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05-31-2019, 10:13 PM

2018 GOLDEN BEACON POLITICAL LAW

By: Dean MANUEL R. BUSTAMANTE

1. WRIT OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

PETITION    FOR    WRIT    OF    AMPARO    OF    NORIEL    H.
RODRIQUEZ    vs.    GLORIA    MACAPAGAL    ARROYO et.   al.
G.R.   191805,    November    15,    2011,   660 SCRA   84

FACTS: Rodriguez, a member of KMP, was abducted by military men and was tortured when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data against President Arroyo et. al.

ISSUES

1) Whether President GMA may be held liable under the command responsibility doctrine within the context of the amparo proceedings.

2) Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez are violated or threatened by respondents.

RULINGS

1) YES. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: (a) the existence of a superior - subordinate relationship between the accused as his superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; (b) the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about or had been committed; and (c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The President, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility.

2) YES. The totality of the evidence adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in violating his life, liberty and security. The right to security of a person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate. In this case, there was an abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation of his ordeal in the hands of the military wherein respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military.

While on military custody, he was forced to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an encounter and the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset.

SPOUSES   NERIO   &   SOLEDAD   PADOR   vs.   BARANGAY
CAPTAIN    BERNABE    ARCAYAN    et.    al.
G.R.   No. 183460,   March   12,   2013,   693   SCRA   192

FACTS: Respondents conducted a raid on the property of Padors based on information that the latter were cultivators of marijuana. The barangay captain sent them invitation letters without stating the purpose of the invitation. Barangay Captain Arcayan refused to receive Padors’ letter-reply. Anticipating the possibility more harassment cases, false accusations and potential violence from respondents, the Padors filed a writ of amparo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Padors are entitled to a writ of Amparo.

HELD: NO. To be entitled to the privilege of the writ of Amparo, petitioners must be proven by substantial evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission. It was undisputed that the intrusion occurred, whether the entry was done with or without permission, it was merely a violation of Padors’ property rights. The writ of Amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely property or commercial in nature.

2. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND OF THE PRESS

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. RAUL M. GONZALES
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441

FACTS: Press Secretary Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President GMA and Comelec Commissioner Garcillano. The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Atty. Allan Paguia subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purportedly conversations of the President, First Gentlemen, Comelec Commissioner Garcillano and the late Senator Barbers. DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged wiretapped conversations involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. The NTC issued this press release: “NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS.”

ISSUE: Whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed at the case at bar.

HELD: YES. Government action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule.

This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object -- a specific content -- fixed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.

Free speech and free press may be identified to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of view or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has right to prevent.

BAYAN vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169838, April 29, 2006, 488 SCRA 226

*** Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) used to disperse rallies is unconstitutional.

1) Authorities must strictly observe the policy of “maximum tolerance” in dealing with rallies.

2) The “no permit, no rally” policy under BP 880 is upheld.

3) Local governments are ordered to designate “freedom parks” where rallies can be held without a permit within 30 days after the court ruling becomes final.

3)

fter the court

4) All parks in cities and municipalities that fail to designate “Freedom Park” will become freedom parks.

5) Mayors have two days to act on rally permit applications. Applications are deemed approved if no action is taken.

6) Specific reasons must be stated in writing if a rally permit application is denied, namely “clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MAYOR LITO ATIENZA
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 518

FACTS: On June 15, 2006, the IBP filed with the Office of the Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

Mayor Atienza issued a permit dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on a given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.

Aggrieved, IBP filed on June 21, 2006 a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals. The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from filing brought the matter to the Supreme Court. The high court’s resolution of November 20, 2006 denied the petition for being moot and academic.

ISSUES

1. Whether the instant petition no longer present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether the modification of the venue in IBP’s rally permit constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

RULINGS

1. NO. An exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days to the assembly.

2. YES. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus, if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

In modifying the permit outright, Mayor Atienza gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 482

FACTS: A news item was published by the petitioner that a certain Swiss national was shooting cats and dogs that come up his walls and driving barbarously with children playing around. It was proven at the trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of speech and of the press extends to the petitioner in this case.

HELD: NO. The freedom of speech and of the press is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. Although it has been stressed that a newspaper “should not be held to account to a point of suppression for honest mistakes, or imperfection in the choice of words,” even the most liberal view of free speech has never countenanced the publication of falsehoods, especially the persistent and unmitigated dissemination of patent lies. “There is no constitutional value in false statement of facts.”

