Login

05-31-2019, 10:28 PM

2018 GOLDEN BEACON REMEDIAL LAW

By: Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

1. J U R I S D I C T I O N

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. It is conferred by substantive law or by other statutes.

Features of jurisdiction over the subject matter:

1. conferred by law

2. can be raised at anytime

3. to be determined by the allegations of the case

4. determined by the allegations in the pleadings, not the evidence

5. sometimes territorial

COURTS OF LAW vs. COURTS OF EQUITY

A court of law decides a case according to what promulgated law is while a court of equity adjudicates a controversy according to the common precept of what is and just without inquiring into the terms of the statutes.

CONSTITUTIONAL and STATUTORY COURTS

Constitutional Courts are those created by the Constitution while Statutory Courts are those created by law. The Supreme Court owes its creation to the Constitution. It is therefore a Constitutional Court.

The Sandiganbayan is NOT a constitutionally created court because it was not directly created by the Constitution but was created by law pursuant to a constitutional mandate. All courts in the Philippines other than the Supreme Court are statutory court.

The distinction is significant because Constitutional Courts cannot be abolished by Congress without amending the Constitution whereas Statutory Courts may be abolished by Congress by just simply repealing the law which created those courts.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Under this doctrine, courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge and experience of said tribunal in determining technical and intricate matters of fact. (Villaflor vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 297).

WHEN JURISDICTION OVER THE RES BECOMES SIGNIFICANT

Jurisdiction over the res becomes relevant only in actions in rem and quasi in rem but also in situations where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant cannot be acquired in personam.

ACTIONS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION

In actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basic issue is one other than the recovery of a sum of money. The money claim is this type of action is merely incidental.

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the SC has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the MTC or RTC would depend on the amount of the

claim. However, where the basic issue is something OTHER THAN the right to recover a sum of money, then the action is considered as one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Some Examples of Action Incapable of Pecuniary Estimations:

1. Specific Performance;

2. Rescission;

3. Support;

4. Foreclosure of Mortgage;

5. Injunction;

6. Annulment;

7. etc.

ZENAIDA LANTING vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN
458 SCRA 93, G.R. No. 141426, May 6, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner filed a criminal complaint before the office of the Ombudsman against city officials of Manila for violation of RA 3019.

The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

She appealed the decision of the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals (CA), however, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the CA have jurisdiction to review cases decided by the Ombudsman?

HELD: NO. Petitioner’s complaint before the Ombudsman is for violation of the RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts) and it is not an administrative complaint. Considering the complaint is criminal in nature, the Supreme Court (SC) has the sole authority to review the Ombudsman resolution on pure question of law.

ESTOPPEL

SPRINGSUN MANAGEMENT SYSTEM vs. OSCAR CAMERINO
449 SCRA, G.R. No. 161029, January 19, 2005

FACTS: Respondents have been the farmers-tenants of Victoria Homes, cultivating and planting rice and corn on the lots.

Victoria Homes without notifying the respondents, sold the lots to petitioner Springsun.

Petitioner filed several complaints for forcible entry with the MTC against the respondent farm tenants.

In their common answer to the complaint, the respondents averred that they and their families have been in their possession of the lots as tenants and they have been tilling and planting rice and other agricultural crops thereon many years ago up to the present. MTC dismissed the case.

On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal. When appeal was brought to the CA, the petitioner asserts that the lower court did not have jurisdiction in the said case and it should have been filed with the Department of Agrarian Reforms instead.

ISSUE: Whether the question of jurisdiction be raised for the first time on appeal?

HELD: NO. It did not do so before the trial court and the Appellate Court. The SC has consistently ruled that an issue proffered for the first time on appeal and not timely presented in the proceedings before the lower court is barred by the principle of estoppel.

**** The Court has constantly upheld the doctrine that while jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a litigant’s participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, including the invocation of its authority in asking affirmative relief, bars such party from challenging the court’s jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to

secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party participating in the

proceedings and submitting his case for decision and then accepting judgment only if favorable and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA AGBAY & PEOPLE
G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

FACTS: An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed against David before the MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against David.

On February 11, 2011, after the filing of the information and before his arrest, David filed an Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause.

The MTC denied David’s motion for re-determination of probable cause and further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused David as the motion was filed prior to his arrest.

ISSUE: Whether the jurisdiction over the person of the accused was already acquired by the filing of the Urgent Motion for Re-determination of Probable Cause.

HELD: YES. The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires the jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits such as requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereafter, appearing for arraignment or by filing of bail.

Distinction should be made between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person.

Custody of the law required before the court can act upon application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant when the mere application therefore constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary surrender.

One can be under the custody of the law but not subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as, when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant.

On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.

Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.

Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

Considering that David sought affirmative relief in filing his motion for re-determination of probable cause, the MTC acquires over his person.

VOID JUDGMENT DOES NOT ATTAIN FINALITY

HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR vs. JOSE M. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 201607, February 15, 2017, 817 SCRA 623

FACTS: Chairman Domingo of the PAGC appointed Ramirez as Executive Assistant III. A month later, Chairman Domingo resigned and was replaced by Buenaflor.

Buenaflor terminated Ramirez as of the same date as Chairman Domingo’s resignation on the ground that his position was co-terminus with that of the appointing authority.

Believing that his appointment had been contractual in nature, Ramirez sued Buenaflor in the RTC. On the other hand, Buenaflor filed his answer and contended that Ramirez should have instead filed an administrative complaint in the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Buenaflor guilty of unlawful termination because he had not discharged his burden of proving that Ramirez’ employment was co-terminus with that of Chairman Domingo.

Buenaflor seasonably filed his motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied the same on September 30, 2008.

On September 22, 2011, Buenaflor filed a notice of appeal.

The RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal of Buenaflor, and altogether dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time.

Buenaflor assailed the order of the RTC by petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that the RTC thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The CA dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Buenaflor moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion for reconsideration as Buenaflor’s Notice of Appeal was filed 1,125 days thereafter is clearly out of time.

ISSUES

1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the termination of the services of Ramirez.

2) Whether the decision of the RTC has not attained finality despite the belated appeal.

RULINGS

1) NO. The RTC has no jurisdiction over a case involving termination of employment of an employee of the Civil Service.

Ramirez’ complaint challenging the validity of his termination from the service was outside of the RTC’s sphere of authority. His appointment or separation from the service are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.

It is clarified that the CSC has jurisdiction over a case involving a civil servant if it can be regarded as equivalent to a labor dispute under the Labor Code.

Conversely, the regular court has jurisdiction if the case can be decided under the general laws, such as when the case is for the recovery of private debts, or for the recovery of damages due to slanderous remarks of the employee, or prosecution of the employees.

The mere fact that the parties are members of the Civil Service should not remove the controversy from the general jurisdiction of the courts of justice and place them under the special of the CSC.

Jurisdiction over the subject the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law, it cannot be acquired through a waiver, it cannot be acquired, it cannot be enlarged by the omission of the parties; it cannot be conferred by the acquiescence of the court.

BP 129 did not vest jurisdiction in the RTC over matters relating to the Civil Service. Consequently, the RTC could not arrogate unto itself the hearing and decision of a subject matter outside of its jurisdiction.

2) YES, the void and ineffectual decision of the RTC did not attain finality despite the supposedly belated appeal by Buenaflor.

When a court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action. Upon the filing of the complaint, the RTC could only have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Any further actions the RTC took, were void and ineffectual.

A void judgment - being non-existent in legal contemplation -- does not become final and executory even with the belated filing of an appeal.

KATARUNGANG     PAMBARANGAY

AVELINA ZAMORA   vs.   HEIRS   OF    CARMEN IZQUIERDO
443 SCRA   24, G.R. No. 146195, November 18,   2004

FACTS: Respondents filed with the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against the petitioner.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. First, petitioner alleged that the barangay Certificate to file action is fatally defective because it pertains to another dispute i.e. the refusal by respondents to give consent to petitioner’s request for installation of water facilities in the premises. And second, when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay as Lupon Chairman did not constitute the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been conducted.

ISSUE: Whether the case be dismissed for the alleged failure to comply with the required barangay conciliation?

HELD: NO. While it is true that the “Sertifikasyon” is entitled “Ukol sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig,” this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings. Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as sine qua non for the filing of the instant case would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no issues would be raised therein and the parties have proven so many times in the past that they cannot get to settle their differences amicably.

Furthermore, the SC cannot sustain petitioner’s contention that the Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, contravenes the law on Katarungang Pambarangay. Section 412 (a) of RA 7160 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman as what happened in the present case, or the Pangkat. Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine times at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioner’s violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence thereto.

**** The court, agency or quasi-judicial agency which has possession or physical custody over the res or subject property of the case has jurisdiction over it and has the authority and jurisdiction to rule and issue a decisions over the same. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111202-05, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 109).

**** The “Construction Industry Arbitration Law” provides that the CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved. These disputes may involve government and private contracts. For the Board to acquire jurisdiction, the parties to the dispute must agree to submit the same to voluntary arbitration. When a contract contains a clause to the submission of a future controversy to arbitration, it is not necessary for the parties to enter into a submission agreement before the claimant may invoke the jurisdiction of CIAC. (Department of Health vs. HTMC Engineers Company, G.R. No. 146120, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 299).

**** Non-compliance with the condition precedent under PD 1508 does not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of jurisdiction over a case where the defendants fail to object to such exercise of jurisdiction. But such objection should be seasonably made before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, and must be raised in the Answer, or in such other pleading allowed under the Rules of Court. (Espino vs. Legarda, G.R. No. 149266, March 17, 2006, 485 SCRA 74)

BARANGAY   CONCILIATION

CRISANTA   ALCARAZ   MIGUEL   vs.   JERRY   D.   MONTAÑEZ
G.R.   No.   191336,   January   25,   2012,   664   SCRA   345

FACTS: There was a Contract of Loan between Crisanta and Jerry but when the obligation became due and demandable, debtor Jerry failed to pay despite demand. A complaint was filed before the Lupong Tagapamayapa and a compromise was entered into where the debtor agreed to pay P2,000 per month. However, the debtor failed to pay, hence, a certificate to file an action was issued by the Lupon. The creditor filed a complaint for sum of money before the MeTC of Makati City.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy.

HELD: YES. Because the debtor failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the creditor can insist on her original demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy.

Q: What is a doctrine of hierarchy of courts?

A: Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition. Thus, a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision involving both questions of fact and law must first be brought before the Court of Appeals. (Lacson Hermanas vs. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 290).

Q: What is judicial courtesy?

A: It applies where “there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of origin.” Thus, the lower court or court of origin should suspend its proceedings. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 492 SCRA 748, June 26, 2006)

ACQUISITION    OF    JURISDICTION    OVER    THE    PERSON

MA. IMELDA   MANOTOC   vs.   COURT   OF   APPEALS
G.R. No. 130974,   August   18,   2006,   499   SCRA   21

The court’s jurisdiction over a defendant is founded on a valid service of summons. Without a valid service, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. The defendant must be properly apprised of a pending action against him and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit. Proper service of summons is used to protect one’s right to due process.

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER

FELICISIMO OPRIASA vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 149190, December 19, 2006, 511 SCRA 234

For the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution, the occupants of the property should be notified of the petition. However, there was no need to notify petitioners as they were not occupants or persons in possession of the property entitled

to a notice of hearing. As petitioners were not entitled to notice, they could not claim intrinsic fraud.

ACTION   INCAPABLE   OF   PECUNIARY   ESTIMATION

FAR   EAST   BANK   vs.   SHEMBERG   MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R.   No.   163878,    December   12,   2006,   510   SCRA    685

Where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action questioning the validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary estimation.

JURISDICTION   NOT    AFFECTED   BY    MERE    DEFECT   IN   FORM

MR. &   MRS.   GEORGE TAN   vs.    G.V.T.   ENGINEERING SERVICES
G.R.   No. 153057,   August   7,   2006,   498   SCRA   93

It would be an unjustifiable abandonment of the principles laid down in the jurisprudence if the Court would nullify the proceedings had in the present case by the lower and appellate courts on the simple ground that the complaint filed with the trial court was not properly captioned for these are matters of form and the Court finds the defect merely technical which does not, in any way, affect its jurisdiction.

PRINCIPLE   OF   HIERARCHY   OF    COURTS

MOLDEX    REALTY,   INC.    vs.   H L U R B
G.R.   No.   149719,   June 21,   2007,   525   SCRA   198

Petitions seeking the nullification of an administrative resolution which do not involve circumstances and issues of transcendental importance to the public must be filed with the Regional Trial Court and not with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals directly.

ARBITRATION

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY vs. TITAN – IKEDA CONSTRUCTION CORP.
G.R. No. 126619, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 335

As an arbitration body, the CIAC can only resolve issues brought before it by the parties through the Term of Reference (TOR), which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. The Rules of Court may not be used to contravene the spirit of the CIAC rules.

RULE 3 - PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS
SECTION 6 – PERMISSIVE JOINDER OF PARTIES

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC. vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY
453 SCRA 482, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005

FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by Martina. While driving, a Pantranco passenger bus was trailing behind. The Pantranco bus overtook the jeepney, in so doing, the Pantranco bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.

Crispin reported the incident to the police station and respondent Standard Insurance Company, insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was not paid in full by Standard, so Martina shouldered the balance.

Thereafter, Standard and Martina demanded reimbursement from petitioner Pantranco and its driver but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with the RTC a complaint for sum of money.

In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that there was a misjoinder of parties. Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action of each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no common questions of law and fact common to both parties.

For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law.

ISSUE: Whether there was misjoinder of parties.

HELD: NO. There was no misjoinder of parties in the case at bar. Pursuant to Rule 3, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, permissive joinder of parties requires that: (1) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (2) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (3) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners. To

determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.

SECTION   6 -   MISJOINDER   OF   CAUSES   OF   ACTION

LILIA     B.     ADA     vs.     FLORANTE    BAYLON
G.R.   No.   182435,   August   13,   2012,   678   SCRA   293

FACTS: During the pendency of an action for partition, there was a donation made by Rita to Florante without the consent of the other parties or the Court. When the other parties learned of the donation, they filed a Supplemental Pleading seeking the rescission of the donation.

ISSUE: Can there be a joinder of these two (2) causes of action?

HELD: NO. There was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition could not be joined with action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the ordinary civil action precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particular cause of action.

Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal.

A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the Court sua sponte, may be adjudicated by the court together with the other cause of action.

RULE   3 -    PARTIES   TO    CIVIL    ACTIONS

SECTION   16 -   DEATH   OF   A   PARTY,   DUTY   OF   COUNSEL

CAPITOLINA   NAPERE   vs.   AMANDO   BARBARONA
543   SCRA   376,   G.R.   No.   160426,   January   31,   2008

FACTS: Amando filed a complaint for recovery possession, quieting of title and damages against Spouses Juan and Capitolina.

During the pendency of the case, Juan died, and their counsel informed the Court of Juan’s death and submitted the names and addresses of Juan’s heirs.

The trial court failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Despite this oversight, the proceedings were conducted and the judgment was rendered by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs for its failure to order their substitution.

HELD: NO. Formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear. It is a fact that Capitolina is a co-defendant of the deceased and actively participated in the case. The records show that the counsel of Juan and Capitolina continued to represent them even after Juan’s death.

The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein.

It is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representatives, or heirs, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein.

SPOUSES JULITA & FELIPE DELA CRUZ vs. PEDRO JOAQUIN
464 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 162788, July 28, 2005

FACTS: Pedro filed a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership, cancellation of title and damages against Spouses Julita and Felipe dela Cruz.

During the pendency of the case, Pedro died. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Pedro.

On appeal, the Motion for Substitution of Party Plaintiff was filed before the Court of Appeals and the same was granted.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the case upon the death of Pedro.

HELD: NO. Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction but a requirement of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, non-compliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.

Mere failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

Evidently, the heirs of Pedro voluntary appeared and participated in the case. When the appellate court had ordered the legal representatives to appear and substitute for him, the substitution even on appeal had been ordered correctly.

CHITTICK vs. COURT OF APPEALS
166 SCRA 219, G.R. No. L-25350, October 4, 1988

The failure of the heirs to substitute for the original plaintiff upon her death led to the nullification of the trial court’s decision. The latter had sought to recover support in arrears and her share in the conjugal partnership.

The children who allegedly substituted for her to continue the case against their father had vehemently objected to their inclusion as parties.

Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the case, they were bound to substitute for the defendant also. The substitution effectively merged the persons of the plaintiff and the defendant and thus extinguishes the obligations being sued upon.

