, he must be circumspect in his language and should have abstained from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court.

SAMUEL B. ARNADO vs. ATTY. HOMOBONO A. ADAZA
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015, 768 SCRA 172

FACT: Atty. Adaza filed a request for exemption for the First and Second Compliance period on the grounds of expertise of law.

While awaiting for his request of for exemption, he used to indicate in his pleadings “MCLE application for exemption under process” filed in 2009, 2010, 2011 and “MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in the pleadings filed in 2012.

On January 14, 2009, the MCLE Governing Board denied his request for exemption for his failure to submit sufficient, satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in a certain area of law.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Adaza is administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.

HELD: YES. Atty. Adaza’s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregards of the directives of MCLE office warrant his declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP.

While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing to prevent the SC from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors to declare such lawyer as a delinquent member of the IBP.

Having declared Atty. Adaza as a delinquent member of the IBP, he is suspended from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he has complied with the MCLE requirements for the 1st to the Fifth periods of compliance.

FILING OF PLEADINGS WITH FALSE MCLE COMPLIANCE NUMBER

VIRGILIO J. MAPALAD vs. ATTY. ANSELMO S. ECHANEZ
A.C. No. 10911, June 6, 2017, 826 SCRA 57

FACTS: Complainant Virgilio filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Echanez for indicating falsified Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance number without stating the date of issue. Atty. Echanez used said falsified MCLE number in several pleadings against complainant.

Upon inquiry with the MCLE office, a certification was issued stating that the respondent has not complied with MCLE requirements.

Despite the resolutions and orders requiring him to file a comment, Atty. Echanez failed to do so. He did not also attend the mandatory conference/hearing and failed to submit his position paper.

ISSUE

Whether respondent’s act of indicating false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings and repeatedly failing to obey lawful orders warrant the penalty of disbarment.

RULING

YES, indicating false MCLE compliance number in his pleading and repeatedly failing to obey lawful order warrant the penalty of disbarment.

It was clearly established that respondent violated Bar Matter No. 850. No less than the MCLE office had issued a certification stating that respondent had not complied with the first and second compliance period of the MCLE.

Despite such non-compliance, respondent repeatedly indicated a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings before the trial courts. In so doing, he indeed misled the courts, litigants, his own clients included professional colleagues, and all others who may have relied on such pleadings containing false information.

Respondent’s act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is a mockery of the courts, especially the Supreme Court, considering that it is the Supreme Court that authored the rules and regulations that the respondent violated.

In using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, respondent also put his own client at risk. Such deficiency in pleadings can be fatal to the client’s cause as pleadings with false information produces no legal effect.

Respondent also repeatedly failed to obey legal orders of the courts and the IBP-CBD despite due notice.

Court orders should be respected not only because the authorities who issued them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the government, which is absolutely essential if our government is to be a government of laws and not of men.

Clearly, respondent’s act of ignoring the court order despite notice violates the lawyer’s oath and runs counter to the precepts of the CPR. By his repeated dismissive conduct, the respondent exhibited an unpardonable lack of respect for the authority of the Court.

Taken altogether, considering respondent’s act of using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings and his repeated failure to obey legal orders, respondent Atty. Echanez is DISBARRED from practice of law.

IMPROPRIETY    OF    A    JUDGE

POSTING   IMPROPER     PHOTOS     IN      FRIENDSTER

ANTONIO   M.   LORENZANA    vs.    JUDGE    MA.   CECILIA    I.    AUSTRIA
A.M.   No.   RTJ-09-2200,     April   2,    2014,     720    SCRA    319

FACTS: On April 14, 2008, a complaint was filed against Judge Austria for committing an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal details as a RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible partner.

She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

ISSUE: Whether the posting of “Friendster” photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggested dress constitutes an act of impropriety.

HELD: YES. Judge Austria is guilty of impropriety, as she is a visible personification of law and justice.

Judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.

The very nature of their functions requires under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be beyond reproach.