POSTING    OF     TARPAULIN

THE   DIOCESE   OF    BACOLOD    vs.   COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS
G.R.   No.   205728,    January   21,   2015,   747 SCRA   1

FACTS: On February 21, 2013, the Diocese of Bacolod posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.

The second tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and list candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(PRO-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH law. Those who voted for the passage of the law were classified as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

The tarpaulins were neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. In contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections.

The Comelec issued a Notice to Remove Campaign ordering the tarpaulins’ removal within three (3) days from receipt, otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election offense against the Diocese of Bacolod.

ISSUE: Whether the removal of the tarpaulins violate the right to freedom of expression and right to property.

HELD: YES. The removal of tarpaulins violates petitioner’s right to freedom of expression. Comelec had no legal basis to issue an order as the tarpaulins were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the candidates were not consulted regarding the posting.

Comelec does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

First, the petitioner is a private individual who has lost his right to give commentary on the candidates when the Comelec ordered the tarpaulin removed.

Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech.

Third, the tarpaulins and their message are not religious speech.

More importantly, every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not mean it is election propaganda.

3. RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATION

- Right of government employees to organize: limited to the formation of unions or associations only, no right to strike.

GSIS vs. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGAGAWA NG GSIS (KMG)
G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 622

FACTS: For four (4) straight days, participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walkout and waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep of the GSIS main building against Winston Garcia’s mismanagement of the financial resources of the GSIS. Administrative sanctions were imposed against those who participated in said mass action.

ISSUES

(1) Whether or not GSIS, a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) is covered by Civil Service Law and thus its employees are prohibited to conduct concerted mass actions.

(2) Whether or not the four-day mass actions of GSIS employees to air grievances be considered an “assembly of citizens” or a “striking crowd.”

RULING

(1) YES, under the 1987 Constitutions, government owned and controlled corporations with original charters like GSIS are covered by the Civil Service Law. As such, employees of GSIS are part of the civil service system and are subject to the guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees, however, they are prohibited on concerted mass action in the public sector.

(2) It is an “STRIKING CROWD,” the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved, they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus provoking work stoppage by government personnel and service-delivery disruptions, the very evil sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.

Any collective activity undertaken by government employees with the intent of effective work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force concession, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass actions.

4. POLICE POWER OF THE STATE

MMDA vs. DANTE GARIN
G.R. No. 130230, April 5, 2005, 456 SCRA 176

FACTS: Respondent Garin assails the validity of Section 5 (f) of RA 7924 creating the MMDA which authorized it to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s license in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations. He further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and other penalties.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA is vested with police and legislative power?

HELD: NO. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.

MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. With the passage of RA 7924, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special development and administrative region” and the administration of “metro-wide” basic services affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to as the MMDA.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.

“Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statues and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and for the subjects of the same.”

MMDA vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT ADVERTISING PROMOTIONS
G.R. No. 179554, December 16, 2009, 608 SCRA 335

FACTS: Pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. Trackworks entered into contract with MRT3 for advertising services, however, when Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

ISSUE: Whether MMDA has authority to dismantle the subject billboards and signages

HELD: NO, it is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power of its own to dismantle, remove the billboards, signages and other advertising media on the MRT3 structures by Trackworks. The MMDA’s power were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system and administration. Nothing in RA 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The prohibitions against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas but MRT3, being private property, was not one of the areas to which the prohibition applied.

RODOLFO BELTRAN et. al. vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168.

RA 7719 required the phase-out of commercial blood banks. Petitioners, who operated commercial blood banks, argued that the law constituted deprivation of property without due process.

HELD: The avowed policy of the law is the protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. To give meaning to the purpose of the law, the legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power. The legislature adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good.

“Police power in the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” (Pita vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 362).

“The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.” (Patalinghug vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104786, January 27, 1994, 229 SCRA 554).

“The non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purpose targeted by the government.” (Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 386).

AMELIA CABRERA vs. MANUEL LAPID
G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 55

FACTS: Petitioner’s fishpond was ordered demolished by the respondent Governor in the presence of media representatives and other government officials because it was purportedly illegal and blocked the flow of the Pasak River. Respondent claimed that the demolition of the fishpond is an exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether the demolition of the fishpond is valid.