SECTION 17 – DEATH OR SEPARATION OF A PARTY WHO IS
A PUBLIC OFFICER

MAYOR RHUSTOM DAGADAG vs. MICHAEL TONGNAWA
450 SCRA 437, G.R. Nos. 161166-67, February 3, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner, while then the mayor of Tanudan, sent respondents a memorandum ordering them to explain within 72 hours why they should not be administratively sanctioned for acts unbecoming of public servants and failure to perform their duties. After investigation, the Committee found respondents liable for insubordination, non performance of duties, and absences without official leaves. Petitioner issued an order suspending respondents from their respective positions for two months.

Respondents appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) but the latter affirmed petitioner’s orders. Upon appeal to CA, the appellate court reversed CSC’s decision and reinstated the respondents.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. However, at the time of filing of said petition, the petitioner was no longer the mayor.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner may appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals.

HELD: NO. Section 17 of Rule 3 provides, “When a public officer is a party in an action in his official capacity and during its pendency dies, resigns or otherwise ceases to hold office, the action may be continued and maintained by or against his successor if, within thirty (30) days after the successor takes office or such time as may be granted by the court, it is satisfactorily shown to the court by any party that there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining it and that the successor adopts or continues or threatens to adopt or continue the action of his predecessor. Before the substitution is made, the party or officer to be affected, unless expressing thereto, shall be given reasonable notice of the application therefore and accorded an opportunity to be heard.

Where the petitioner ceases to be mayor, the appeal and/or action be initiated may be discontinued and maintained by his successor if there is substantial need to do so. If the successor failed to pursue the appeal and/or action, the same should be dismissed.

**** A party who was not properly impleaded as a party defendant cannot be liable for the judgment against a defendant without a trial. (2005 BQ # X)

PARTIES   TO   THE   ACTION

ANTONIO   BALTAZAR   vs.    HON.    OMBUDSMAN
G.R.   No.   136433,   December   6,   2006,   510   SCRA   74

In private suits, standing is governed by the “real parties – in – interest” rule found in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.”

PERSON NOT PRIVY TO A CONTRACT MAY NOT BRING AN ACTION; EXCEPTION

CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORP.
G.R. No. 150711, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 400

Ordinarily, one who is not a privy to a contract may not bring an action to enforce it. However, this case falls under the exception. As an exception, parties who have not taken part in a contract may show that they have a real interest affected by its performance or annulment. In other words, those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in a contract, in which they had no intervention, may show their detriment that could result from it.

RULE 7
PARTS   OF    A   PLEADING

SEC. 5 -   CERTIFICATION   AGAINST    FORUM   SHOPPING

Q:   What     is      forum    shopping?

A: It is an act of a party which consists of filing multiple suits, simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.

**** Failure to comply with the requirement of forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading, but shall cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. However, the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, may choose to be liberal and consider the amendment as substantial compliance. (Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. vs. Acuna, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422).

**** Counsel cannot sign the anti-forum shopping certification because it must be executed by the plaintiff or principal party. (2000 BQ # II)

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA vs. ATTY. LOLITO APARICIO
A.C. No. 7298, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA 444

The filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions rarely happen in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. Thus, if the complaint in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease.

PAUL LEE TAN vs. PAUL SYCIP
G.R. No. 153468, August 17, 2006, 499 SCRA 216

In the interest of substantial justice, a procedural lapse may be excused especially when there appears to be no intention to circumvent the need for proper verification and certification. The substantial merits of petitioners’ case and the purely legal question involved in the Petition should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify an exception to the strict requirements of the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.

RULE 8
MANNER OF   MAKING ALLEGATION IN   PLEADINGS

EQUITABLE   CARDNETWORK,   INC.    vs.    JOSEFA    B.   CAPISTRANO
G.R.   No.   180157,   February   8,   2012,   665   SCRA   454

FACTS: In a complaint for sum of money, Equitable Cardnetwork alleged that the defendant, a woman at the age of 81 and bedridden at that, applied for and used a credit card, but failed to pay for her obligations. In her answer, she alleged that she denied the allegations for lack of knowledge as to their truth and denied having applied for membership with the card company and that she never authorized anyone to get her alleged card thus not being a member, she has no obligation, monetary or otherwise, to the plaintiff. After trial, the RTC ruled that having failed to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of ECI’s actionable document that were attached to the complaint, she impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of the same.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant made an effective specific denial of the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents.

HELD: YES. Because the defendant effectively denied the genuineness and due execution of the actionable documents. It is true that she denied the documents merely for “lack of knowledge” which denial, is inadequate since by their nature she ought to know the truth of the allegations regarding those documents. But her inadequacy was cured by her assertion that she was denying the allegations regarding those actionable documents, stating that she never applied for membership with the card company. These reasons cannot be ignored and they form part of the answer. Hence, when she denied the transactions for “lack of knowledge,”

it was her way of saying that such transactions took place without her knowing. Since the answer was verified, she in effect denied under

oath the genuineness and due execution of the documents supporting them. For this reason, she is not barred from introducing evidence that those documents were forged.

SEC. 8 - HOW TO CONTEST SUCH DOCUMENTS

**** Respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present the original of said note. (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. vs. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. G.R. No. 154684, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 117).

SEC. 10 - SPECIFIC   DENIAL

AGRIFINA   AQUINTEY   vs.   SPS.   FELICIDAD   &    RICO TIBONG
G.R. No.   166704,   December 20, 2006,   511   SCRA   414

A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial not become specific by the use of the word “specifically.” The answer should be so definite and certain in its allegations that the pleader’s adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.

FAILURE OF   DEFENDANT   TO    DISCLOSE   THE MATTERS ALLEGED   IN    THE    COMPLAINT

FRILOU   CONSTRUCTION,   INC.    vs.
AEGIS   INTEGRATED   STRUCTURE   CORPORATION
G.R. No. 191088,   August   17, 2016, 800 SCRA 611

FACTS: Respondent Aegis filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Frilou. Aegis averred that the sum of P6,024,306.00 has long been overdue in that respondent Aegis had long supplied, fabricated, delivered and erected the structural steel requirements of petitioner Frilou but the latter has paid respondent the sum of P4,490,014.12 only thereby leaving an unpaid balance of P1,534,291.68.

Petitioner denied this by stating “petitioner also DENIES paragraphs 4 and 5 for being contrary to the facts and circumstances surrounding the case,” but did not state specifically the matters which it relies on to support denial of liability of unpaid balance.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence sustaining petitioner’s contention that respondent failed to show evidence of Frilou’s supposed remaining liability for the balance amount of P1,534,291.68.

On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling on the sole issue of whether respondent Aegis established its claim of the balance amount of P1,534,219.68 even in the absent of presentation of delivery receipts. The CA ruled that petitioner’s judicial admission of the existence of the Purchase Orders worked to establish the remaining balance amounting to P1.534 Million by preponderance of evidence.

Moreover, in failing to specifically deny the allegation that respondent Aegis supplied, delivered and erected the structural requirements of Frilou in the amount of P6,014 Million, the latter is deemed to have admitted the same.

ISSUES

1) What are the three (3) modes of specific denial?

2) What is the purpose of requiring defendant to make a specific denial?

3) Whether petitioner Frilou failed to make a specific denial.

RULINGS

1) Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court on manner of making allegations in pleading contemplates three (3) modes of specific denial:

a) by specifying such material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whatever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will rely upon to support his denial;

b) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true and material and denies only the remainder;

c) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to truth of a material averment in the complaint which has the effect of a denial.

2) The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint with the matter which he intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table.

3) YES. Petitioner admitted and failed to specifically deny the material averments in respondent’s complaint that Aegis complied with the obligation under the Purchase Orders or the complete amount of P6,024,305.00.

First, petitioner did not make a specific denial, but a general one to the effect that it is no longer has any remaining liabilities to the respondent.

Secondly, petitioner did not state “ the facts and circumstances surrounding the case,” the matters which it relies on to support its denial of its liability in the amount of P1,534,291.68.

Petitioner only asserted that respondent failed to show evidence of its supposed remaining liability. This is not an assertion of the truth and substance of the matter. It is merely a statement that as far as petitioner is concerned, respondent does not have evidence to prove its claim.

Petitioner is plainly splitting hairs. As a result of its failure to make a specific denial, it was deemed to have admitted all the material averment in the complaint.

Petitioner should have, and could have easily, specifically denied each and every averment under the foregoing paragraph as required by Section 10 of Rule 8 and the asserted the substance of the matter which it relies on to support its denial.

Consequently, the judicial admission of petitioner’s remaining liability need not be proved.

RULE 9
EFFECT OF   FAILURE TO   PLEAD

Section   1    -    Defenses    and     objections    not     pleaded.

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the defenses contained in the answer. (Francel Realty Corporation vs. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684, September 8, 2005, 469 SCRA 424).

Section 3 - Default: Declaration of

The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its right, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not

support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence. (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. 151098, March 21, 2006, 485 SCRA 108).

RULE   10
AMENDED   AND   SUPPLEMENTAL   PLEADINGS

ALPINE     LENDING    INVESTORS    vs.     CORPUZ
G.R.   No.   157107,   November   24,   2006,   508   SCRA   45

Amendment     is     a     matter     of     right    when     a     motion   to     dismiss    was     filed.

Settled is the rule that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for the purpose of Section 2, Rule 10. As no responsive pleading had been filed, respondent could amend her complaint as a matter of right. Following the ruling in Breslin vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co. that respondent has the right to amend her complaint, it is the correlative duty of the trial court to accept the amended complaint, otherwise, mandamus would lie against it. In other words, the trial court’s duty to admit the amended complaint was purely ministerial. In fact, respondent should have not have filed a motion to admit her amended complaint.

RULE   13
FILING   AND    SERVICE     OF     PLEADINGS,    JUDGMENTS
AND      OTHER     PAPERS

LUCIANO ELLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
460 SCRA 406, G.R. No. 141255, June 21, 2005

FACTS: Respondents filed with the MTCC a complaint against the petitioners for forcible entry. The MTCC dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish that they have brought the instant case within one year from entry of petitioners.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the MTCC decision and ordered the petitioners to vacate the lots and deliver the same to the respondents.

Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for review. The petition was dismissed outright on the ground that it does not contain the affidavit of service required by Section 11 of Rule 13.

Petitioners promptly filed a motion for reconsideration attaching therewith the affidavit of service executed by Gabriel M. Manasan. In their motion for reconsideration, petitioners averred that they failed to append to their petition the affidavit of service due to an excusable oversight considering the time constraint in filing the petition with voluminous annexes and that there would be a denial of substantial justice if their petition would be dismissed merely by reason of technicality. Still unconvinced, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the petition be dismissed for failure to attach the affidavit of service?

HELD: NO. Under Section 11 Rule 13, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioners violated Section 11 of Rule 13 by failing to append the affidavit of service to their petition for review filed with the CA. The SC note, though that petitioners, upon receipt of the CA’s challenged Resolution dismissing outright their petition due to such omission, promptly filed a motion for reconsideration, readily acknowledging their procedural lapse and attaching therewith the required affidavit of service. Significantly, the affidavit of service shows that the petition for review was filed with the CA thru

Registered mail. This mode of filing is permitted under Section 11 Rule 13 since it is obviously impractical for petitioners and their counsel, who are all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, to personally file their petition in Manila. Clearly, the affidavit of service is a substantive compliance with the requirement under Section 11.

SECTION 9
FILING   AND      SERVICE      OF      PLEADINGS,    JUDGMENTS
&       OTHER    PAPERS

HEIRS   OF    WILFREDO    DELOS    SANTOS    vs.    DEL    ROSARIO
G.R.   No.    139167,   June   29,    2005,   462    SCRA    98

FACTS: On April 2, 1998, the postman attempted to deliver a copy of an adverse decision of the lower court to the office of Atty. Olaybal, counsel for petitioner. At that time, the office of Atty. Olaybal was closed since he was then suffering from influenza. The postman instead delivered the copy of the decision to Bernadeth Faye Alamares, who was a clerk in an office adjacent to Atty. Olaybal. Alamares received the Decision and signed the corresponding registry return card.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid service of decision.

HELD: NO. In this case, the postman served a copy of the trial court’s decision on Alamares who was neither an associate nor employee of Atty. Olaybal. The records show that Alamares was then an employee of Asaphil Corporation whose office is adjacent to Atty. Olaybal. There is nothing in the records showing Atty. Olaybal authorized either Alamares or Ashapil Corporation to receive mails addressed to him or his law office.

SEC. 8 - SUBSTITUTED SERVICE

REMELITA ROBINSON vs. CELITA MIRALLES
G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006, 510 SCRA 678

ISSUE: Whether a substituted service of summons upon petitioner has been validly effected.

HELD: YES. We have ruled that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully and any substituted service other than that authorized by the Rules is considered ineffective. However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules. It is the spirit, rather than the letter of the procedural rules that governs.

In his return, Sheriff Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills twice. The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. Obviously, it was impossible for the sheriff to effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner. We note that she failed to controvert the sheriff’s declaration. Nor did she deny having received the summons through the security guard. Considering her strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences. Thus, we agree with the trial court that summons has been properly served upon petitioner and that it has acquired jurisdiction over her.

INVALID    SUBSTITUTED   SERVICE   OF   SUMMONS

YUK   LING   ONG    vs.   BENJAMIN   T.   CO
G.R.   No.   206653,    February    25,   2015,   752   SCRA   42

FACTS: Ong, a British - Hong Kong national, and Co, a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982 at Ellinwood Malate Church.

Sometime in November 2008, Ong was subpoenaed by the BID to appear before the said agency because her permanent residence visa was subjected to cancellation proceedings reportedly her marriage with Co was nullified by the court.

When Ong appeared before the BID, she was furnished copies of petition for declaration of marriage and RTC decision declaring the marriage between Ong and Co as void ab initio dated December 11, 2002.

Ong was perflexed that her marriage with Co had been declared void ab initio.

Consequently, Ong filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA on November 24, 2008 claiming that she was never notified of the annulment case filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision dated December 11, 2002 be nullified on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Ong alleged that Co committed extrinsic fraud because he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from participating in the trial. Jurisdiction over her person was not acquired because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient explanation showing impossibility of personal service was stated before resorting to substituted service was made on a security guard of their townhouse and not a member of her household.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the annulment of judgment is the proper remedy to invalidate the decision dated December 11, 2002 that has long lapsed into finality.

(2) Whether the substituted service of summons is valid.

RULINGS

(1) YES. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.

Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party – litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law for it involves the service of summons or other processes on the defendant.

(2) NO. There was lack of jurisdiction over her persons because there was an invalid service of summons.

Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant does not voluntarily appears in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or substituted service of summons as laid down under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

In the case at bench, the summons was issued on July 29, 2002 and the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on August 1, 2002 after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons. The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on defendant. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the underlying reasons for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the defendant. These important acts to serve the summons on defendant, though futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.

SEC. 10 - PRIORITIES IN MODES OF SERVICE AND FILING

REY GARCESA vs. MARIETTA LAGUARDIA
G.R. No. 161234, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 559

On the issue of lack of explanation for non-personal service, Section 11, Rule 13 requires that resort to registered mail as a mode of service must come with an explanation why personal service was not practicable in the first place. However, while it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.

RULE   16
MOTION   TO    DISMISS

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPS. WILFREDO GATAL
452 SCRA 697, G.R.   No. 138567,   March   4,   2005

FACTS: Respondent spouses obtained a loan from petitioner which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a commercial lot.

For failure of respondents to pay their loan, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage and thereafter, the title of the lot was consolidated in the name of petitioner DBP. The property was then offered for sale at public auction, but none of the bidders was able to meet the bid price ceiling.

Afterwards, petitioner offered the property for negotiated sale. Respondents submitted their bid but petitioner rejected it because another buyer, Jimmy Torrefranca, was already declared the preferred bidder.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction, seeking to declare the sale of the property to Torrefranca void, to uphold respondents’ right of pre-emption and to maintain the status quo.

Meantime, petitioner filed with the same RTC a petition for issuance of a writ of possession, which the court issued.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for issuance of a writ of possession and to quash the writ of possession on the ground that there is another case pending before the same court involving the same parties, the same subject matter and the same legal issues. The RTC issued an Order dismissing the action and recalling its earlier Order granting the writ of possession on the ground of litis pendentia.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether the action be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia.