PROHIBITION OF    JUDGES TO    SERVE    AS    FIDUCIARY

CONRADO   ABE   LOPEZ    vs.   JUDGE   ROGELIO S.   LUCMAYON
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837,    September 24,   2014,    736   SCRA   291

FACTS: Conrado alleged that he inherited a lot from his adopted father, Restituto.

Sometime in October 2004, Conrado and Judge Lucmayon met in a waiting shed and at that meeting, Judge Lucmayon allegedly deceived him into signing a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale of Lot 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company.

Unknown to Conrado, the said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called “Waiver of Rights” that Judge Lucmayon had deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot 1696.

After signing the document which was already notarized by a certain Atty. Mata without his presence, Judge Lucmayon allegedly told Conrado that he no longer any right over the property.

In March 2005, Judge Lucmayon’s father, Pedro, ordered him to cease cultivating the land because of the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.

Conrado also asserted that Judge Lucmayon had caused Pedro and his siblings to execute a document entitled “Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement” wherein his name and the name of his adopting mother were excluded.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Lucmayon is administratively liable for serving as fiduciary.

HELD: YES. First, Judge Lucmayon violated Rule 5.06 of the code. As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary.

The intent of the rule is to limit a judge’s involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of his official functions.

When a member of the bench serves as administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runs the risk of losing his neutrality and impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those of the litigant who comes before his court.

The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties.

The Code defines “immediate family” as being limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity.

In this case, since Conrado clearly does not fall under Judge Lucmayon’s “immediate family” as herein defined, the latter’s appointment as the former’s attorney-in-fact is not a valid exception to the rule.

DISPLAY    OF   BIAS   AND   PARTIALITY

GASPAR    BANDOY    vs.   JUDGE   JOSE   S.   JACINTO,   JR.
A.M.   No. RTJ-14-2399,     November    19,    2014,   740   SCRA   578

FACTS: During the 2007 local elections, Bandoy was an election watcher of former mayor Panaligan, while De Jesus, a teacher, was one of the chairpersons of the Board of Election Inspector.

De Jesus was rumored to be closely associated with the rival mayoralty candidate, Villarosa.

De Jesus was caught in the act of ballot switching which was captured on video by a member of media.

As a result of this incident, De Jesus was criminally charged with the offense of ballot switching. Accordingly, on August 17, 2007, a warrant of arrest was issued against De Jesus.

On August 20, 2007, while there was a standing warrant of arrest against him, De Jesus filed a criminal case before the prosecutor’s office for Serious Illegal Detention against Bandoy.

On March 7, 2008, De Jesus was able to post bail before Las Piñas Judge Raul Villanueva.

Because Bandoy was charged with Serious Illegal Detention, the provincial prosecutor recommended no bail leaving him incarcerated for more than two years.

Bandoy charged Judge Jacinto of grave abuse of authority when he granted several postponements of De Jesus’ arraignment, originally scheduled on April 23, 2008 but was reset for seven times until De Jesus entered a plea of not guilty supposedly inside Judge Jacinto’s chamber on July 6, 2011.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Jacinto was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and displayed bias and partiality.

HELD: YES. Judge Jacinto was directly confronted with an allegation that he arraigned De Jesus inside his chambers. He was given the opportunity to answer, but he chose not to delve into it.

Ultimately, Judge Jacinto did not squarely face the issues being imputed against him, which was quite irregular since it was his name and his capacity as a member of the bench that was being challenged.

His silence introduces doubts in the minds of the public, which is not acceptable.

Hence, the Court cannot fathom why the arraignment of De Jesus was postponed from 2007 to 2011 without appropriate action coming from the court. Judge Jacinto should have availed of known legal remedies to compel De Jesus to personally appear for his arraignment but he did not. The appearance of leniency seemingly exhibited in favor of De Jesus gives an impression of bias and partiality that should be addressed and corrected.

The Code of Judicial Ethics emphasizes that Judges, as officers of the court have the duties to see to it that justice is dispensed with evenly and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public.