HELD: YES. The demolition of the illegal fishpond following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se constitutes exercise of the police power of the state. The acts of blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled to serve the best interest of the general public - for the good and the highest good.

ROBERT TAYABAN et. al. vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 150194, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 488

FACTS: A formal contract was executed by contractor Pugong and the Cordillera Executive Board, the project owner, for the construction of the Tinoc public market. While the construction was on progress, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 to demolish the erected structures for the purpose of erecting the Public Market Building. On that same day, Mayor Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished the structures and improvements introduced thereon.

As a result, Mayor Tayaban and his co-petitioners were charged for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act alleging that in the performance of their official functions and acting in evident bad faith, willfully and unlawfully pass and unanimously approve Resolution No. 20, vesting upon themselves powers and authority to demolish the half-finished Tinoc Public Market construction to the damage and prejudice of the government particularly the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB), being the owner of 0the project.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid exercise of police power in the demolition.

HELD: NO. petitioners were guilty of bad faith in causing the demolition. Evidence of this is the fact that Resolution No. 20 was implemented on the same day that it was adopted without due notice of the planned demolition given to the CEB and the private contractor.

Likewise, the Court is not persuaded by petitioner’s contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislatures, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416

FACTS: Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 prohibits short time rates and admissions, wash-up rates in hotels, motels, inns and other similar establishments in the City of Manila. The said ordinance was questioned for being unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement. It is also criticized as an invalid exercise of police power and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

ISSUE: Is a city ordinance absolutely prohibiting “short time” rates and admissions in hotels, motels and other similar establishments a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: NO. The prohibition not only affects the property rights of the owners but also of third persons who would wish to avail of the short time rates. The rights involved not only the property rights of the petitioners but the liberty and privacy of third persons who may be their customers.

It bears stressing that the test for the valid exercise of police power requires that (1) it must be for the interests of the public in general as distinguished from that of a particular class and (2) the means employed must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and must not unduly oppressive of private rights.

MMDA vs. VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO. INC.
G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 341

FACTS: E.O. 179 was issued providing for the establishment of greater Manila transport system and designated MMDA to implement the removal of bus terminals located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing a more convenient access to the mass transport system and to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities.

ISSUE: Is E.O. 179 constitutional as a valid exercise of police power?

HELD: NO. The said E.O. failed to satisfy one of the valid tests of the proper exercise of police power, namely, the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Closure of the bus terminals would not solve the traffic congestions in the street.

Furthermore, MMDA has no authority be it police power or legislative power to implement the said E.O. for the order of closure of bus terminals.

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK, INC. vs. DSWD & DOF SECRETARY
G.R. No. 175356, December 3, 2013, 711 SCRA 302

FACTS: Upon the enactment of RA 9257 amending Sec. 4 of RA 7432 otherwise known as Expanded Senior Citizen Act, the DSWD and DOF issued IRRs allowing business establishment to claim 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction. Petitioner questions said tax treatment as it contravenes to the former Sec. 4 (a) of RA 7432 which allows 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax credit. It further claims that allowing the 20% tax deduction scheme would violate Sec. 9 (1) Art. III of the Constitution which provides that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether the 20% discount to senior citizens that may be claimed as a tax deduction by private establishments, valid and constitutional.

HELD: YES. The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power where just compensation is not warranted contrary to the claim that it is an exercise of eminent domain which would render it unconstitutional because it is not a peso to peso reimbursement of the 20% discount given to senior citizens.

The 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern.

5.   AMENDMENTS   AND REVISIONS

LAMBINO   vs.    COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006,   505   SCRA 160

FACTS: On 15 February 2006, petitioners, namely Lambino and Aumentado (“Lambino Group”), commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5 (b) and (c) and Section 7 of R.A. No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA 6735).

However, in a Resolution dated 31 August 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution. The COMELEC invoked the Court’s ruling in Santiago vs. Comelec declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Thereafter, the Lambino Group prayed for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and to compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group

claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the “will of the sovereign people.”

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2 , Article XVII of the Constitution on amendment to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

2. Whether or not the Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

RULINGS

1. NO. Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended that the people must first see the full context of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5 (b) of RA 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”

In the instant case, there is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral - Presidential to the Unicameral – Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Furthermore, the initiative petition violates Sec. 12, Article XVI of the Constitution disallowing revision through initiatives. A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. Certainly, the Lambino group’s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary; and from bicameral to unicameral legislature.