HELD: NO. Litis pendentia does not apply to the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar. For litis pendentia to lie as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the parties to the action are the same; (2) that there is substantial identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought; and (3) that the result of the first action is determinative of the second in any event and regardless of which party is successful. It is undisputed that both cases involve the same parties and the same property. The first case filed is an action for injunction by respondents against petitioner DBP, while upon the other hand, the latter

action is a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by petitioner DBP, being the purchaser of the lot at the public auction. Clearly, the rights asserted and the reliefs sought by the parties in both cases are not identical. Thus, respondents’ claim of litis pendentia is unavailing.

Section 1 - Grounds time for filing

Section 1, Rule 16 of the said Rules specifically provides that the Motion to Dismiss must be made “within the time for but before the filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Thus, a Motion to Dismiss may not, therefore, be made after an answer had already filed. (Bonifactio Construction & Management vs. Perlas-Bernabe, G.R. No. 161379, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 392)

Section 6 - Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses.

Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is explicit in stating that the defendant may reiterate any of the grounds for dismissal provided under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as affirmative defenses but that a preliminary hearing no longer be had thereon if a motion to dismiss had already been filed. The Section, however, does not contemplate a situation, such as the one obtaining in this case where there are several defendants but only one filed a motion to dismiss.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Laperal does not affect the right of the other defendants, including petitioners herein, to plead their own affirmative defenses and be preliminary heard thereon. The trial court is likewise not proscribed from granting, in its discretion, such a motion for preliminary hearing. The only caveat is that the ground of non-compliance with the condition precedent of resorting to arbitration, which was raised in Laperal’s Motion to Dismiss, may no longer be included in the preliminary hearing because it has already been heard and finally resolved. (Abrajano vs. Heirs of Augusto Salas, G.R. No. 158895, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 476).

MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 vs. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 33

ROSA PAMARAN vs. BANK OF COMMERCE
G.R. No. 205753, July 4, 2016, 795 SCRA 430

FACTS: In her complaint, Rosa alleged that she was the owner of a residential house she had constructed in 1987 on the lots owned by her children with their consent in Muntinlupa City.

Sometime in 1998, her children obtained loans from the Bank of Commerce (Bankcom) and as a security, her children constituted Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their lots.

Rosa claimed that Bankcom neither included her house in determining the loan amount nor obtained consent to the REM. She added that Bankcom was aware of the existence of her house on these lots.

Eventually, these lots were foreclosed and their ownership was consolidated in favor of Bankcom. Later, Bankcom filed a petition for issuance of writs of possession, which was granted.

Rosa averred that because of these writs, she was dispossessed of her house. Thus, she prayed that Bankcom be ordered to pay her damages for the value of her house for its violation of her right to due process before the RTC Olongapo City where she resides.

Bankcom raised in its answers, the following affirmative defenses: 1) Rosa has no cause of action because she is not the owner of the subject lots and she was never a party to the REM; 2) the complaint is a collateral attack on the title because the REM and the certificate of sale also indicated the improvement thereon; 3) an interference with the jurisdiction of RTC Muntinlupa where the present complaint is a real action which should be filed also in RTC Muntinlupa and not in RTC Olongapo.

Rosa contended that this is a personal action because she cited real properties in Muntinlupa City, she is not asking to be the owner or possessor thereof but is merely praying that Bankcom be ordered to pay her damages corresponding to the value of her house. She likewise affirmed that the venue is proper since she resides in Olongapo City.

On December 10, 2012, the RTC Olongapo issued an order granting Bankcom’s motion to dismiss and accordingly, dismissing the complaint.

ISSUES

1) Whether the RTC Olongapo correctly dismissed the complaint based on the motion to dismiss raised by Bankcom.

2) Whether Rosa’s complaint has a valid cause of action.

3) Whether Rosa’s complaint is personal action.

4) Whether Rosa’s action interferes with the jurisdiction of RTC Muntinlupa.

5) Whether Rosa’s right to due process was violated.

RULINGS

1) NO. A Motion to dismiss under Section 1 (a) of Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections made before the trial, while the motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is made only after the plaintiff rested his case.

In the first situation, the motion must be made before a responsive pleading is filed, and it can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading.

On the other hand, in the instance, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff rested his case, and it can be determined only on the basis of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff.

In the first case, it is immaterial if the allegations in the complaint are true or false, however, in the second situation, the judge must determine the truth or falsity of the allegations based on the evidence presented.

Hence, Bankcom submitted its motion to dismiss by way of affirmative defenses. Clearly, there had been no presentation of evidence made and Rosa had not yet rested her case.

2) YES. In determining whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action, the court must hypothetically admit the truth of the allegations and determine if it may grant the relief prayed for based on them. The court cannot consider external factors in determining the presence or the absence of a cause of action other than the allegations in the complaint.

In fine, the allegations in the complaint that: Rosa is the owner of a residential house built on the lots owned by her children; by reason of the foreclosure of these lots, Bankcom acquired the lots and also appropriated Rosa’s house; thus, Rosa seeks recovery of damages against Bankcom.

Hypothetically, admitting these allegations to be true, Rosa’s cause of action against Bankcom involves a) her right over her house; b) Bankcom’s obligation to respect Rosa’s right to enjoy her house; and c) Bankcom’s violation of such right, which gave rise to this action for damages.

Notably, the RTC Olongapo disregarded the allegations in the Complaint but also, it failed to consider that the Bankcom’s arguments necessitate the examination of the evidence that can be done through a full-blown trial.

The determination of whether Rosa has a right over the subject house and of whether Bankcom violated this right cannot be addressed in a mere motion to dismiss. Such determination requires the contravention of the allegations in the Complaint and the full adjudication of the merits of the case based on all the evidence adduced by the parties.

3) YES. The complaint is one for recovery of damages relating to the injury committed by Bankcom for violating Rosa’s right to due process and right to enjoy her house.

Rosa repeatedly averred that she does not seek recovery of the possession or title. Her interest to the house is merely incidental to the primary purpose which the action is filed, that is, her claim for damages.

Clearly, this action involves Rosa’s interest in the value of the house but only in so far as to determine her entitlement to damages. She is not interested in the house itself. Indeed, the primary objective of the Complaint is to recover damages and not to regain ownership or possession of the subject property. Hence, this case is a personal action properly filed in the RTC Olongapo, where Rosa resides.

4) NO. The present action does not interfere with the jurisdiction of the RTC Muntinlupa.

One, the nature of this action, which is damages, is different from the petition before the RTC Muntinlupa, which is for issuance of writs of possession.

Two, the laws relied upon in these actions vary, this damage suit is based on Rosa’s reliance on her right emanating from Article 32 of the Civil Code, while Bankcom’s petition is pursuant to Act No. 3135, as amended.

5) YES. Bankcom’s motion to dismiss must be resolved with reference to the allegations in the Complaint assuming them to be true.

The RTC Olongapo did not inquire on the truthfulness of the allegations of the Complaint and declared them to be false and dismissed the complaint.

On this regard, Rosa’s right to due process of law is gravely violated.

EFFECT   OF   DISMISSAL   WITHOUT   PREJUDICE

SPS.   ISIDRO & LEA   CRUZ   vs.   SPS.   FLORENCIO & AMPARO CARAOS
G.R.   No.   138208,   April   23,   2007,   521   SCRA   510

The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had not been commenced.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER (PDI) vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA
550 SCRA 199, G.R. No. 160604, March 28, 2008

FACTS: PDI published an article narrating the death of Bong Caldez due to the alleged erroneous diagnosis of Dr. Babaran.

Based on this article, Dr. Babaran filed a complaint for damages against PDI.

The Answer with Counterclaims was filed by PDI, raising, among others, that the complaint states no cause of action.

Pre-trial was held and terminated.

Thereafter, PDI filed a Motion for a Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense raised in the answer (which is also a ground for a motion to dismiss) based on failure to state cause of action due to the failure of Dr. Babaran to specifically allege the participation of PDI in the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint should be dismissed upon the motion for a preliminary hearing on affirmative defense raised in the answer on failure to state cause of action.

HELD: YES. This procedure is designed to prevent a tedious, if not traumatic, trial in case the complaint falls short of sufficiently alleging a cause of action.

When a defendant seeks the dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss, the sufficiency of the motion should be tested on the strength of the allegations of facts contained in the complaint and no other basis.

RELAXATION     OF     THE     RULE    ON     RES    JUDICATA

PABLO   DE   LEON   vs.    JOSEFINA    BALINAG
G.R.   No.   169996,   August   11,   2006,   498   SCRA   569

The public policy underlying the principle of res judicata must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which to present his case. After all, rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice, and should thus not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.

RULE 17
DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS

Section 3 - Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff - nolle prosequi

Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Court of Civil Procedure, there are three instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s fault: (1) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court.

There is failure to prosecute when the plaintiff, being present, is not ready or is unwilling to proceed with the scheduled trial or when postponements in the past are due to the plaintiff’s own making, intended to be dilatory or to cause substantial prejudice on the part of the defendant. (Belonio vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 161379, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 557).

RULE 18
PRE – TRIAL

SECTION 3 - NOTICE OF PRE-TRIAL

Old rules concerning notice of resetting of pre-trial conferences

The Supreme Court noted the proceedings before the lower court happened in the years 1994 to 1995, and thus governed by the old Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the old rules, particularly Rule 20, Section 1, a notice of pre-trial must be served on the party affected, separately from his counsel. Otherwise, the proceedings will be null and void. The general rule that notice to counsel is notice to parties has

been insufficient and inadequate for purposes of pre-trial, such that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party through or care of his counsel at counsel’s address with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference and assuring that the party either appear thereat or deliver to counsel a written authority to represent the party with power to compromise the case, with the warning that a party who fails to do so may be non-suited or declared in default. (Advance Textile Mills vs. Tan, G.R. No. 154040, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 431).

EFFECT     OF     FAILURE    TO     APPEAR   AT     THE    PRE-TRIAL   CONFERENCE

PANGASINAN FIVE STAR   BUS   CO.   vs.   SPS.   LEON &   LUISA   BARREDO
G.R.   No.   152714,   August   10,   2006,   498   SCRA   418

A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. If the defendant is declared as in default, the court may allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte before the Branch Clerk of Court and thereafter, render judgment on the basis of the evidence of the plaintiffs. On the other hand, if the defendant is absent during the initial trial without any justifiable reason therefore, the defendant cannot be declared as in default for such absence. However, the court may allow the plaintiff to present his evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court ex parte.

Effect    of     failure    to    file    Pre-trial   Brief

BANK   OF   THE   PHILIPPINE   ISLANDS (BPI)   vs.   DOMINGO   R.   DANDO
G.R.   No.   177456,    September   4,   2009,   598   SCRA   378

FACTS: BPI filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages against Dando before the RTC. After Dando filed his Answer with Counterclaim, BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial.

The trial court issued a Notice of Pre-trial Conference which directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial on August 18, 2003. Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief on August 11, 2003. BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial Brief with the RTC, and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on August 18, 2003, the very day of the scheduled Pre-trial Conference.

When the parties appeared before the RTC on August 18, 2003 for the schedule Pre-trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion and thereby dismissed the case with prejudice.

ISSUE: Should the case be dismissed on the ground of BPI’s failure to file a pre-trial brief within the period prescribed.

HELD: YES. It is basic legal construction that where the words of command such as “shall,” “must,” or “ought” are employed, they are generally and ordinarily regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word “shall” is used a mandatory duty is imposed, which the Court ought to enforce.

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.

Pre-trial     Brief    of      Amended     Complaint

EUFEMIA   BALATICO   AGATEP   vs.   ROBERTA   RODRIGUEZ
G.R.   No.   170540,   October   28,   2009,   604   SCRA   634

FACTS: Natalia mortgaged a parcel of land to PNB to secure a loan. For failure to pay the loan, PNB foreclosed the property.

After the expiration of the redemption period, PNB consolidated its ownership over the parcel of land.

However, while the mortgage was still in existence, Natalia sold the land to Agatep. Neither was the sale registered nor the title was delivered to Agatep, nonetheless, Agatep took possession of the land and fenced it with barbed wire.

PNB later sold the said property to Roberta, who is the daughter of Natalia. A new title was issued in the name of Roberta.

Agatep filed a complaint for reconveyance against Roberta and Natalia. After both parties had already filed their respective Pre-trial Brief, Agatep filed an amended complaint impleading PNB. During the pre-trial conference, the RTC dismissed the amended complaint because Agatep failed to file its Pre-trial Brief.

ISSUE: Whether the Rules of Court requires that another pre-trial brief when a complaint is amended to implead another defendant.

HELD: YES. The pre-trial brief serves as a guide during the pre-trial conference so as to simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial if not to dispense with it. It is a devise essential to the speedy disposition of disputes, and parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality.

ADR   MEDIATION   PROCEEDINGS   -    Non - Appearance    of    Party

LINDA   CHAN   KENT   vs.   DIONISIO   MICAREZ
G.R.   No.   185758,    March   9,   2011,   645   SCRA   176

FACTS: Linda Kent filed a complaint for recovery of real property and annulment of title against her parents and brother. RTC explored the possibility of an amicable settlement by ordering the referral of the case to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). Kent and her counsel twice attended the mediation conference and were made to sign the attendance sheet while waiting for the late arrival of the defendants and their counsel. On the last scheduled conference, Kent and her counsel failed to appear because they had to attend some urgent matters caused by the sudden increase in prices of commodities and on account of this absence, the RTC dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal is proper on account of non-appearance during the mediation proceedings.

HELD: NO. A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties are encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. To

ensure the attendance of the parties, it specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court can impose upon a party who fails to appear in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand, contempt and even dismissal of the action. However, the Court finds dismissal too severe to be imposed where the record is devoid of evidence of willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that the absence was intended to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case as lack of interest on the part of Kent to enter into a possible amicable settlement of the case.

RULE   19
INTERVENTION

HEIRS OF   GERONIMO RESTRIVERA vs.   SALVADOR DE   GUZMAN
434 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 146540,   July 14,   2004

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the PARAB a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession against herein respondents.

The provincial adjudicator rendered a decision finding and declaring all the petitioners are not bona fide tenants on the property in question.

Meantime during the pendency of petitioner’s appeal to the DARAB, TRICOM filed a motion for intervention. TRICOM alleged that it has legal interest in the subject landholding, having purchased the same from respondents, as shown by a Deed of Assignment and a Deed of Sale on Installments.

ISSUE: Whether TRICOM’s Motion for intervention is proper?

HELD: YES. TRICOM’s motion for intervention is proper. Fundamentally, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the intervention. The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been so exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

Section 1 of Rule 19 provides: “A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the parties, or in interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s right may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Here, TRICOM’s legal interest in the subject property cannot be disputed. As shown by the Deed of Assignment and the Deed of Sale on Installments, respondents transferred and sold to TRICOM the subject landholding. As a purchaser, respondent TRICOM acquired an interest in the property, and thus, has standing to intervene to protect such interest.

RULE 26
ADMISSION BY ADVERSE   PARTY

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF   THE   PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF   APPEALS
G.R. No.   153034,   September   20,    2005,   470    SCRA   317

FACTS: Irene Canadala obtained 2 loans from DBP secured by mortgages on 3 parcels of land.

Later, DBP foreclosed the mortgages and sold it at public auction. Canadala redeemed one of the lands and offered to redeem the other 2 properties but the bank denied it for being below the amount of its claim.

Consequently, when respondent’s daughter, as the assignee, failed to redeem, the bank consolidated its titles over the properties. Respondent then filed a complaint for the exercise of her right to redemption with damages. Before trial, respondent request for admission by adverse party.

The bank filed its Comment which respondent objected because it was not under oath as required under Rule 26 and it failed to state the reasons for the admission or denial of matters. Both the trial court and the CA ruled that the admission should be under oath in order to be admitted.

ISSUE: Whether the admission of DBP should be admitted even it is not under oath.

HELD: YES. The admissions of DBP were already alleged in the supplemental complaint which were already denied or admitted. To require it to be under oath would be pointless and superfluous. DBP did not have to comment on respondent’s request for admission which merely reproduced the allegations in her complaint. That the Comment was not under oath is not a substantive, but merely a formal defect which can be excused in the interest of justice conformably to the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings should be liberally construed in order to do substantial justice. Thus, DBP substantially complied with Rule 26.

If the factual allegations in the complaint are the very same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied or otherwise dealt with in the answer, a response to the request is no longer required.