JUDGES TO WEAR JUDICIAL ROBES AT ALL TIMES DURING COURT SESSION

JOCELYN MELAREN et. al. vs. JUDGE JACINTO C. GONZALES
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1876, April 26, 2017, 824 SCRA 610

FACTS: The complainants were the defendants in civil case for unlawful detainer. They alleged that respondent Judge Gonzales was arrogant during the hearings, not wearing the judicial robe, incessantly puffing a lighted cigarettes and unnecessarily banging the gavel.

Respondent judge admitted not wearing the judicial robe due to the extreme heat, non-functioning air-conditioning units and regular brownouts but denied that he unnecessarily banged the gavel and smoked during trial.

ISSUE

Whether a judge is required to wear his judicial robe at all times during court session.

RULING

YES, a judge is required to wear his judicial robe at all times during court session.

Respondent Judge Gonzales’ act of not wearing the judicial robe during court sessions violated the Administrative Circular No. 25 dated June 9, 1989, which provides that “pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article 8 of the Constitution and in order to heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, it is hereby directed that beginning Tuesday, August 1, 1989, all Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of their respective courts.”

DUTY   TO   RESPECT   THE    LAW
AND   LEGAL   PROCESSES

FERNANDO    CHU    vs.    ATTY.    JOSE     C.   GUICO,   JR.
A.C.   No.   10573,    January   13,   2015,    745    SCRA    257

FACTS: Chu retained the services of Atty. Guico to handle the labor dispute involving his company CVC.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a judgment adverse to CVC. Hence, the case was appealed to the NLRC.

Atty. Guico asked Chu to raise P300,000 to be given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal. Chu raised and gave P280,000.

Thereafter, Atty. Guico showed Chu of a document allegedly a draft of the decision favorable to CVC.

Upon resolution of the appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Chu then confronted Atty. Guico, who referred him to his assistant for the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration (MR).

The MR having been denied, Chu brought the case before the Court of Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated the services of Atty. Guico.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Guico violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for demanding and receiving money from Chu to guarantee favorable decision from the NLRC.

HELD: YES. Atty. Guico violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x.

The Code of Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:

CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

In the case at bar, Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case.

He thus violated the law aginst bribery and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted gross dishonesty and deceit.

GAVINO & FLORDELIZA TOLENTINO vs. ATTY. HENRY SO & ATTY. FERDINAND ANCHETA
A.C. No. 6387, July 19, 2016, 797 SCRA 106

FACTS: Flordeliza was a defendant in a civil case before the RTC involving recovery of possession of a parcel of land, which was rendered against Flordeliza ordering her to vacate the land.

The case was appealed to the CA. While the appeal is pending, Flordeliza’s counsel was replaced by Atty. Henry So.

Spouses Flordeliza learned that the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Atty. Henry So did not inform them nor take the necessary action to elevate the case to the Supreme Court.

Thus, they were compelled to take the services of Atty. Ancheta. The latter promised them that there was still a remedy that he will file a motion to reopen appeal case and asked P200,000 to bribe the CA justices.

Spouses Flordeliza learned that no such motion was filed by Atty. Ancheta and the CA decision had been final and executory.

Spouses Flordeliza sought to recover the money from Atty. Ancheta but to no avail. On the other hand, Atty. Henry So answered explaining that he had departed from the law office while the case is pending at CA and moved to Western Samar.

Atty. Ancheta failed to follow order of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) requiring his attendance and presence in the hearing. He did not file any pleading.

ISSUES

1) Whether Atty. Henry So is guilty of negligence for failure to inform the spouses of the status of the case.

2) Whether Atty. Ancheta defrauded the spouses.

RULINGS

1) NO, Atty. Henry So is not guilty of negligence.

The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence of Atty. Henry So’s misconduct affecting her standing and moral character as an officer of the Court and member of the bar.

Atty. Henry So’s omission is not of such gravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension.

2) YES. Atty. Ancheta is guilty of defrauding the spouses.

Any member of the bar who fails to live up to the standards of integrity and morality exposes himself to administrative liability.