2. NO. The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people’s initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court’s ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions “to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution.” The Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved on some other grounds.

The Court added that, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.

6.  CITIZENSHIP

TABASA   vs.    COURT    OF    APPEALS
G.R. No. 125793,    August   29,    2006,    500    SCRA   9

FACTS: The petitioner, Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. His father, Rodolfo Tabasa, having acquired US citizenship through naturalization, the petitioner also acquired American citizenship by derivative naturalization.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a “balikbayan” for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996. The reason for the arrest and detention was a letter of the Consul General of the US Embassy, Kevin Herbert, to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) saying that the petitioner’s passport has been revoked by the US Department of State making the petitioner an undocumented and undesirable alien in the Philippines. Thereafter, the BID ordered deportation to his country of origin.

Petitioner then filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas Corpus. Afterwards, he also filed a Supplemental Petition alleging Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171 and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. The Court of Appeals ruled against the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171 and therefore cannot be summarily deported to his country of origin.

HELD: NO. The Court said that the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:

(1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and

(2) Natural - born Filipinos including minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural - born citizen. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship.

In the case at bar, petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his “repatriation” on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent’s and not his.

SPOUSES DAVID & MARISA WILLIAMS vs. ATTY. RUDY ENRIQUEZ
A.C. No. 6353, February 26, 2006, 483 SCRA 204

FACTS: Respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants. According to the complainant - spouses William, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A TCT was then issued in her favor, stating that she is a “Filipino married to David W. Williams, an American Citizen.”

On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. Respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Williams lose her Filipino citizenship when she married David Williams.

HELD: NO. Section 4, Article IV of the Constitution provides: “Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed under the law, to have renounced it.”

There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa Bacatan - Williams has renounced her Filipino citizenship, except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically acquired her husband’s citizenship upon her marriage to him.

MA. JEANETTE TECSON et. al. vs. COMELEC & FPJ
G.R. No. 161634, March 3, 2004, 424 SCRA 277

FACTS: Atty. Fornier filed a “Petition for Disqualification of Presidential Candidate FPJ. He asserted that Poe is not a citizen, much more a natural-born citizen. Fornier would have it appeared that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.

According to Fornier, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than FPJ himself, consisting of a birth certificate of FPJ and marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Atty. Fornier further contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Fernando Poe Jr., the hero of silver screen and one of the main contenders for the May 2004 presidency, a natural - born Filipino.

HELD: YES. The question whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the Comelec, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

2ND LT. SALVADOR PARREÑO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
G.R. No. 162224, June 7, 2007, 523 SCRA 390

FACTS: Salvador Parreño served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Parreño availed and received payment of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, Parreño started receiving his monthly pension amounting to Php13,680.00.

Parreño migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. In January 2001, the AFP stopped Parreño’s monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended by PD 1650, provides that a retiree who losses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Parreño filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension but COA denied the same.

ISSUES

(1) Whether or not the COA has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638 as amended.

(2) Whether or not COA commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.

(3) Whether PD 1638 as amended has retroactive or prospective effect.

(4) Whether or not petitioner has vested right to his retirement benefits.

(5) Whether petitioner was denied of equal protection and due process clause of the Constitution.

RULINGS

(1) NO. The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws.

The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the Supreme Court and in all Regional Trial Courts.

(2) NO. Assuming that COA assumed jurisdiction over the instance case, claimant’s entitlement to the retirement benefits he was previously receiving must necessarily be severed or stopped upon loss of his Filipino citizenship as prescribed in Section 27, PD 1638 as amended.

The COA effectively denied petitioner’s claim because of the loss of his Filipino citizenship.

(3) Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its approval.

In fact, Section 2 of PD 1638 as amended provides that “the decree shall apply to all military personnel in the service of the AFP. PD 1638, as amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Parreño retired in 1982, long after the approval of PD 1638 as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638, as amended, apply to Parreño.

(4) NO. As a rule, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. At the time of the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendments, Parreño was still in active service. Hence, his retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age and length of service.

It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquires a vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest wherever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.

Further, the retirement benefits of military personnel are purely gratuitous in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where employer participation is mandatory, hence, the employers have contractual or vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.

(5) NO. The constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the

classification (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.