RULE 29
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY

SECTION   1 -   REFUSAL   TO   ANSWER

FELISA   JARAVATA   vs.   MA.   DIANA   KAROLUS
G.R.   No.   154988,   June 21,   2007,   525   SCRA   239

No judgment by default maybe had, without first requiring an application by the proponent to compel an answer. This is the requisite procedure under Section 1 of Rule 29 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals cannot decide a case on the merits, when the appealed judgment is a judgment by default since there was as yet no trial or presentation of evidence in the court a quo. Parties must at least have been a chance to substantiate by evidence their respective claims at the trial court.

RULE   35
SUMMARY   JUDGMENT

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION &   DEV.   CORP.   vs.    PCI   BANK
G.R. No. 153827, April 25, 2006,   488   SCRA   192

It must be borne in mind that the petitioner admitted in its “Answer” the due execution and authenticity of the documents appended to the complaint. Petitioner did not deny its liability for the principal amount claimed by the respondent in its complaint. Petitioner merely alleged, by way of defenses, that if failed to pay its account because of the region-wide economic crisis that engulfed Asia in July 1997, and the “Deeds of Assignment” executed by it in favor of the respondents were contracts of adhesion. Petitioner elaborated on and catalogued its defenses in its “Appellant’s Brief” what it believed, as “genuine issues.” However, petitioner failed to append to its “Opposition” to the “Motion for Summary Judgment,”

“Affidavits showing the factual basis for its defenses of “extraordinary deflation,” including facts, figures and data showing its financial conditions before and after the economic crisis and that the crisis was the proximate cause of its financial distress.

The failure of the petitioner to append to its “Opposition” any “Affidavits” showing that its defenses were not contrived or cosmetic to delay judgment created a presumption that the defenses of the petitioner were not offered in good faith and that the same could not be sustained.

ESTATE OF LIM CHING vs. FLORENCIA BACALA
G.R. No. 149603, March 14, 2007, 518 SCRA 315

Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended, when there is no genuine factual issue to be resolved.

RULE 36
JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS AND ENTRY THEREOF

HEIRS OF THE LATE FLOR TUNGPALAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
460 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 136207, June 21, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for Reformation, Reconveyance and Nullification of titles against the respondents.

After the respondents filed their answer, the trial court set the case for pre-trial conference on various dates but was postponed for five times upon motion of the petitioners and the respondents. Thus, they were twice warned that the postponement would be for the last time.

During the pre-trial conference, the petitioners were declared non-suited for their failure to appear despite notice. Their complaint was dismissed.

One year and seven months later, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court granted the motion “in the interest of justice.” However, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order on the ground that the trial court has no more jurisdiction to issue the same. The trial court granted this motion and reinstated the order declaring the petitioners non-suited.

ISSUE: Whether the decision of the trial court, dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute, become final and executory.

HELD: YES. Failure to interpose an appeal within the reglementary period renders an order or decision final and executory unless a party files a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of 15 days from his receipt of the court’s decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.

After the lapse of the 15-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. The court loses jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the power to review a judgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the law and the maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable controversies with finality.

A motion for Clarification is not a Motion for Reconsideration

A Motion for Clarificatory Judgment not being in the character of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the reglementary period for filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Its filing will not bar the judgment from attaining finality, nor will its resolution amend the decision to be reviewed. (Commissioner on Higher Education vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 157877, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 424)

RULE 37
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

Motion for Extension of Time does not toll/suspend the 15-day reglementary period of filing a Motion for Reconsideration

The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.

Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is justified. Precisely, it is because petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when

petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. (Apex Mining Co., Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 122472, October 20, 2005, 473 SCRA 490).

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO ALSUA
G.R. No. 167361, April 2, 2007, 520 SCRA 132

The period for filing a motion for reconsideration should be counted from the date of receipt of the order or a person having sufficient discretion to receive the same.

RULE 38
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER PROCEEDINGS

Section 3 - Time for filing petition

A petition for relief from judgment is the proper remedy of a party seeking to set aside a judgment rendered against him by a court of whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing or was prevented from taking an appeal, in either case, because of fraud,

accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The petition for relief should be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment or order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not more than six months after such judgment. Both periods must concur and are not extendible and never interrupted. Strict compliance with these periods stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for adequate remedy. A petition for relief is actually the “last chance” given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order. Failure to avail of such “last chance” within the grace period fixed by the Rules of Court is fatal. (Datu Eduardo Ampo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169091, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 562).

EFFECT    OF    VOID     JUDGMENT    ON     PERIOD    SET     UNDER    RULE     38

NARCISO   GUIANG   vs.   COURT   OF   APPEALS
G.R.   No.   169372,    December   6,   2006,   510   SCRA   568

When the judgment on its face is void ab initio, the limited periods for relief from judgment under Rule 38 are inapplicable. This is so because a void judgment is vulnerable to attack, in any way and at anytime, even when no appeal has been taken.

RULE 39
EXECUTION, SATISFACTION   AND   EFFECT   OF JUDGMENTS

AIDA LUGAYAN   vs. SPOUSES ANTONIO TIZON
454 SCRA 488, G.R. No. 147958,   March   31, 2005

FACTS: Travel 2000 International filed a civil case for a sum of money against Aida Lugayan with the MeTC and the judgment was rendered in favor of Travel.

The Sheriff then levied upon Aida’s house and lot. During the auction sale, Spouses Tizon were declared the highest bidders and were awarded the certificate of sale.

Thereupon, Aida Lugayan filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of the MeTC Decision in the civil case for sum of money.

Meanwhile, Aida failed to redeem her house and lot within one year. This prompted Spouses Tizon to file a complaint for illegal detainer against Rona and Arturo Lugayan with the MeTC.

During the course of the proceedings, the Lugayans alleged among others, that they were the real parties in interest and spouses Tizon have no cause of action against them due to the pendency of the civil case for annulment of judgment pending in the RTC and that litis pendentia and forum shopping barred the institution of the illegal detainer case.

ISSUE: Whether the case for unlawful detainer be dismissed on the ground of res judicata

HELD: NO. The elements of res judicata, also known as “bar by prior judgment,” are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Here, the fourth element is not present.

First, there is no identity of parties. In civil case for sum of money, the parties are Travel 2000 International as plaintiff and Aida Lugayan as defendant. In civil case for illegal detainer, the parties are spouses Tizon as plaintiffs and Rona Lugayan and Arturo Lugayan as defendants.

Second, the subject matter in the sum of money is non-payment of debt, while in civil case for illegal detainer, it is unlawful possession of the property.

Third, there is no identity in the cause of action. The first case is for sum of money, while the second case is for illegal detainer.

Section 1 - Execution upon judgments or final orders

Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution wherein the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty.

There are instances, however, when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a party. These instances call for correction by a superior court, as where the writ of execution varies the judgment. (Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waster Mgt. Commission vs. Jancom Environmental Corp., G.R. No. 163663, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 281).

Section 48 - Effect of Foreign Judgments or final orders

This foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and internal law that a foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy. (Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, February 1, 2006, 481 SCRA 457).

EXECUTION     PENDING    APPEAL    IN     ELECTION    CASES

DIEGO   LIM   vs.   COMELEC
G.R.   No.   171952,   March   8,   2007,   518 SCRA   1

Before granting an execution pending appeal in election cases, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (2) there must be “good reasons” for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.

SECTION   2   (a)   -   EXECUTION     PENDING    APPEAL

LAND BANK   vs.    SPS.    PLACIDO   &    CLARY   ORILLA
556   SCRA   102,   G.R.   No. 157206,   June   27,   2008

FACTS: DARAB informed Spouses Orilla of the compulsory acquisition of their landholding pursuant to CARP. The RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC) fixed the just compensation of the land at P1.47M.

Land Bank filed a Notice of Appeal, subsequently, Spouses Orilla filed a Motion for Execution pending Appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the Spouses Orilla were entitled to execution pending appeal of the compensation fixed by SAC based on the principle of prompt payment of just compensation.

HELD: YES. Execution of the judgment or final order is discretionary. The existence of good reasons is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. “Good reasons” consist of compelling or superior circumstances demanding urgency which will

outweigh the injury or damages suffered should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment or final order.

In the case at bar, the prompt payment of just compensation is consistent with principle of justice, fairness and equity, and that suspending payment will prolong the agony of Spouses Orilla due to the deprivation of their land. It must be noted that Spouses Orilla are 71 years old and if payment would be delayed, it would not be long that death would overtake them.

SECTION     6   -    EXECUTION      BY      MOTION      OR     BY    INDEPENDENT   ACTION

CENTRAL   SURETY   &   INSURANCE   CO.   vs.   PLANTERS   PRODUCTS, INC.
G.R.   No. 149053,   March   7, 2007,   517   SCRA   651

Under Rule 39, Section 6, the rule is that a final judgment may be executed by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not absolute and admits one notable exception and, that is, when the delay in enforcing the judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.

ESTEBAN YAU vs. RICARDO SILVERIO, SR.
543 SCRA 520, G.R. No. 158848, February 4, 2008

FACTS: On March 28, 1984, Esteban Yau filed a complaint with RTC for recovery of the value of the promissory note and for damages against Philfinance and the members of its board of directors.

On May 27, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of Esteban Yau.

Philfinance interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The order of dismissal became final and executory on December 26, 1991.

The trial court issued the writ of execution. The defendants’ bank deposits were garnished by the sheriff. Also, the shares of Silverio in the Manila Golf and Country Club were sold at public auction.

As the judgment was only partially satisfied, the writ of execution was enforced against the other defendants, including Macapagal.

In 1999, the sheriff sent notices of garnishment to several banks in Manila against any existing account of Macapagal. Thereupon, Macapagal filed with the trial court a motion to quash the writ of execution on the ground that its lifetime has expired.

ISSUE: Whether the decision rendered by the RTC may still be enforced against Silverio and Macapagal even if more than five (5) years have already lapsed from its finality.

HELD: YES. A judgment may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. However, there are instances where the Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse period upon meritorious grounds. These grounds have one common denominator, and that is, the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

Here, the judgment of the trial court sought to be executed became final and executory on December 26, 1991. The writ of execution was issued and it could not be enforced for the full satisfaction of the judgment within the five-year period because Macapagal and Silverio filed petitions with the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court challenging the trial court’s judgment and the writ of execution. Such petitions suspended or interrupted the further enforcement of the writ.

MODIFICATION    OF   JUDGMENTS

REPUBLIC   vs.   UNIMEX   MICRO-ELECTRONICS GMBH
G.R. Nos.   166309-10,   March 9, 2007,   518   SCRA   19

Where facts or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts constitute a supervening cause rendering the final

judgment unenforceable, said judgment may be modified. Also, a final judgment may be altered when its execution becomes impossible or unjust. Final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitation, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitation.

TERCERIA is a remedy available to a third-party claimant under Sec. 17, Rule 39 and is filed by a third party claimant with the officer making the levy by executing an affidavit of the claimant’s title with a copy thereof served upon the officer making the levy and the judgment creditor. With the filing of this affidavit, the officer is not bound to keep the property unless the judgment creditor indemnifies the officer against such claim by an adequate bond. An action for damages may be brought against the officer within 120 days from the date of the filing of the bond.

SECTION 33, RULE 39 - DEED AND WRIT OF POSSESSION

DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the issuance of a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption is ministerial.

As an exception, it ceases to be ministerial if there is a third party holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.

EMMANUEL     VILLANUEVA      vs.      CHERDAN     LENDING
INVESTORS     CORPORATION
G.R. No. 177881,   October   13,   2010,   633   SCRA   173

FACTS: Peñaredondo obtained from Cherdan Lending a loan amounting to P2.2 million secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered by TCT # T-129690.

Despite demand, Peñaredondo failed to pay the obligation. Hence, Cherdan extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale, Cherdan was declared as the highest bidder. Upon the expiration of the redemption period, the title to the property was consolidated and a new title was issued to Cherdan.

On September 28, 2001, Cherdan filed before the RTC an Ex Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.

Accordingly, a writ of possession was issued and served to Villanueva who moved for the reconsideration of the order and setting aside of the writ of possession on the ground that he is the owner and is in actual possession of the property. He notified the court that he had filed criminal and civil case relative to fraudulent transfer of ownership of the subject property from him to Peñaredondo.

ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject property of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage be enforced against Villanueva.

HELD: NO. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.

In this case, Villanueva opposed the issuance of a writ of possession on the ground that he is in actual possession of the mortgaged property under a claim of ownership. His title to the property was cancelled by virtue of a falsified deed of donation in favor of Peñaredondo. Because of this falsification, he filed civil and criminal cases against Peñaredondo to nullify the deed of donation and to punish the party responsible for the falsified document.

To enforce the writ against Villanueva, an unwitting third party possessor who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings, would amount to the taking of real property without the benefit of proper judicial intervention.

TEODORO DARCEN vs. V.R. GONZALES CREDIT ENTREPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 199747, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 207

FACTS: Sometime in January 2007, Gonzales appeared and claimed that Teodoro’s late mother Flora had mortgaged their properties to V.R. Gonzales Credit in 1995 and demanded payment of several loans taken out by Flora.

Upon investigation, Teodoro found out that their properties had indeed been mortgaged to Gonzales in 1995 and the purported signatures of her mother to the mortgage contracts were allegedly forged by his brothers Manuel and Arturo.

When Gonzales extrajudicially foreclosed the subject properties, Teodoro filed an action for the annulment of mortgage against Gonzales and his brothers Manuel and Arturo.

On December 8, 2009, Gonzales filed an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession. The order of court dated February 26, 2010 was served to Teodoro.

Teodoro opposed the order of a writ of possession on the ground that he is the adverse claimant who is a third party and stranger to the real estate mortgage executed by his late mother Flora.

ISSUE: Whether Teodoro be considered a third party and stranger who is actually holding the properties adversely to the judgment obligor.

HELD: NO. Teodoro had consented to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father as well as waiver by them of their shares in favor of their mother. For this very reason, he cannot be permitted to interpose an adverse claim in the subject mortgaged properties and defeat the writ of possession issued to Gonzales.

RURAL BANK OF STA BARBARA vs. GERRY CENTENO
G.R. No. 200667, March 11, 2013, 693 SCRA 110

FACTS: Gregorio mortgaged his property as a security for a loan in favor of Sta. Barbara Rural Bank.

Gregorio defaulted on the mortgage prompting Sta . Barbara to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said mortgage. Consequently, the subject lots were sold to Sta. Barbara being the highest bidder at the auction sale.

Gregorio failed to redeem the subject lots within one (1) year redemption period. Nonetheless, Gregorio still continued with the possession and cultivation of the aforesaid properties.

Sometime in 1983, Gerry, the son of Gregorio, took over the cultivation of the subject properties.

On March 14, 1988, Gerry purchased the said lots from Gregorio and able to obtain the corresponding tax declaration in his name.

On March 19, 1998, Sta. Barbara filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

Gerry opposed the petition asserting that he purchased the said property and has in fact in actual, open and exclusively possession of the same properties for at least 15 years. He further averred that the foreclosure sale was null and void owing to the forged signatures in the real estate mortgage and Sta. Barbara’s right over the subject lots had already prescribed.

ISSUE: Whether Gerry be considered a third party who is holding the properties adversely to the judgment obligor.

HELD: NO. Considering that Gerry acquired the subject lots from his father Gregorio on March 14, 1988 after they were purchased by Sta. Barbara in the foreclosure sale in 1971, it cannot be therefore be disputed that Gerry is a mere successor-in-interest of Gregorio.

Consequently, he cannot be deemed as a “third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor” under the legal contemplation.

A P P E A L

Q: When may late appeals be entertained by the Court?

A: There have been exceptions, however, in which the Court dispensed with technical infirmities and gave due course to tardy appeals. In some of those instances, the presence of justifying circumstances recognized by law -- such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence -- properly vested the judge with discretion to approve or admit an appeal filed out time. In other instances, lapsed appeals were allowed in order to serve substantial justice, upon consideration of a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; c) the merits of the case d) causes not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party that would be favored by the suspension of the rules; e) the failure to show that the review being sought was merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party would not be unjustly prejudiced. (Go vs. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 107).

APPEAL     IN    NATURALIZATION    CASES

IN RE:   PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZENS,
SHEWAK KESWANI vs. REPUBLIC   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES
G.R.   No.   153986,   June 8, 2007,   524   SCRA   145

The applicable procedure with regard to appeals governing naturalization cases is that provided under BP 129 and supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which is through an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals.