Atty. Ancheta’s act of asking for money from the spouses Flordeliza, to be used as bribe for the justices of the CA, is clearly an act which shows his lack of integrity in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). He is disbarred.

FLORDELIZA A. MADRIA vs. ATTY. CARLOS P. RIVERA
A.C. No. 11256, March 7, 2017, 819 SCRA 261

FACTS: Complainant Flordeliza engaged the services of respondent Atty. Rivera to process her annulment of marriage. After she signed the petition for annulment, Flordeliza was assured that she does not need to appear in court.

When her daughter made follow-ups on the case, she was informed that the petition was granted. A copy of the decision dated April 16, 2003 was received at the office of Atty. Rivera.

Believing that the documents were authentic, Flordeliza then declared in her Voter Registration Record that she was single.

After securing a copy of the certificate of finality, Flordeliza applied for renewal of her passport. Later, her former partner filed a complaint charging her fabricating the decision of the annulment of her marriage. Accordingly, she faced criminal charges for violation of the Philippine Passport Act.

Complainant claimed that she relied in good faith on the representation of respondent Atty. Rivera. Respondent averred that his client prevailed upon him to simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage had been annulled and to fabricate the certificate of finality and she had assured him that such simulated documents would be kept strictly confidential.

ISSUE

Whether simulation of a court decision and finality warrant disbarment.

RULING

YES, simulation of a court decision and finality warrant disbarment.

Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Under Rule 1.01, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 15.07 mandates that a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.

In this case, Atty. Rivera acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage and simulation of the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation that he only did it upon complainant’s persistent prodding did not exculpate him from responsibility for the acts are outright criminal falsification or forgery.

His deliberate falsification of the court decision and certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part and made mockery of the administration of justice. He is therefore unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. He is disbarred.

REBECCA     MARIE     UY     YUPANGCO – NAKPIL   vs.
ATTY.     ROBERTO     L.     UY
A.C.   No. 9115,   September   17,   2014,   735   SCRA   239

FACTS: Rebecca averred that Atty. Uy was her illegitimate half-cousin and he continuously failed and refused to comply with the court order declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties.

Atty. Uy mortgaged a commercial property in favor of the PSB despite an existing Trust Agreement wherein, subject property was subject of the dispute.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Uy violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. Atty. Uy is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the case at bar, Atty. Uy committed some form of misconduct by mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.

Regardless of the merits of his own claim, he should have exhibited prudent or restraint becoming of a legal exemplar.

He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar’s reputation.

ORTIGAS   PLAZA   DEVELOPMENT    CORPORATION   vs.
ATTY.   EUGENIO    S.   TUMULAK
A.C. No. 11385,   March 14,   2017, 820   SCRA 232

FACTS: Respondent Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by uniformed guards, unlawfully entered and took control of the entrance and exit of a parcel of land, which was related to the proceeding of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez in which respondent was designated as assignee.

Complainant Ortigas charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have coordinated the proper government agencies prior to the illegal and forcible intrusion.

The complainant manifests that as a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of his principal in the property was barred by res judicata due to the valid issuance of a torrens title under its name.

ISSUE

Whether Atty. Tumulak violates the CPR when he facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and participated in the forcible intrusion of complainant’s properties.

RULING

YES, Atty. Tumulak violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR and was suspended for two (2) years from practice of law.

Under Canon 1, a lawyer should uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.02 mandates that a lawyer shall not counsel or abeit activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening confidence in the legal system.

Atty. Tumulak, as a long-time practitioner, is presumed to know that the Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically addressing the fake titles arising from a spurious Deed of Assignment of the supposed Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez - the 2005 case of “Evangelista et. al. vs. Santiago” where the same modus as the one adapted by respondent lawyer was used by an “assignee” in claiming properties allegedly part of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.

Respondent lawyer is presumed to know the legal development that only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of the estate, but also because of his being a lawyer with the constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal development.

All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled rulings in order to commit injustice against the complainant.

*** I HAVE FOUGHT A GOOD FIGHT, I’VE FINISHED MY RACE***
I HAVE KEPT MY FAITH

GODSPEED

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