There is compliance with all these conditions. There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in another country such as Parreño in this case.

The constitutional right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service necessarily includes not only private citizen but also citizen who have retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship already renounced his allegiance to the state, thus, he may no longer be compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need arises. Parreño’s loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.

There was no denial of due process in this case. When Parreño lost his Filipino citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended. He had opportunity to contest the termination of his pension when he requested for reconsideration of the removal of his name from the list of retirees and the termination of his pension. The JAGS denied the request pursuant to Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM
G.R. No. 153883, January 13, 2004, 419 SCRA 123

“By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.”

ERNESTO MERCADO vs. EDUARDO MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 630

FACTS: Edu Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, USA and he acquired US citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli. He was a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth.

During the 1998 local elections, Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor of Makati City but his proclamation was suspended in view of a petition for disqualification as Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manzano is a natural born citizen and qualified as candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

HELD: YES. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, at birth, he was a national of both of the Philippines and of the United States. By participating in 1998 Philippine elections, Manzano effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law so that now he is solely a Philippine national. The filing of certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship and effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

CIRILO VALLES vs. COMELEC & ROSALIND Y. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000, 337 SCRA 543

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Western Australia to Filipino father and Australian mother. In 1952, she married to a Filipino citizen, Leopoldo Lopez, in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the Philippine electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate. When she ran for governor of Davao Oriental, her election was contested by her opponent as she was an Australian citizen.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a natural born citizen.

HELD: YES. Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen, having born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, she can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship. When she filed her certificate of candidacy, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 696

FACTS: Eusebio Lopez was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and renounced his Filipino citizenship. By virtue of RA 9225, he became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship. He returned to the Philippines and established his residence in Barangay Bagacay where he ran as barangay chairman. He won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay chairman but this victory was challenged as he failed to personally swear to a renunciation of foreign citizenship at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of candidacy operate as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.

HELD: NO. It is undisputed that Lopez reacquired his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.” Lopez failed to renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary. For failure of Lopez to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, he is disqualified from running for an elective position in the Philippines and the votes cast in his favor should be considered stray votes.

NESTOR JACOT vs. ROGEN T. DAL & COMELEC
G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 295

FACTS: Nestor Jacot was a natural born citizen of the Philippines who became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. on December 13, 1989. He reacquired his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. During the 2007 elections, he ran for vice mayor in Catarman, Camiguin and garnered the highest number of votes for the said position. Just before the election, Rogen Dal sought his disqualification for his failure to renounce his U.S. citizenship as required under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225. Jacot countered that his oath of allegiance in Los Angeles operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nestor Jacot is disqualified from running as a candidate for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.

HELD: YES. Under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it categorically requires person seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. For his failure to comply with election requirements applicable to dual citizen, he is declared disqualified to run for the position of vice mayor of Catarman, Camiguin.

LOSS   AND   REACQUISITION    OF   PHILIPPINE    CITIZENSHIP

RENATO   M.    DAVID    vs.   EDITHA   A.   AGBAY   &   PEOPLE
G.R.   No.   199113,    March   18,    2015

FACTS: In 1974, David migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon their retirement, David and his wife returned to the Philippines.

Sometime in 2000, David purchased a 600 - square meter lot along the beach in Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where he constructed a residential house.

However, in the year 2004, he came to know that the portion where he built his house is public land and part of salvage zone.

On April 12, 2007, David filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR and indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Agbay opposed his application on the ground that David is a Canadian citizen and disqualified to own land and also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public document for indicating in his MLA application that he is a Filipino citizen.

Meanwhile, David re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225 on October 11, 2007.

David argued that he is a natural - born Filipino citizen and by re-acquiring the same status under RA 9225, he was by legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization is Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease Application.

ISSUE: Whether the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship” under RA 9225 on dual citizenship.

HELD: YES. Section 3 of RA 9225 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural - born Filipinos.

Under the first paragraph are those natural – born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Filipino citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

The second paragraph covers those natural – born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath.

The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural - born citizens who became citizens of a foreign country but the terminology used is different, “re-acquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group.

In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

RA 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural – born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship.

In the case of those who became foreign citizens after RA 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.

Considering that David was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of RA 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural – born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.

David made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural – born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship.

While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned.