FINAL    AND    EXECUTORY   JUDGMENT    MADE    SUBJECT   OF    APPEAL

DANILO   L.   PAREL   vs.    HEIRS   OF   SIMEON   PRUDENCIO
G.R.   No.   192217,   March   2,   2011,   644   SCRA   496

FACTS: Simeon was the owner of a two-storey house, where he allowed Danilo and his parents to live on the ground floor. Later, Simeon needed the whole house back and informed Danilo and his parents that they had to vacate the place. Danilo, however, remained in the house with his family despite repeated demands which drove Simeon to institute an action for recovery of possession and damages. Danilo maintained that the land on which Simeon’s house was constructed was in his father’s name, making Simeon and his father co-owners of the house of which Simeon claims sole ownership.

RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. The CA, on Simeon’s appeal, rendered a Decision reversing the RTC Decision. SC on certiorari affirmed the CA decision.

Thereafter, Simeon sought to enforce the final and executory decision and thus filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. Danilo prayed that the P2,000 monthly rental he was ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to March 1994 only since he had vacated the premises by April 1994.

ISSUE: Whether a decision which became final and executory can be subject of appeal.

HELD: YES. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is the matter of right. However, there are exceptional circumstances which considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some mode available to the

party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. The instant case falls under one of the exceptions, that is the fact that Danilo has left the property under dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or unjust.

RULE 41
APPEAL FROM THE RTC

M. A. SANTANDER CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. ZENAIDA VILLANUEVA
441 SCRA 525, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004

ISSUE: Whether non-payment of the docket fees and other legal fees within the prescribed period a valid ground to dismiss an appeal.

HELD: YES. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. Failure to pay the appellate court docket and other lawful fees on time is a ground to dismiss the appeal.

The mere filing of the notice of appeal is not enough, for it must be accompanied by the payment of the correct appellate docket fees. Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal had been filed.

ANTONIO BORBON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
445 SCRA 617, G.R. No. 138495, December 9, 2004

ISSUE: Whether the appeal be dismissed for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the period provided for by law.

HELD: YES. Section 3 of Rule 41 provides: “The appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.” This provision should be read in consonance with Section 7 Rule 44 . Courts have the power and jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to perfect the appeal with the filing of the appellant’s brief but the motion seeking an extension of time to file an appellant’s brief must be filed within the period to perfect an appeal. Here, the Appellate court, upon petitioner’s timely motion, allowed him to file the appellant’s brief up to September 7, 1998, but he filed the same only February 2, 1999 or after a lapse of 159 days.

Section 1 - Subject of appeal

The rule that no appeal lies from an order or writ directing the execution of a final judgment, for otherwise a case will not attain finality, is not absolute since a party aggrieved by an improper or irregular execution of a judgment is not without a remedy. Thus, the Court enumerated the exceptional circumstances where a party may elevate the matter of an improper execution for appeal, to wit: “when the writ of execution varies the judgment.” (Banaga vs. Majaducon, G.R. No. 149051, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 153)

RULE   42
PETITION   FOR   REVIEW   FROM   RTC   TO   COURT   OF    APPEALS

GERTRUDES   TEH    vs.    PEOPLE   OF    THE    PHILIPPINES
448 SCRA 25, G.R. No. 141180, January 11,   2005

FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty for estafa by the MTCC beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the CA by way of petition for review. The latter, however, dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form, not being accompanied by duplicate original or certified true copies of the documents and material parts of the record that would support the allegations. Moreover, there was

no written explanation why service of the petition was not done personally.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal be dismissed based on the aforementioned grounds.

HELD: YES. Petitioner violated the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 42 and Section 11 of Rule 13 which warrants the dismissal of her petition by the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner herself admitted that the only documents attached to the petition were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC and the MTCC. There were no copies of the pleadings filed below or other materials portions of the record which would support the allegations in the petition.

Section 11 of Rule 13 reads: “Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other

modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.”

Failure to pay the correct docket fees

The appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees should there be a justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant.

The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is jurisdictional and is necessary for the perfection of an appeal. The failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period confers a discretionary, and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal, and that such power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with a great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances. Said “discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. (De Dios Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134473, March 30, 2006, 485 SCRA 578).

MOTION     FOR     EXTENSION    OF     TIME

BERNARDO   vs.    PEOPLE
G.R.   No.   166980,   April   3,   2007,   520 SCRA   332

The extension should be tacked to the original period, to commence immediately after the expiration of such period. The court has no discretion to reckon the commencement of the extension from a date later than the expiration of such original period, not even if the expiry date is Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday.

RULE   45
APPEAL   BY   CERTIORARI   TO   THE    SUPREME   COURT

JOY TAN vs. JUDGE SALIC DUMARPA
438 SCRA 659, G.R.   No.   138777,   September    22,    2004

FACTS: Respondent filed a civil case for damages with prayer for issuance of writ of attachment against petitioner.

Tan filed her answer with motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to state cause of action. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and set the pre-trial conference.

But during the pre-trial, petitioner and counsel did not appear. Thus, petitioner was declared in default and respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte. The trial court rendered judgment by default.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default on the ground that her counsel did not receive the copy of the order denying her motion to dismiss and setting the pre-trial conference. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and ruled that

the motion is pro forma and does not toll the running of the period to appeal. Thus judgment by default has become final and executory.

Petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUE: Whether the SC may consider the petition for review as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

HELD: YES. The petitioner should have, pursuant to the Rules, filed with the trial court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal with the CA. Instead, she came directly to the SC via the instant petition for review on certiorari. However, in the interest of justice, the SC considered the instant petition, pro hac vice, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It appears prima facie from petitioner’s allegations that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the Judgment by Default. If such allegations are true and the trial court’s fatal error remains uncorrected, then petitioner will suffer great injustice.

Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, the SC will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice. Verily, by denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on the wrong ground that it is pro forma and by declaring her as in default and allowing respondent to present his evidence ex parte, the trial court deprived petitioner of her right to due process. Clearly, the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion.

LOSING PARTY TO SEEK RELIEF FROM THE COURT OF ORIGIN

MARY JANE G. DY CHIAO vs. SEBASTIAN BOLIVAR
G.R. No. 192491, August 17, 2016, 800 SCRA 611

FACTS: In a civil case, the CA declared petitioner Mary Dy Chiao subsidiarily liable to pay the exact amount of P5,711,164, which was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The decision was forwarded to RTC Branch 19 of Naga City for execution. Following the execution proceedings, a writ of execution was issued and directed the respondent sheriff to levy properties of petitioner to satisfy the amount of P5,711,164.00.

To fend off the public auction of her properties, petitioner filed a so-called Petition for Prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction and the case was raffled to RTC Branch 23.

The RTC Branch 23 dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, opining that the processes being undertaken by the respondent sheriff were deemed proceeding in same civil case assigned to and still pending before RTC Branch 19, and that the RTC Branch 19 continued to exercise general supervision and control over such proceedings.

Petitioner then filed in the CA her Motion for Extension of Time to file Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari indicating therein that she would be raising a question of law.

As stated, the CA denied said petition on the ground that where only questions of law are raised, the petition for review on certiorari shall be filed with the Supreme Court and not with CA.

ISSUES

1) Whether CA has jurisdiction to resolve the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

2) Whether the dismissal of the action by RTC Branch 23 is proper.

RULINGS

1) NO. CA has no jurisdiction to resolve the Motion for Extension of Time to File verified petition for review on certiorari.

The CA properly denied the petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time to File Verified Petition for Review on Certiorari and justifiably considered the case close and terminated.

The petitioner was patently guilty of taking an erroneous appeal in view of her manifest intention to limit her appeal to question of law. Such an appeal would only be filed to the Supreme Court pursuant Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal raising only questions of law brought to the CA instead to the Supreme Court, shall be dismissed.

2) YES. The dismissal of the case by RTC Branch 23 is proper considering that the assailed action and processes undertaken by the respondent sheriff to levy the properties of the petitioner were deemed proceedings in the same civil action assigned to RTC Branch 19 as the court that had issued the writ of execution.

Such proceedings, being incidents of the execution of the final and executory decision of the RTC Branch 19 remained within its control.

To allow the petitioner’s action in the RTC Branch 23 would disregard the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference, under which no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.

Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority -- even those exercising concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction - - are not permitted to interfere with each other’s respective cases, much less their orders or judgments therein.

That the respondent sheriff was the sole party sought to be prevented from further acting in the execution proceedings or that the RTC Branch 23 was not impleaded by the petitioner, did not matter.

The respondent sheriff was under the direct control and supervision of the RTC Branch 19 as the court that had issued the writ of execution enforcing the final decision of the CA against the petitioner.

The determination of whether or not the notice of levy was valid and proper, rightfully fell within the exclusive prerogative of the RTC Branch 19 to ascertain and pronounce.

If she doubted the authority of the respondent sheriff to issue the notice of levy, she would have sought clarification of the matter from RTC Branch 19, and should an outcome be adverse to her, she could then have sought fitting redress from a superior court vested with the authority to review and reverse the action of the respondent sheriff instead of resorting to her action before the RTC Branch 23.

RULE    47
ANNULMENT   OF   JUDGMENT     OR     FINAL   ORDERS   AND RESOLUTIONS

ALABAN   vs.    COURT    OF    APPEALS
G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005,   470   SCRA   697

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief of judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies available to petitioners, they could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment. Otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or negligence.

SECTION   2   -   GROUNDS    FOR     ANNULMENT

FELIX   CAMITAN   vs.   COURT   OF   APPEALS
G.R. No.   128099,   December   20,   2006,   511   SCRA   364

Annulment of judgment is allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. An action for annulment of judgment is grounded only on two justifications: (1) extrinsic fraud; and (2) lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process.

RULE    50
DISMISSAL OF APPEAL

ESTATE OF   TARCILA   VDA.   DE   VILLEGAS   vs.   GABOYA
G.R. No.   143006, July 14,   2006,   495   SCRA   30

The right to appeal is a statutory right and a party who seeks to avail of the right must faithfully comply with the rules. Petitioner’s plea for liberal application of the rules would mean deviation from the aforementioned rules, which cannot be tolerated. These rules are designed to facilitate the orderly disposition of appealed cases.

Q: What is the “Law of the Case”?

A: It is an opinion on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (Arriola vs. Philex Mining, G.R. No. 147756, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 152).

RULE   52
“FRESH   PERIOD   RULE”
Fresh     15     day     period     after    denial    of     motion    for     reconsideration

FIL-ESTATE   PROPERTIES, INC. vs.   HON. MARRIETA   HOMEÑA – VALENCIA
555   SCRA   345,   G.R. No. 173942,   June   25,   2008

FACTS: In 1998, Naval filed a complaint against Fil-Estate seeking the recovery of a parcel of land which the latter had allegedly taken possession of by constructing a golf course within the vicinity of her property.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Naval of which Fil-Estate moved for reconsideration. On July 26, 2000, the RTC denied the motion.

On August 11, 2000, Fil-Estate filed a Notice of Appeal alleging that the order of denial of the motion for reconsideration was received on August 9, 2000, but the filing fee was paid only on August 25, 2000, or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal. Consequently, the RTC denied the appeal and such denial was sustained by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the “fresh period rule” pronounced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to September 14, 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.

HELD: YES. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. They may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.

To deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule” will amount to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 2000 as compared to the notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998.

RULE 57
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT

Section   20   -   Claim    for damages    on    account   of    improper,
irregular     or      excessive     attachment

The language used in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure leaves no doubt that there is no longer need for a favorable judgment in favor of the party against whom attachment was issued in order that damages may be awarded. It is indubitable that even a party who loses the action in main but is able to establish a right to damages by reason of improper, irregular, or excessive attachment may be entitled to damages. This bolster the notion that the claim for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may arise and be decided separately from the merits of the main action. (De Dios Carlos vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 135830, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 266)

RULE 58
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Computation of the 20-day period for TRO

Non-working days (Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays) are excluded from the counting of the period only when the last day of the period falls on such days. The Rule does not provide for any other circumstance in which non-working days would affect the counting of a prescribed period. (BPI vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142731, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 168)

PRELIMINARY    INJUNCTION    AS     ACTION    IN     PERSONAM

CONRADO   PINEDA   vs.   HON.   PEDRO T. SANTIAGO
G.R.   No.   143482,   April   13,   2007,   521   SCRA   47

A suit for injunction is an action in personam and, as such, the respondent judge’s jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to the parties in the injunction suit.

SECTION   5 -   PRELIMINARY    INJUNCTION    NOT     GRANTED    WITHOUT    NOTICE;     EXCEPTIONS

SPS.   MANUEL &   LUISA TAN LEE   vs.   COURT   OF   APPEALS
G.R.   No.   147191,   March   20,   2007,   518   SCRA   546

No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined.

RULE   63
DECLARATORY    RELIEF

Propriety    of     declaratory    relief

The Court may entertain a suit for declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the rights of the party affected. (Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, G.R. No. 164171, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 673).

EXECUTORY    PROCESS    AVAILABLE    IN      DECLARATORY    RELIEF

DBM   vs.   MANILA’S   FINEST   RETIREES ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R.   No.   169466,   May   9,   2007,   523   SCRA   90

The execution of judgments in a Petition in a Declaratory Relief is not necessarily indefensible. A special civil action is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes some necessary special regulation.

RTC   HAS   JURISDICTION   OVER   DECLARATORY RELIEF   BUT   HAS   NO   JURISDICTION OVER   TRO & INJUNCTION UNDER   EPIRA

ENERGY   REGULATION    COMMISSION    vs.
HON.   GREGORIO L. VEGA, JR.   &   MERALCO
G.R. No. 225141,   September   26,   2016,    804   SCRA   181

FACTS: Meralco filed petition for declaratory relief with prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to declare as null and void selected issuances by the DOE and ERC related to Retail Competition and Open Assess (RCOA) provision of the EPIRA.

The RTC issued an order granting Meralco’s prayer and ordering the issuance of a 20-day TRO in its favor.

The ERC then filed a petition assailing the RTC’s order as well and praying for an injunction relief to enjoin the RTC from continuing its proceeding in the present case.

ISSUES

1) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief.

2) Whether RTC has jurisdiction over the ancillary prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining EPIRA’s implementation.

RULINGS

1) YES. The RTC’s exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief is proper as this is a matter that expressly falls under its jurisdiction.

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court furthermore is clear that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.

2) NO. RTC does not have jurisdiction to issue any order or enjoining the DOE/ERB issuances relating to EPIRA.

Under the clear terms of Section 78 of the EPIRA, only the Supreme Court may issue an order enjoining the EPIRA’s implementation.

This provision is similar to Section 3 of RA 8975 enacted in relation with government infrastructure projects, where it was established that if the RTC issues a writ of preliminary injunction that will impede the process of national government projects, the lower court commits grave abuse of discretion.

RULE 65
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

MAYOR EDGARDO FLORES vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA
452 SCRA 278, G.R. No. 159022, February 23, 2005

ISSUE: Whether the petition prematurely filed as petitioner failed to first exhaust all administrative remedies.

HELD: YES. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with respondent Sanggunian in accordance with Section 61 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). After receiving the order of the respondent Sanggunian preventively suspending him from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the latter the opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 Section 1 of the same Rule requires that petitioner must not only show that respondent Sanggunian, in issuing the questioned order, “acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,” but that “there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law.” The “plain” and “adequate remedy” referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling and valid reason for doing so. This, petitioner failed to do.

PO3 WILLIAM MENDOZA vs. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
460 SCRA 399, G.R. No. 139658, June 21, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner police officer was administratively charged with illegal arrest, illegal detention, physical injuries and robbery.

The PNP Regional Director rendered a decision dismissing petitioner from service. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB) of the Napolcom. The RAB rendered a resolution affirming the decision of the PNP Regional Director. Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RAB.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari on the ground that he was not accorded due process. The RAB, through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss contending that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative e remedies.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies fatal.

HELD: YES. Petitioner’s failure to exhaust all administrative remedies is fatal to his cause. It is elementary that where, as here, a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to. Under the provisions of the DILG Act of 1990, the Decision of the PNP Regional Director imposing upon a PNP member the administrative penalty of dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the Secretary of the DILG. Here, petitioner did not interpose an appeal to the DILG Secretary. It bears emphasis that in the event the Secretary renders an unfavorable decision, petitioner may still elevate his case to the Civil Service Commission.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & ILUSORIO
460 SCRA 146, G.R. No. 141796, June 15, 2005

ISSUE: Whether a petition for certiorari be filed with the SC without first filing a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.

HELD: NO. As a rule, the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when the lower court has been given the opportunity to correct the error imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution. The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order or resolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error. The motion for reconsideration, therefore, is a condition sine qua non before filing a petition for certiorari.