7.     S U F F R A G E

LOIDA NICOLAS - LEWIS   vs.   COMELEC
G.R. No.   162759, August   4,   2006,   497   SCRA   649

A perusal of the Constitution suggests that Section 1 of Article V prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 of the same article authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. In response to this mandate, the Congress enacted RA 9189 of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

The Court also noted that there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - RA 9225 - requiring “duals” to actually establish and physically stay in the Philippine first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, RA 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5 (1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under RA 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that RA 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

** “Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote.

** “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of election.

ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 614

Section 5 (d) of RA 9189 is not a violation of Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution and is therefore not unconstitutional. The interpretation here of “residence” is synonymous with “domicile.” Under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.

Comelec should not be allowed to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to the Congress. The provisions of the Constitution should be harmonized with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

8.   LEGISLATIVE   DEPARTMENT

ARTURO TOLENTINO vs.   COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334, January   21,    2004,    420    SCRA    438

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Sec. 2 of RA 6645, as amended, requires Comelec: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.

An election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of votes as would change the results of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void.

In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the elections.

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general election fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488 SCRA 1

While attendance to Congressional hearings is discretionary on the part of department heads during the “question hour,” such is not the case in inquiries in aid of legislation, except upon a valid and express claim of “executive privilege.”

The principle of separation of powers is the reason why executive officials may not be compelled to attend hearings when the Congress exercises its oversight functions. Though, this is not the case when the Congress exercises its power of inquiry in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, Article VI therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objectives of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

ROMULO L. NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77

FACTS: Neri was invited by the Senate Committee to attend the joint investigation on NBN project. He testified that Abalos brokered for ZTE and was offered P200 million for his approval of the project. He informed the president about the bribery attempt and was told not to accept the bribe. When asked what had Neri and the President discussed about the NBN project, he refused to answer invoking “executive privilege.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the questions that Neri refused to answer are covered by “executive privilege.”

HELD: YES. The questions are covered by presidential communications privilege and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demand for information.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007, 541 SCRA 456

FACTS: The Senate Committee conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on account of Senator Enrile’s privilege speech denouncing Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of RA 8799. During that investigation, SCB representative submitted a letter presenting its position that these were cases pending in court involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the pending cases before the courts could divest the power of inquiry from the legislature

HELD: NO. The unmistakable objective of the investigation was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities by conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.

Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV vs. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 471

FACTS: Trillanes is currently under detention due to charge of coup d’etat filed against him for his participation in the Oakwood accident. As a result of his election as Senator, he asked the RTC to allow him to leave detention in order to attend to his functions as a Senator and to be allowed to set up an office at his place of detention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Trillanes be allowed to leave detention in order to attend to his duties as Senator?

HELD: NO. Election to public office does not itself merit the temporary release of a detention prisoner in order for him to attend to his official duties. The necessary consequence of arrest and detention is to curtail the detainee’s physical movement and practice of profession or occupation including that of holding offices.

ANTERO J. POBRE vs. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, 597 SCRA 1

FACTS: Out of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago delivered a privilege speech on the Senate floor where she was quoted as saying that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the privilege speech is actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

HELD: NO, because her statements, being part of her privilege speech as a member of Congress was covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

9.   EXECUTIVE   DEPARTMENT

GEN.   GUDANI     vs.    GEN.   SENGA
G.R.   No.    170165,    August   15,    2006,   498    SCRA    671

The President has constitutional authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under the law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel

the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA
G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 587

The President has the authority to issue acting appointments while Congress is in session.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the president, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reason may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Distinguishing ad-interim appointments from appointments in an acting capacity:

Both of them are effective upon acceptance.

But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a vacancy.

Moreover, ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.

PIMENTEL vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622

Under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate, or having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of mandamus.

CONSTANTINO vs. CUISIA
472 SCRA 505, G.R. No. 106064, October 13, 2005, 472 SCRA 505

*** Whether the President can delegate to the Secretary of Finance the constitutional authority to incur foreign debts.

- - - It fell upon the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President to formulate a scheme for the implementation of the policy expressed by the President and respect sovereign debt.

- - - the lack of showing that the President countermanded the acts of the Secretary of Finance lead to the conclusion that they carried presidential approval.

RUFINO vs. ENDRIGA
G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 112

The source of the President’s power to appoint, as well as the Legislature’s authority to delegate the power to appoint, is found in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Under the same section, the Congress may, by law, vest in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards the appointment of officers lower in rank. However, the express language of the Constitution and its framers intend that the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards, upon whom the legislature may delegate the power of appointment, must appoint officers of lower rank and not of co-equal rank. Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 is, thus, irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,

Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6 (b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CPP Board, allowing them to elect their fellow trustees. And since the pertinent section is unconstitutional, the President has the power to appoint the trustees by virtue of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution which gives the President the power to appoint officers whose appointments are not provided for by the law.

CLUSTERING OF NOMINEES BY THE JBC

Judge   PHILIP   A.   AGUINALDO   et.    al.   vs.   President
BENIGNO   SIMEON   AQUINO   III    et.   al.
G.R. No. 224302,   November   29,   2016,   811   SCRA   304

FACTS: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) submitted to President Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of Sandiganbayan. The nominees were clustered into several lists like for example 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st with five (5) nominees for each cluster.

On January 20, 2015, President Aquino appointed Justices to the vacant positions, but did not pick up the nominees from the clustered concerned but appointed Justices from one cluster to another position.

Petitioners who were listed in the cluster for the 17th Justice questioned the appointments. They contented that the President could chose one nominee from each of the six separate shortlists for each specific vacancy and no other and the appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether the President is limited to appoint only from the nominees in the shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.

RULING

NO. The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the judiciary is still paramount.

As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.

President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan from each of the shortlists submitted by the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on President Aquino’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Clustering nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into six separate shortlists impairs the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine seniority of the newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Moreover, the clustering can be used as device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment, or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment. Furthermore, the Court ruled that there are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees set by the JBC.

10. RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

ALEJANO vs. CABUAY
468 SCRA 188, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005

*** Whether the right to privacy of the petitioners who were detained and charged with staging a coup d’etat was violated because the officials of the detention center opened and read the letters they were sending for mailing.

- - Inmates are deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially with anyone.

- - Inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or discipline.

- - The inspection of the letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of the contraband.

- - Since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyer, the officials of the detention center could read the letter.

- - If the letters are marked confidential communications between the detainees and their lawyer, the officials should not read the letter but only open the envelop for inspection in the presence of detainees.

11.    JUDICIARY   DEPARTMENT

KILOSBAYAN   vs.   EDUARDO   ERMITA
G.R.   No.   177721,   July   3,   2007,   526   SCRA   353

FACTS: Justice Gregory Ong was appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by the president through the Executive Secretary. The appointment was questioned because Ong is a Chinese citizen as indicated in his own birth certificate which also reveals both his parents were Chinese at the time of his birth. Justice Ong claimed he is a natural born citizen as indicated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration and the opinion of the DOJ Secretary Guingona.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gregory Ong is a natural born citizen.

HELD: NO. He is a naturalized Filipino citizen because his Chinese father was naturalized in 1964 when he was only eleven years old. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot prevail since citizenship status cannot be changed without a judicial order. Until he obtains a judicial order changing his citizenship status, he cannot accept an appointment to the Supreme Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.

Naturalized Filipino citizens are disqualified from being a member of the Supreme Court. Under the Constitution, only natural born Filipino citizen can be appointed as member of the Supreme Court.

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL & BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 496

FACTS: Under Section 8 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress, as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Supreme Court and a representative of the private sector.”

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eight member was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.

ISSUE: Whether or not the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

HELD: NO, the provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretations. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8 (1), was to treat each ex officio member as representing one co-equal branch of the government. Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.

12.   TERM   LIMITS

FRANCIS   ONG    vs.    JOSEPH    ALEGRE
G.R.   No.    163295,    January     23,     2006,   479    SCRA    473

FACTS: In May 1995 elections, Francis Ong was elected mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. He was re-elected in May 1998 elections, however, respondent Alegre filed an election protest. The RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.

ISSUE: Whether or not Francis Ong’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three - term limit rule.

HELD: YES. The Court held that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the Constitutional and statutory provisions barring local executive officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.

It is true that the RTC ruled in Election Protest that it was respondent Alegre who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected Mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

For the three - term limit for elective government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) terms in the same local government post, and 2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

ROMEO LONZANIDA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602

Petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of election and declared the position vacant. The Comelec affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the

office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule, and was eventually granted. However, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As the Court pointed observed, Lonzanida “cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate and in fact vacated his post before the expiration of the term.