EAST ASIA TRADERS, INC. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
433 SCRA 716, G.R. No. 152947, July 7, 2004

Doctrine: Certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling.

HELD: Interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted only to correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Its function is limited to keeping an inferior court within its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts – acts which courts or judges have no power or authority in law to perform. It is not designed to correct erroneous findings and conclusions made by the courts.”

MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL vs. REY BORROMEO
438 SCRA 653, G.R. No. 138305, September 22, 2004

Doctrine: A petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

HELD: Upon receipt of a copy of the Voluntary Arbitrator’s Decision, petitioner should have been filed with the Court of Appeals, within

the 15-day reglementary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari, which is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal. And without an appeal (petition for review) seasonably filed, as in this case, the questioned Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator became final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from notice.

MOBILIA    PRODUCTS,    INC.   vs.    HAJIME   UMEZAWA
G.R.   No.   149357,   March    4,    2005
PEOPLE   OF    THE    PHILIPPINES    vs.    FERNANDEZ   &    UMEZAWA
452 SCRA 736,   G.R. 14903, March   4,   2005

Doctrine: Recognized EXCEPTIONS to rule that certiorari cannot be availed of when the period has lapsed.

ISSUE: Whether the State is barred from assailing the order of the RTC for not filing a motion for reconsideration.

HELD: While ordinarily, certiorari is unavailing where the appeal period has lapsed, there are exceptions. Among them are:

(1) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;

(2) when the broader interest of justice so requires;

(3) when the writs issued are null and void; or

(4) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

DOMINGO MANALO vs. PAIC SAVINGS BANK & TERESE VARGAS
453 SCRA 747, G.R. No. 146531, March 18, 2005

ISSUE: Whether mandamus is the proper recourse to enforce petitioner’s alleged right of redemption.

HELD: NO. Mandamus is a writ issued in order to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective, it does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a contractual obligation or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion.

The SC held that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioner’s alleged right of redemption. To begin with, mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful.

RULE 66
QUO WARRANTO

QUO WARRANTO CASE AGAINST CJ SERENO

REPUBLIC vs. MARIA LOURDES SERENO
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Quo Warranto to declare void respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom for her failure to submit SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by law.

ISSUES

1) Whether the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent Sereno who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already filed with the House of Representatives.

2) Whether respondent Sereno is an impeachable officer and such that quo warranto petition cannot prosper.

3) Whether there is a forum shopping.

4) Whether impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an impeachable official may be removed from office.

5) Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription.

6) Whether respondent’s failure to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by law voids the nomination and appointment of respondent Sereno as Chief Justice.

7) Whether respondent Sereno is a de jure or de facto officer.

RULINGS

1) YES, SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the qualification of a member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public concern.

2) NO. The Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different.

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ.

At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

3) There is NO forum shopping because quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds (3) applicable rules pertaining to institution, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocably different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense.

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding.

4) YES. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointee or invariably elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition on impeachable officer. In the case of Estrada vs. Macapagal Arroyo where the SC took cognizance of quo warranto petition against former President Macapagal Arroyo whether the former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status as President.

5) NO. Prescription does not lie against the State.

The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petition is not mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking a relief for a public wrong and suing for public interest.

In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must”

As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. In effect, when the government is the real party and is proceeding mainly to assert its right, there can be no defense on the grounds of laches or prescription.

6) YES. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity. Contrary to respondent Sereno’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement.

7) DE FACTO OFFICER. The effect of a finding that person appointed to an office is ineligible therefore is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers to him the status of a de facto officer.

For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from office other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

RULE 70
FORCIBLE   ENTRY    &    UNLAWFUL    DETAINER

RUBEN SANTOS vs. SPOUSES TONY and MERCY AYON
458 SCRA 83,   G.R.   No.   137013,    May   6,   2005

ISSUE: Whether accion publiciana is the proper remedy upon a person who occupies a property by tolerance or permission.

HELD: NO. The correct remedy is unlawful detainer. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to defend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant.

Possession by tolerance is lawful but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Petitioner’s cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondent’s failure to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996. Within one (1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.

MTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER EJECTMENT CASES
DESPITE ASSERTION OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY

AMELIA ROBERTS vs. MARTIN PAPIO
G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007, 515 SCRA 346

The summary nature of the action is not changed by the claim of ownership of the property of the dependant. The MeTC is not divested of its jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer action simply because the defendant asserts ownership over the property

LENGTH OF TIME OF DISPOSSESSION ESSENTIAL IN
DETERMINING ACTION TO BE FILED FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

VICTORIANO ENCARNACION vs. NIEVES AMIGO
G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172

The material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property is the length of time of dispossession. If the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment is proper and the inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than one year,

the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana, which should be brought to the proper RTC.

RULE   71
CONTEMPT

PHILIPPINE   GUARDIANS   BROTHERHOOD, INC.   vs.    COMELEC
G.R.   No.   190529,   March   22,   2011,   646   SCRA   63

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC may be cited for Contempt for its refusal to reinstate in the list of Party-List Candidates, Philippine Guardian Brotherhood, Inc.

HELD: YES, the COMELEC Chair and Members are found guilty of Contempt of Court for their disobedience to the lawful directive of the Supreme Court specifically the Status Quo order dated February 2, 2010.

It is a judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson Jose A.R. Melo’s resignation effective January 15, 2011 and Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal’s retirement on February 2, 2011. However, their departure from government service, however, do not render moot and academic their liability for indirect contempt, since “contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act. The higher interest of effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite the retirement of the government official or employees, more so if is involves a former member of the bench. (Curata vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 154211-12, June 22, 2009, 590 SCRA 214).

VERIFIED PETITION NEEDED FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT
IF COURT DID NOT INITIATE THE CHARGE

MA. CONCEPCION REGALADO vs. ANTONIO GO
G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 616

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

RULE 74
SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF   ESTATES

UNION BANK   OF    THE    PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ
452  SCRA 228, G.R.   No.   149926,   February    25,    2005

Doctrine: Partition among the heirs is not allowed until the will has been probated.

HELD: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will, may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of the will. This of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.

APOLONIA BANAYAD FRIANELA vs. SERVILLANO BANAYAD, JR.
G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 380

FACTS: Apolonia filed with RTC a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Moises Banayad. She alleged that she was named as devisee of the will and the decedent died without an issue and left her a parcel of land in Pasay City, image of Oracion del Huerto and Pieta including the crown and all personal property.

ISSUE: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant case.

HELD: NO. Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises’ estate. Thus, from the reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings.

The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is, not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void.

EXTRA-JUDICIAL   SETTLEMENT/PARTITION;
EFFECT   TO    A     PERSON    WHO   HAS    NOT     PARTICIPATED
IN    THE     PROCEEDINGS

MERCEDES   CRISTOBAL   CRUZ   vs.   EUFROSINA   CRISTOBAL
G.R.   No.   140422,   August   7,   2006,   498   SCRA   37

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states: The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section, but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.

CONSTRUCTIVE     NOTICE     THROUGH     PUBLICATION

JOSEPH   CUA   vs.   GLORIA   VARGAS
G.R.   No.   156536,   October   31,   2006,   506   SCRA   374

FACTS: Five heirs of one Paulina Vargas executed a notarized Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Sale over a parcel of land left by the latter in favor of herein petitioner Joseph Cua.

However, Gloria Vargas and her co-heirs did not sign the document evidencing the said settlement which was duly published in the newspaper.

ISSUE: Whether the heirs are deemed constructively notified regardless of their failure to participate therein by an extrajudicial settlement of estate and partition which was duly published.

HELD: NO. Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, constructive notice to interested parties may suffice through publication but the same should be done before the execution of the settlement and sale, unlike in the case at bar, in which, Gloria was totally unaware of the transaction.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs after the facts of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate.

RULE   73
VENUE   AND   PROCESSES

EDGAR   SAN   LUIS    vs.    FELICIDAD   SAN   LUIS
G.R.   No.   133743,   February   6,   2007,   514   SCRA   294

Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.

Under Section 2, Rule 79, an “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

RULE    99
ADOPTION   AND   CUSTODY   OF   MINOR

CONSENT    TO   ADOPTION

ROSARIO   MATA    CASTRO    vs.    JOSE   MARIA    GREGORIO
G.R.   No.   188801,    October    15,   2014,    738   SCRA   415

FACTS: Atty. Castro is the estranged husband of Rosario and the father of Joane. He filed a petition for adoption of his alleged illegitimate children, Jed and Regina, with Lilibeth.

The trial court approved the adoption, having ruled out that no opposition from any person including the OSG representing the government had been received by the court.

A year after the decree of adoption was issued, Rosario and Joane filed a petition to annul the judgment of the trial court on the ground that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption proceedings as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the petition.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the consents of the wife and legitimate children of the adopter are required as requisite for adoption.

(2) Whether publication is a sufficient notice to the spouse and legitimate children.

(3) Whether the petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is the proper action to annul the decree of adoption.

RULINGS

(1) YES. Under Article III, Section 7 of RA 8552, the husband must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock.

The provision is mandatory. The spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Atty. Castro and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation.

RA 8552 also requires the consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. It is undisputed that Joane was Atty. Castro and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of adoption proceedings.

The consent of the adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

(2) NO. For the adoption to be valid, the consent of the spouse and legitimate children is required by RA 8552.

Personal service of summons should have effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected.

It is not enough to rely on constructive notice by publication as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joane of the adoption proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

(3) YES. The annulment of judgment is a remedy which disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgment, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.

The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedullary, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the court exist.

As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land.

As to the second controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or laches.

The grant of adoption should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud by employing tactics by Atty. Castro not only to induce the trial court in approving the petition but also to prevent Rosario and Joane from participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.

RULE   102
HABEAS   CORPUS

IN RE:   APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS   vs. BUCOR   DIRECTOR
G.R.   No.   170497,   January   22,   2007,   512   SCRA   177

The writ of Habeas Corpus may also be issued where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court has no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.

MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER vs. DIRECTOR OF BUCOR
UDK – 14071, July 17, 2009, 593 SCRA 265

FACTS: Martin seeks his release from prison in his petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. He claims that his prison sentence of 12 to 17 years was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to 9 to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months and 12 days including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment is illegal.

OSG opposed the petition because it was neither signed or verified by Martin or a person on his behalf or by his purported counsel. The OSG further opposed the petition on the ground that Martin’s prison sentence was never commuted by then Pres. Ramos as he had not been granted the status of a colonist and there were other pending cases against him warranting his continued detention and he was put under custody of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is meritorious.

HELD: NO. So far as the failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is concerned, the strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas corpus petition as claimed by the OSG may be dispensed with where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case for habeas corpus.

The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.

HABEAS    CORPUS    JURISDICTION

MA.   HAZELINA   TUJAN – MILITANTE     vs.   RAQUEL   CADA – DEAPERA
G.R.   No.   210636,    July    28,   2014,    731    SCRA   144

FACTS: Raquel, the biological mother of minor Criselda, filed before the Family Court of Caloocan City, a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus, demanding that custody over the child be returned to her by Militante.

Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful in personally serving Militante copies of the habeas corpus and of the writ.

Raquel then filed a criminal case for kidnapping against Militante. During the preliminary investigation, the sheriff was able to serve the alias writ upon Militante at the prosecutor’s office of Quezon City.

Following this development, Militante, by way of special appearances, moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed before the RTC of Caloocan City for the dismissal of the habeas corpus, claiming, among others, That she was not personally served with summons and the present petition should be filed in the Family Court in Quezon City since the minor resides in Quezon City.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the writ of habeas corpus issued by the Family Court of Caloocan City is enforceable in Quezon City.

(2) Whether summons is required in Petition for Habeas Corpus.

RULINGS

(1) YES. A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court and shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

It is undisputed that Caloocan City and Quezon City both belong to the same National Capital Judicial Region.

(2) NO. Service of summons to begin with is not required in habeas corpus petition. A writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions.

By service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of Militante.

RULE   103
CHANGE   OF    NAME

REPUBLIC   vs.    TRINIDAD   CAPOTE
G.R.   No.   157043,   February   2,   2007, 514   SCRA   76

A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. The fact that no one opposed the petition had not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial in nature.

RULE    108 -   CORRECTION   OF    ENTRIES

REPUBLIC    vs.    MERLINDA   L.    OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538,   February   10,   2014,   715   SCRA   605

FACTS: Merlinda requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years.

Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean national, on June 24, 2002 at the office of the MTCC Palace of Justice.

She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed before the RTC a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion.

The RTC granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of Melinda and Ye Son Sune.

The OSG, however, filed an appeal assailing the Decision on the ground that (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract, in effect, nullifies the contract.

(2) Whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the appropriate remedy for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

RULINGS

(1) NO. Melinda indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak about, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence presented.

Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by canceling the entries in the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

(2) YES. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.

The proceeding may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed whereas opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of Melinda. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such marriage.

CRIMINAL   PROCEDURE

RULE    111   -    PROSECUTION   OF    CIVIL   ACTION

WHEN   CIVIL   ACTION    MAY    PROCEED    INDEPENDENTLY

CRISTINA   B.   CASTILLO    vs.    PHILIP   R.   SALVADOR
G.R.   No. 191240,    July   30,   2014,    731   SCRA   329

FACTS: Cristina Castillo charged Philip Salvador with estafa for allegedly enticed her to invest $100,000 in May 2002 into the remittance business

in the name of Philip Salvador and the said amount was allegedly misappropriated by the latter.

However, Philip vehemently denied the receipt of $100,000 from Cristina.

On April 26, 2006, RTC has found Philip Salvador guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, the CA has reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC and acquitted Philip Salvador of the crime of estafa.

ISSUES

(1) What are the effects on the civil liability of the accused on his acquittal?

(2) Whether the judgment of acquittal of the accused by the CA should at least have retained the award of damages to complainant.

RULINGS

(1) Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused.

First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such an act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complaint of.

The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

(2) NO. Philip Salvador was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The evidence of the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by Philip, the general presumption, “that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor.”

The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present. For in fact, Cristina herself could not even establish clearly and precisely her allegation that she gave Philip $100,000 in May 2002 and how Philip committed fraud.

EFFECT   OF   DEATH     OF    THE     ACCUSED
ON     CIVIL   LIABILITY

DR.   CLENIO   YNZON   vs.   PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES
G.R.   No. 165805,   July   30,   2015,   731   SCRA   214

FACTS: Dr. Ynzon performed a surgical operation upon a 10 – year - old patient, JR, of acute appendicitis and due to his negligence, carelessness and imprudence, JR died due to cardio-respiratory arrest.

On February 28, 2003, the RTC convicted Dr. Ynzon of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.

On June 4, 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Dr. Ynzon.

While pending appeal to the Supreme Court, Dr. Ynzon died on December 23, 2011 due to “multi-organ failures.”

ISSUES

(1) Whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his appeal survives the claim for civil liability.

(2) Whether the recovery of civil liability may be enforced in the same action.

RULINGS

(1) YES. The death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability survives or subsists as the same is not based on delicts but by contract and the reckless imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

(2) NO. A separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator of the estate, depending on the sources of obligation upon which the same is based and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

RULE   112   -    PRELIMINARY   INVESTIGATION

SEC.   6 -   DETERMINATION   OF    PROBABLE   CAUSE

ALFREDO   C.   MENDOZA    vs.    PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES
G.R.   No. 197293,    April    21,   2014,   722    SCRA   647

FACTS: Juno Cars hired Mendoza as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. Upon partial audit, it was discovered that five cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without permission and without remitting the payment to Juno Cars.

Juno Cars filed a criminal complaint against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa. Mendoza contends that Juno Cars failed to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments, hence, it could not have suffered damage.

Prosecutor Rey Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause and filed the two (2) informations before the RTC against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.

Mendoza moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. He filed before the RTC a motion for determination of probable cause.

After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on record, Judge Rizalina Capco – Umali dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of probable cause.

(2) What is the difference between executive determination of probable cause from judicial determination of probable cause?

(3) What are the three (3) options given to the trial court upon the filing of the criminal information under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court?

RULINGS

(1) YES. Once the information has been filed in court, the judge shall then “personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.

Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court mandates the judge to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.”

(2) The executive determination of probable cause is one made during the preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.

Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be competent to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The difference is clear. The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

(3) Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three (3) options upon the filing of the criminal information:

(a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause;

(b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and

(c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.

Rule     114   -    Conduct     of     Hearing    in     Granting    Bail

CHIEF   STATE    PROSECUTOR    ZUÑO   vs.    JUDGE   ALEJANDRO    CABEBE
444 SCRA 382,   A.M. OCA No. 03-1800   RTJ, November 26,   2004

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge’s grant of bail without the benefit of hearing justified.

HELD: NO. Under the present Rules of Court, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.

PEOPLE vs. LUIS BUCALON PLAZA
G.R. No. 176933, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 457

FACTS: Luis was indicted for Murder. After the prosecution rested its case, Luis, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Court denied the Demurrer.

The Defense while in the course of the presentation of its evidence filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond based on the findings of the trial court in the Demurrer that prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, so he could be released on bail.

The prosecution vehemently opposed the said motion contending that the case being Murder, a non-bailable offense, it is public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged.

Luis was subsequently released after he posted a P40,000 bond.

ISSUE: Whether the hearing conducted satisfies the requirement of due process and that Luis is entitled to bail.

HELD: YES. Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

When the trial judge denied the Demurrer and with his corresponding statement that the evidence was sufficient to convict Luis of Homicide only, a holding of a summary hearing merely to determine whether Luis was entitled to bail would have been unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.

ANITA ESTEBAN vs. JUDGE REYNALDO ALHAMBRA
437 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 135012, September 7, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Anita Esteban posted cash bail of P20,000 in each four criminal cases of her brother Gerardo Esteban for the latter’s temporary liberty.

While out on bail, Gerardo was again charged with another crime for which he was arrested and detained. Fed up with Gerardo’s actuation, petitioner refused to post another bail, instead she filed an application for the cancellation of the cash bonds she posted in the four criminal cases. Respondent judge denied petitioner’s application for cancellation of cash bonds.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for cancellation of the accused’s cash bail.

HELD: NO. We hold that the cash bail cannot be cancelled. Petitioner did not surrender the accused charged in the four criminal cases to the trial court. The accused was arrested and detained because he was charged in a subsequent criminal case. Moreover, the bail bond posted for the accused was in the form of cash deposits which shall be applied to the payment of fine and cost and the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to any person who made the deposit.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

RIGHT     TO     BAIL

PEOPLE     vs.    SANDIGANBAYAN   &    JINGGOY   ESTRADA
G.R.   No.   158754,   August   10,   2007,   529   SCRA   764

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great.

RULE 119 - T R I A L

SEC. 17 - DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED TO BE STATE

WITNESS

MANUEL J. JIMENES, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 209195, September 17, 2014, 735 SCRA 597

FACTS: On June 11, 2009, Montero executed sworn statement confessing his participation in the killing of Ruby Rose by providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the ship or tug boat and together with his co-conspirators, dropping the steel box containing the

cadaver into the seal. He named Jimenes, Lope, Lennard, Robert and Eric as his co-conspirators.

On August 20, 2009, an information was filed before the RTC charging Jimenes, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and Montero of Murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.

Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge as a state witness. The state filed a motion to discharge Montero as a state witness for the prosecution, however, Jimenes opposed both motions.

ISSUES

(1) What are the conditions for the discharge of an accused as state witness.

(2) Whether there is an absolute necessity for the testimony of accused Montero whose discharge is requested.

(3) Whether the testimony of said accused be substantially corroborated in its material points.

(4) Whether said accused does not appear to be most guilty despite being a principal by participation.

RULINGS

(1) Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that in discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely:

(a) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;

(b) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;

(c) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;

(d) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and

(e) The trial court is satisfied that:

(1) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(2) there is no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;

(3) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(4) said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and

(5) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

(2) YES. Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged when he alone has knowledge of the crimes. In more concrete term, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution evidence.

In the present case, not one of the accused - conspirators, except Montero, was willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her killing.

Hence, there is an absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero which he alone is available to provide direct evidence of the crime.

(3) YES. Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points.

The evidence consisting of the steel casing where the cadaver was found, the drum containing the cadaver of Ruby Rose, the spot in the sea where the cadaver was retrieved, the apparel worn by the victim when she was killed as well as her burnt personal effects, these all partly corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of Montero.

Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that the testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points.

(4) YES. By jurisprudence, “most guilty” refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilty taking into account his degree of participation in the commission of the offense.

What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.

It appears that while Montero was part of the planning, preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had no direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby Rose. Montero’s participation was limited to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and together with his co-accused dropping the steel box containing the cadaver into the sea.

The discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness because he does not appear to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission of the crime.

Demurrer to Evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
447 SCRA 291, G.R. No. 137707-11, December 17, 2004

FACTS: Herein private respondents were charged of several criminal complaints with the Sandiganbayan. When arraigned, they pleaded not guilty to all charges. Two of the respondents were never arraigned.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense filed with leave of court a demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the respondents beyond reasonable doubt.

Sandiganbayan rendered decision granting respondents’ demurrer to evidence and acquitting all the respondents for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan in granting respondents demurrer to evidence acted without jurisdiction.

HELD: Records show that two of the respondents were never arraigned before the Sandiganbayan nor were they ever arrested. Hence, the Sandiganbayan did not acquire jurisdiction over them. Basic is the rule that before a court can act upon the case of an accused, it must first acquire jurisdiction over his person. Jurisdiction over the accused is acquired (1) his arrest, or (2) his voluntary submission. If the accused is a fugitive from justice, the court cannot even proceed with a trial in absentia unless he has been previously arraigned.

With respect to the rest of the respondents, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in granting their demurrer to evidence.

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE GRANT TANTAMOUNT TO ACQUITTAL

PEOPLE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN & MANUEL BARCENAS
G.R. No. 174504, March 21, 2011, 645 SCRA 726

FACTS: Barcenas was the vice mayor who obtained cash advances and

failed to liquidate the same. After the prosecution presented the COA auditor to be its last witness, Barcenas filed a Demurrer to Evidence which the Sandiganbayan granted. At the time the case was filed in Sandiganbayan, Barcenas had already liquidated his cash advances. The prosecution claimed that the settlement of the cash advances would not exonerate Barcenas but only mitigate his criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether the granting of demurrer to evidence by the Sandiganbayan tantamount to acquittal.

HELD: YES. In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and this would place the accused in double jeopardy. This may be reviewable through certiorari and the writ may only be issued if it could be proved that the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion. In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from Barcenas’ non-liquidation of the subject cash advances because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecution’s witness that Barcenas liquidated the same albeit belatedly.

EXCEPTION     TO    DEMURRER     TO     EVIDENCE

PEOPLE    OF   THE   PHILIPPINES    vs.    JOSE   C.   GO,   et. al.
G.R.   No.   191015,    August    6,    2014,    732    SCRA   216

FACTS: Orient Bank was placed under the receivership of PDIC. As a result, PDIC began collecting on Orient Bank’s past due loans available. Among these borrowers of Orient Bank are Timmy’s Inc. and Asia Textile Mills. Both denied having applied, much less, being granted a loan by Orient Bank.

After conducting an investigation, a finding came out that loans purportedly for the said two firms were released in the form of manager’s checks and then deposited to the savings account of Jose C. Go of Orient Bank.

A complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against respondents Jose C. Go, Aida C. Dela Rosa and Felecitas D. Necomedes. The private respondents pleaded not guilty during the arraignment and pre-trial was conducted. Thereafter, the trial of the case ensued.

After the presentation of prosecution’s evidence, the private respondents filed Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case, acquitting all the private respondents.

The prosecution, thru the OSG, filed petition for certiorari with CA assailing the order of the trial court. CA affirmed the RTC decision and double jeopardy was attached.

ISSUE: Whether there is an exception to the granting of demurrer to evidence which would tantamount to an acquittal.

HELD: YES. As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

When there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void.

In this case, the evidence shows that respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. By disregarding what is evidence in the record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Therefore, the grant of demurrer to evidence to the accused does not amount to acquittal since the order itself is null and void, being tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

NO    DOUBLE   JEOPARDY    FROM    VOID    JUDGMENT

JOSEPH   CEREZO vs. PEOPLE,   YANEZA, ABUNDA & AFULUGENCIA
G.R.   No. 185230,   June 1,   2011, 650 SCRA   222

FACTS: Joseph filed a complaint of libel against respondents Yaneza, Abunda & Afulugencia. Finding probable cause against the respondents, the Prosecutor’s Office filed the information in the RTC. Respondents sought for reconsideration of the Prosecutor’s resolution. During the intervening period, respondents were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The Prosecutor’s Office rendered a decision reversing its earlier ruling and filed a withdrawal of

information. RTC dismissed the libel case based on prosecutor’s new resolution. Aggrieved by the order, Cerezo filed an appeal to the DOJ.

Later, the Secretary of Justice rendered a decision reversing the prosecutor’s ruling and ordered the refilling of the information. The RTC granted the ruling of the DOJ Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not double jeopardy exists in the present case.

HELD: NO. One of the requisites in order for double jeopardy to be present is the acquittal, conviction, dismissal or otherwise termination of the case without the offender’s express consent. The same is not present in the case.

The order of the RTC based on prosecutor’s resolution as well as the order conforming with the DOJ’s decision were made with grave abuse of discretion. In rendering such rulings, the RTC blindly followed the decision of the prosecutor and DOJ without making an independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of the case. By relying solely on the manifestation of the public prosecutor and the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and refused to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. Thus, the assailed orders were rendered with grave abuse of discretion and are now void and without legal effect.

Since the orders are void and do not have a legal effect, the respondents were never acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of the case. With the fifth requisite missing, there can be no double jeopardy.

NO    DOUBLE    JEOPARDY     WHEN    ORDER
OF    DISMISSAL    WAS    RECALLED

CESAR   T.    QUIAMBAO    vs.    PEOPLE OF   THE   PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185267,   September   17,   2014,   735   SCRA   345

FACTS: Cesar was charged for violation of Section 74 of BP 68 before the MTC of Pasig City, Branch 69.

Before the issuance of the warrant of arrest, Cesar filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.

On May 8, 2006, the MTC denied the motion and set his arraignment on October 9, 2006.

Cesar filed a Petition for Certiorari before RTC, Branch 154 of Pasig City.

Accused Cesar was arraigned on January 29, 2007.

On June 4, 2007, RTC, Branch 154, granted the Petition holding that no probable cause to hold Cesar for trial. Consequently, it directed the MTC to dismiss the criminal case for want of probable cause.

Private complainants Aderico & Bonifacio brought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court raising purely question of law.

While the petition for certiorari remains pending before the Supreme Court, the MTC on June 18, 2007 ordered the dismissal of the criminal case pursuant to the RTC - Branch 154’s order dated June 4, 2007.

Upon learning that a petition for certiorari had been filed with the Supreme Court, the MTC issued an order dated September 17, 2007 recalling the Order of Dismissal and ordered the suspension of the proceeding to await the final outcome the pending case.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the dismissal of the criminal case operates as an acquittal of the accused for the crime charged.

(2) Whether the revival of the criminal case placed the accused in double jeopardy.

RULINGS

(1) NO. MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007 because the petition for review remains pending before the Supreme Court.

The issue of probable cause had already been acquired by the Supreme Court. From the moment the case had been elevated to the SC, the MTC has no longer authority to further act on the issue which was pending review.

Thus, the dismissal neither terminated the action on the merit, nor amounted to an acquittal.

(2) NO. The MTC had no longer authority to dismiss the criminal case because the jurisdiction to act on and entertain the case had already acquired by SC. Hence, it naturally follows that all the issuances and/or order by the lower court relative to the issue pending review with SC will become null and void.

There is no double jeopardy because the MTC which ordered the dismissal of the criminal case, is not a court of competent jurisdiction.

Hence, the dismissal and the subsequent revival or reinstatement of the criminal case did not effectively place the accused in double jeopardy.

DEMURRER   TO    EVIDENCE     PREMATURELY    FILED

ESTHER   P.    MAGLEO    vs.    JUDGE    ROWENA   QUINAG-ORAN
A.M.   No. RTJ-12-2336,   November   12,   2014,   739   SCRA   628

FACTS: Before the prosecution rested its case, accused Esther filed a Demurrer to Evidence and the Court granted the same.

ISSUE: Whether the granting of Demurrer to Evidence is proper.

HELD: NO. The granting of the Demurrer to Evidence is not proper considering that it was filed prematurely before the prosecution rested its case.

The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution when the accused Esther filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, there was no proper acquittal.

The RTC having failed to do so, there is nary a doubt that no double jeopardy attached.

RULE 120 - J U D G M E N T

PROMULGATION   -    Presence   of     Counsel

MARINO    ICDANG      vs.     SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R.   No.   185960,   January   25,   2012,   664   SCRA 233

FACTS: Marino was charged with Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Sec. 3 (a) RA 3019, before the Sandiganbayan. The trial went on and both parties rested its case. When the Sandiganbayan promulgated its judgment of conviction, Marino and his counsel were not present.

ISSUE: Whether the presence of counsel during the promulgation of judgment is indispensable.

HELD: NO. There is nothing in the rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of judgment of conviction to be valid. While notice must be served on both accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right of the accused was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was pronounced.

FAILURE   TO   APPEAR   AT    THE    PROMULGATION   OF    JUDGMENT

REYNALDO   H.    JAYLO,   et.   al.      vs.     SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R.   Nos.    183152-54,     January   21,   2015,   746   SCRA   452

FACTS: On September 8, 1992, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan against Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo for the murder of De Guzman, Calanog and Manguera.

On April 17, 2007, the Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona and Habalo guilty of homicide, however, during that promulgation, none of the accused appeared despite notice. The court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment was entered in the criminal docket. The bailbonds of the accused were cancelled and issued warrants for their arrest.

On April 30, 2007, the counsel of the accused filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision.

On November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion for reconsideration and ordered the implementation for the arrest of the convicted accused.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration by the accused.

(2) What are the effects of non-appearance of the accused without justifiable cause in the promulgation of the judgment of conviction?

(3) Whether the right to file motion for reconsideration is a statutory right and not merely a remedy under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.

(4) Whether Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of the accused.

RULINGS

(1) YES. The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration by the accused. While the motion was filed on April 30, 2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of the accused in court. For one, it is not an act of surrender that is contemplated by Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, nowhere in the motion was indicated that accused were asking for leave to avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, or that there were valid reason for their absence at the promulgation.

For the failure of the accused to regain their standing in court and avail of the remedies against the judgment of conviction, the decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality, 15 days reckoned from 17 April 2007.

(2) If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the following remedies:

(a) filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121); and

(b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

(3) YES. Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant or privilege.

As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner provided by law.

Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

(4) NO. It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of non-appearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.

In this case, the accused have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely, they cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to grant them relief from its judgment of conviction.

VARIANCE    DOCTRINE

PEOPLE   OF   THE    PHILIPPINES    vs.   BERNABE   PAREJA
G.R.   No.   202122,    January   15,   2014,    714    SCRA    131

FACTS: Pareja was charged with two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape of a minor AAA.

The first charge was allegedly committed by Pareja of Rape thru sexual assault by inserting his finger in the vagina of the minor while other charge alleged that Pareja committed rape by carnal knowledge.

On trial, the victim narrated that in the first charge, Pareja inserted his penis in her annus while the second charge, AAA was not able to narrate if indeed, Pareja inserted his finger in her vagina.

The trial court convicted Pareja for rape and acts of lasciviousness upon its reliance on the testimony of AAA.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the accused be convicted of the crime of rape by carnal knowledge when what was proved in the trial court was rape thru sexual assault.

(2) What is the crime committed by the accused?

(3) What are two modes of committing rape?

(4) What is the primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution?

RULINGS

(1) NO. Since the charge in the information is rape through carnal knowledge, the accused cannot be convicted of rape by sexual assault even it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape.

The first mode is not necessarily included in the second and vice - versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault when what was charged with was with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

(2) Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness was present in the first charge incident. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.

(3) Rape can be committed in two ways:

(a) Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as “organ rape” or “penile rape.” The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

(b) Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called “instrument or object rape, or “gender free rape.” It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.”

The two modes of committing rape can be differentiated in the following manner:

(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man or a woman.

(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party may be a man or a woman.

(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person, and

(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.

(4) The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done - to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime.

A faulty and defective information, such as that of the instant case, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the information is accurate and appropriate.

RULE 122 - A P P E A L

PERSONALITY TO APPEAL

PEOPLE & MALAYAN INSURANCE vs. PHILIP PICCIO
G.R. No. 193681, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 254

FACTS: Yuchengco family and Yuchengco Group of Companies thru Malayan Insurance Company filed a criminal complaint of Libel against a group called PEPCI for posting an article in a certain website which was highly defamatory and libelous against the Yuchengo family & Group of Companies.

The RTC quashed the information and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction holding that the criminal information failed to allege where the article was printed and first published or where the offended parties reside.

The People of the Philippines, through the private prosecutors, and with the conformity of public prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal.

The PEPCI group filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal, citing the fact that the Brief for the Private Complainants – Appellants did not carry the conformity of the OSG and that ordinary appeal was not the appropriate remedy.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the private complainants may appeal an order of dismissal in a criminal case by the trial court without the conformity of the OSG.

(2) Whether the offended party may appeal the civil liability of the accused without the intervention of the OSG.

RULINGS

(1) NO. It is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the SC and the CA is vested solely in the OSG, which is the law office of the Government.

The rationale therefore is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the private complainants who are mere complaining witnesses.

The private complainants have no personality or legal standing to interpose an appeal in a criminal proceeding. Since the OSG had expressly withheld its conformity and endorsement in the instant case, the CA, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal.

(2) YES. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concern. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.

APPEAL to Different Appellate Jurisdiction

PEOPLE vs. ROSARIO “ROSE” OCHOA
G.R. No. 173792, August 31, 2011, 656 SCRA 382

FACTS: Rose was charged with Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale and three counts of Estafa. She recruited several individuals and took their placement fees but did not have the necessary license. The RTC found the accused guilty of Illegal Recruitment sentencing her to life

imprisonment. She was also found guilty of Estafa with the penalty of prision correctional minimum up to prision mayor maximum. The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the conviction but then declared their decision null and void later because they do not have appellate jurisdiction of criminal cases when the penalty involves reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction even though some of the consolidated crimes does not have the penalty of life imprisonment.

HELD: YES. An appeal of a single decision cannot be split between two courts. The splitting of appeals is not conclusive to the orderly administration of justice and invites possible conflict of disposition between the reviewing courts. Specifically, the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to review an appeal of a judgment imposing an indeterminate sentence. If the same ruling imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death for crimes arising out of the same facts. In other words, the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of criminal cases in which the penalty imposed below is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, even if the same decision orders, in addition, a lesser penalty of penalties for crimes arising out of the same occurrence or facts.

EFFECT    OF    AN   APPEAL

EDIGARDO   GEROCHE    vs.   PEOPLE   OF    THE   PHILIPPINES
G.R.   No.   179080,    November    26,   2014,   742   SCRA   514

FACTS: Geroche, Garde and Marfil were charged with the crime of violation of domicile under Article 128 of the RPC committed on May 14, 1989.

On November 15, 2001, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the RPC. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that Geroche, Garde and Marfil are public officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC.

Accused elevated the case to the CA, which on November 18, 2005, the CA set aside the trial court’s judgment and ruled that the accused are guilty of violation of domicile considering their judicial admissions that Geroche was a Barangay captain while Garde and Marfil were CAFGU members.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the CA is limited the review of their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries.

(2) Whether there is a double jeopardy since the trial court had already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile which is already final and executory.

RULINGS

(1) NO. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised by the parties.

An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase or reduce the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law.

The appellate court may and generally does look into the entire records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied by the trial court.

(2) NONE. When an accused appeals from sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate.

When the herein accused appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be found in the assailed judgment.

E V I D E N C E

Electronic     Evidence

ZALDY NUEZ   vs. ELVIRA CRUZ – APAO
455 SCRA    288,    A.M.   No.   CA-05-18-P,   April   12,    2005

Doctrine: Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence which is not recorded or retained.

HELD: Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge thereof.

IMPEACHING REPUTATION

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. ALLYSON BELAGAN
440 SCRA 578, G.R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004

Doctrine: When the credibility of a witness is sought to be impeached by proof of his reputation, it is necessary that the reputation shown should be that which existed before the occurrence of the circumstances out of which the litigation arose, or at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. This is because a person of derogatory character or reputation can still change or reform himself.

REGIONAL     STATE     PROSECUTOR      NOT     AUTHORIZED
TO      APPROVE      FILING     OR       DISMISSAL     OF      INFORMATION

STATE   PROSECUTOR   vs.   HON.   PABLO   M.   PAQUEO
G.R.   No. 150606,   June 7,   2007,   523   SCRA   377

Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the information of the investigating prosecutor, the information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the requirement of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the non-compliance was a ground to quash the information under Sec. 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ACCUSED’S      RIGHT     TO     DUE     PROCESS

PEOPLE   vs.   SPO4   EMILIANO   ANONAS
G.R.   No.   156847,   January   31,   2007,   513   SCRA   552

The inordinate delay of several years in terminating the preliminary investigation of an accused violates his constitutional right to due process.

WAIVER     OF    THE     RIGHT    TO     PRELIMINARY    INVESTIGATION

BERNADETTE   ADASA   vs.   CECILLE ABALOS
G.R.   No. 168617,   February   19, 2007.   516   SCRA   261

The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.

JUDICIAL   NOTICE

LANDBANK   OF    THE    PHILIPPINES    vs.    SPOUSES    VINCENT    BANAL
434   SCRA    543,    G.R. No. 143276,   July    20,   2004

Doctrine: Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the record of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge.

RULE   130,   SECTION   9
PAROL     EVIDENCE

SPS.   WILFREDO   &   ANGELA   AMONCIO   vs.   AARON   GO   BENEDICTO
560   SCRA   219,   G.R. No. 171707,   July   28, 2008

FACTS: In 1997, Aaron and Garcia entered into a contract of lease with Spouses Amoncio over 240 sq. m. and 120 sq. m. property of the petitioners, respectively. In July 1999, Garcia pre-terminated his contract with Amoncios, while Aaron stayed on until June 8, 2000. Spouses Amoncio claimed they discovered Aaron was putting up improvements on another 120 sq. m. portion of their property which was never leased to him nor to Garcia. They added he had also occupied Garcia’s portion immediately after the latter left. Petitioner spouses asked Aaron to pay his arrears and desist from continuing with his construction.

Aaron denied the said claims and accusations and alleged that it was Spouses Amoncio who owed him money. According to him, he and Amoncio agreed to construct five commercial buildings on the latter’s property. One of the buildings was to go to Garcia, two to Aaron and the last two to Amoncio. They also agreed that Aaron would finance the construction and Spouses Amoncio were to pay him for the two buildings assigned to them. Aaron added he was to pay the rentals for five years and surrender the building on his leased portion to petitioners after the lapse of said period. However, in June 2000, he vacated the premises after he and Spouses Amoncio could no longer settle things amicably.

ISSUE: Whether the parol evidence rule is applicable to the existence of separate oral agreements aside from those established by the lease contract.

HELD. NO. The so-called “parol evidence” forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other terms were orally agreed on by the parties. Under the aforecited rule, the terms of the written contract are conclusive upon the parties and evidence aliunde is inadmissible to vary an enforceable agreement embodied in the document.

Petitioners failed to make a timely objection and to dispute the fact that Aaron undertook the construction of the buildings. Evidence further disclosed that the building permit I ssued by the Building Official bore the signature of petitioner Wilfredo Amoncio.

Where a party entitled to the benefit of the parol evidence rule allows such evidence to be received without objection, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment. Hence, by failing to object to respondent’s testimony in the trial court, petitioners waived the protection of the parol evidence rule.

DYING    DECLARATION    ADMISSIBLE    AS    PART   OF    RES    GESTAE

PEOPLE    OF   THE   PHILIPPINES    vs.   SONNY   GATARIN
G.R.   No.   198022,    April   7,   2014,   721   SCRA    16

FACTS: One night, SPO3 Mendoza and PO1 Coronel were on board their patrol vehicle performing their routine duty when they met two men, later identified as the accused, who were running at a fast speed. The policemen, however, were unsuccessful in catching them and they continued patrolling the area.

There they saw Januario lying on the street. As he was severely injured, the policemen immediately loaded Januario to the patrol vehicle and brought him to the Zigzag Hospital.

While inside the vehicle, SPO3 Mendoza asked Januario who hurt him. He answered that it was “Jay-R and his uncle” who stabbed him. Subsequently, Januario died due to the fatal wounds he has sustained.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the victim’s statement to SPO3 Mendoza is a dying declaration.

(2) Whether the test of admissibility to SPO3 Mendoza as a part of res gestae is applicable in the case.

(3) What is corpus delicti?

RULINGS

(1) NO. A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites occur, namely: (a) the declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death.

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he made the statements.

The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders a dying declaration admissible. The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certain impending. Thus, the utterances made by Januario could not be considered as a dying declaration.

(2) YES. Even if Januario’s utterance could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae.

Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declaration that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a startling occurrence which is the stabbing by accused and his co-accused. At that time, Januario and the witness were in the vehicle that would bring him to the hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identification of the assailant. His utterance about assailant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza, was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

Definitely, the statement is relevant because it identified the accused as the authors of the crime. Verily, the killing of Januario perpetrated by accused, is adequately proven by the prosecution.

(3) Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime is actually been committed.

As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.

In this case, the element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost by assailant was not to the alleged robbery.

Exception to the hearsay rule: Entries in the course of business.

BERNARDO B. JOSE, JR. vs. MICHAELMAR PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 169606, November 27, 2009, 606 SCRA 116

FACTS: Bernardo’s services was engaged by the Michaelmar Phil., Inc. as an oiler of M/T Limar. While on board, Dr. Heath conducted a random test of the crews of M/T Limar and found Bernardo to be positive of marijuana. However, the test result does not contain the signature of Dr. Heath over his printed name therein.

When M/T Limar reached the next port, Bernardo was repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his arrival in Manila, Bernardo procured drug tests from Manila Doctors Hospital, S. M. Lazo Medical Clinic and Maritime Clinic, Inc. He was found negative for marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether the drug test results of Dr. Heath are admissible being an entry made in the course of business.

HELD: YES. The requisites for admission of entries in the course of business: (1) the person who made the entry is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify; (2) the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer: (3) the person who made the entry was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries; (4) the entries were made in a professional capacity or in the performance of a duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Here, all the requisites are present (1) Dr. Heath is outside the country; (2) the entries were made near the time the random drug test was conducted; (3) Dr. Heath was in a position to know the facts made in the entries; (4) Dr. Heath made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of business or duty; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. The fact that the drug test result is unsigned does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Jose, Jr. was not found positive for marijuana.

Affidavit     of     Recantation

RAYMUND    MADALI    vs.     PEOPLE
G.R.   No.   180380, August   4,   2009,   595   SCRA 274

FACTS: Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino, Jovencio and AAA climbed the stairs to the reservoir. As soon as they reached the reservoir, Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief. Bernardino at once blurted out, “Join the rugby boys.” AAA replied, “That’s enough.” Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut frond. Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same coconut frond. Before AAA could recover, he received punches to his head and body from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishment proved to much, as AAA lost consciousness.

Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog chain. With the contraption, the malefactors pulled the body up a tree.

Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could only muster a faint voice saying “Enough” every single-time AAA received the painful blows. Before leaving the scene, the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal to anyone, or he would be next.

Three days later, policemen found the dead body of AAA emitting a foul odor, hanging from a tree with handkerchief tied around the neck and a dog chain fastened to the handkerchief.

Upon investigation, Jovencio executed his first affidavit narrating the incident and pointing to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the perpetrators of the crime. Because of threat made by the uncle of the assailants, Jovencio executed a second affidavit repudiating his first affidavit. However, when he testified in Court, he made third sworn statement substantially reverting to his first affidavit.

ISSUE: Whether the affidavit of recantation executed by Jovencio should prevail over his testimony in open court identifying the perpetrators of the crime.

HELD: NO. The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot prevail over the testimony made during the trial. Jovencio effectively repudiated the contents of the affidavit of recantation. The recantation would hardly suffice to overturn the trial court’s finding of guilt which was based on a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial.

An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex-parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court.

RULE   132,   SECTION 40
TENDER   OF   EXCLUDED   EVIDENCE

PHILIP   S.   YU   vs.   COURT   OF   APPEALS
476   SCRA   443,   G.R. No. 154115,   November   29,   2005

FACTS: Viveca brought against her husband, Philip, an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. During trial, Viveca moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Company to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be Philip’s illegitimate child.

The court denied the motion and it ruled that the insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. II-2000 issued by the Insurance Commission preventing insurance companies from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies.

When the trial court made its pronouncement that the production of insurance policy and application are inadmissible in evidence, Viveca had no choice but to make a tender of excluded evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.

ISSUE: Whether Viveca had made a valid tender of excluded evidence as contemplated by the Rule 132, Section 40.

HELD: NO. The insurance application and insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, Viveca was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the assail order.

Before a tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified and presented before the court.

While Viveca made a “Tender of Excluded Evidence,” such is not the tender contemplated by Section 40, Rule 132, for obviously, the insurance policy and insurance application were not formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said “Tender of Excluded Evidence” was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented during trial.

The Doctrine of Adoptive Admission

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. (Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, April 3, 2001, 356 SCRA 108)

The “Sexual Abuse Shield” rule

Under the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, the following evidence is NOT ADMISSIBLE in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual abuse:

1. Evidence offered to prove 2 that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and

2. Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.

EXCEPTION: Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other the accused was the source of the semen, injury or other evidence.

CHAIN   OF    CUSTODY   RULE
CORPUS   DELICTI

PEOPLE      vs.     JOSELITO    BERAN
G.R.   No.   203028,   January 15,   2014,   714   SCRA   165

FACTS: Joselito Beran was allegedly caught in a buy-bust operation and was convicted by the RTC for illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

On appeal, the CA ruled that Beran was caught in flagrante delicto as a result of a valid and legitimate buy - bust operation.

To sustain Beran’s conviction, CA held that the prosecution was able to establish the following facts:

a) the identities of the poseur-buyer, PO3 Sia and the seller, Beran;

b) the object of the sale, shabu contained in a heat-sealed plastic sachet handed by Beran to PO3 Sia; and

c) consideration which PO3 Sia paid the staged purchase, a marked P100 bill confiscated in the possession of Beran.

According to the CA, a complete narrative was built by an illegal sale of shabu leading to the arrest of Beran by PO3 Sia.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to establish the corpus delicti.

HELD: NO. The prosecution failed to establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged. Beran must be set free.

It is well-settled that in the prosecution of cases involving the illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the evidence of the corpus delicti which is the dangerous drugs itself, must be independently established beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established, and the chain of custody requirement under RA 9165 performs the function in buy-bust operation as it ensures that any doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized items, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and the use in court as evidence and the final disposition.

APPLICATION   FOR   SEARCH   WARRANT,   WHERE   FILED

RET.   SPO4   BIENVENIDO   LAUD     vs.     PEOPLE
G.R.   No. 199023,    November   19,   2014,   741   SCRA   239

FACTS: PNP applied with RTC of Manila, Branch 50 for a warrant to search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called “Davao Death Squad” may be found.

In support of the application, a certain Avasola was presented to the RTC and there testified that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact part of the group that buried the victims.

The RTC Judge found probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant and the search of the Laud Compound caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.

Retired SPO4 Laud filed an Urgent Motion to Quash and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to issue search warrant which was to be enforced in Davao City.

(2) Whether the human remains sought to be seized are proper subject of a search warrant.

(3) Whether the rule against forum shopping was violated as the PNP previously applied for search warrant with the RTC Davao which had been denied.

RULINGS

(1) YES. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC explicitly mentioned that the rule on search warrant application before the Manila and Quezon City RTC’s for “special criminal cases” shall be an exception to Sec. 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

(2) YES. “Personal property” actually refers to the thing’s mobility, and not to its capacity to be owned or alienated by a particular person.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as specific as to circumstances will ordinarily allow.

The “human remains” description points to no other than the things that bear a direct relation to the offense committed of murder.

(3) NO. Forum shopping cannot be said to have committed in this case considering the various points of divergence attending the search warrant application before the Manila - RTC and that before Davao – RTC.

For one, the witnesses presented in each application were different.

Likewise, the application filed in Manila was in connection with Murder, while the one in Davao did not specify any crime.

Finally, and more importantly, the places to be searched were different - that in Manila sought the search of the Laud Compound caves, while in Davao was for a particular area in the Laud Gold Cup Firing Range.

There being no identity of facts and circumstances between the two applications, the rule against forum shopping was therefore not violated.

I   HAVE   FOUGHT   THE   GOOD FIGHT
I   HAVE   FINISHED   THE   RACE
I   HAVE   KEPT   MY   FAITH
- 2   Timothy 4:7

GOD   SPEED

Login
Username:
Password:	Lost Password?
	Remember me