DIFFERENCE between ONG & LONZANIDA rulings

In Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of “failure of election,” and as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor - elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure - of - election factor does not obtain in Ong’s case. There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Ong was never unseated during the term in question, he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.

ATTY. VENANCIO RIVERA vs. COMELEC & MARINO MORALES
G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41

FACTS: It is undisputed that respondent Marino Morales was elected to the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:

a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998

b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001

c) July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004

d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007

Respondent Morales argued and the Comelec held that the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 term is not his fourth because his second term, July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 to which he was elected and which he served, may not be counted since his proclamation was declared void by the RTC of Angeles City, which decision became final and executory on August 6, 2001 and besides he was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999. He claimed he was only a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer.”

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Morales had served as mayor for three consecutive terms and therefore is ineligible to run for another term or fourth term.

HELD: YES. Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as Mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting respondent as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. By June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. Respondent Morales should be promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.

In the light of the foregoing, respondent Morales cannot be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

As a consequence of Morales’ ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

RAYMUNDO ADORMEO vs. COMELEC & RAMON TALAGA
G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90

Assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.

As the Court observed, there was a “break” in the service of private respondent Ramon T. Talaga as mayor. He was a “private citizen” for a time before running for mayor in the recall elections.

JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA
G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617

“There can be no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.”

ROBERTO LACEDA vs. RANDY LIMENA
G.R. No. 181867, November 25, 2008, 571 SCRA 603

Where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as Punong Barangay and prior to the end or termination of such three-year term, the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into Sorsogon City as a new political unit, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as Punong Barangay thereof, there being no break in the continuity of his term.

FEDERICO MONTEBON vs. COMELEC & SESINANDO POTENCIOSO
G.R. No. 180444, April 9, 2008, 551 SCRA 50

FACTS: Potencioso was elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004 and 2004-2007. However, the service of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. During the 2007 elections, his candidacy for municipal councilor was assailed because he is allegedly disqualified from running for the same position as it would be his fourth consecutive terms.

ISSUE: Whether or not Potencioso deemed to have fully served his second term thereby disqualifying him to run for municipal councilor.

HELD: NO. His assumption of office as vice mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. Consequently, he is qualified to run for municipal councilor.

13.   LAW   ON    PUBLIC   OFFICER

CONSTANTINO   GUMARU   vs.    QUIRINO   STATE   COLLEGE
G.R. No. 161496, June    22,    2007,     525     SCRA    412

FACTS: On June 25, 1985, C. T. Gumaru Construction and Quirino State College through its president Julian Alvarez, entered into an agreement for the construction of the state college’s building. On October 17, 1997, Gumaru filed a complaint for damages against the respondent college and its president. Respondent state college was instead represented by a private lawyer who made no move to protect its interest except to file a motion to dismiss the complaint filed against the state college, which was eventually denied by the trial court. No answer to the complaint was filed notwithstanding due receipt of the order directing its filing, as a consequence of which the state college was declared in default. The order of default itself was not reconsidered, no move whatsoever having been made in that direction. Gumaru was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. When the decision was rendered adjudging the state college and its president Alvarez liable to the plaintiff, no effort was made to appeal the decision notwithstanding due receipt of a copy thereof by the private lawyer. Thus, a writ of execution was issued

against the properties of the state college which by this time remained as the sole defendant, Julian Alvarez having died during the pendency of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state college be bound by or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more non-suited as a result thereof.

HELD: NO. The State has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by, or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents, much more non-suited as a result thereof. The legality of legal representation can be raised and questioned at any stage of the proceedings.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is mandated to act as the law office of the government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents in any litigation or proceeding requiring the services of a lawyer. With respect to government–owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), the OSG shall act as counsel only when authorized by the President or by the head of the office concerned.

The principal law office of GOCCs is the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).

Respondent state college is classified under the Administrative Code as a chartered institution, viz:

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State.

The Solicitor General cannot refuse to represent the government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents without a just and valid reason. He should not desist from appearing before the Court even in those cases where his opinions may be inconsistent with the government or any of its agents he is expected to represent. (Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 459).

As in the case of fiscals or prosecutors, bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility do not constitute legal and valid excuses for inhibition. (Enriquez vs. Hon. Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932 (1960)]

Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal or prosecutor, or the Solicitor General in the case at bar, cannot refuse to perform his functions without violating his oath of office. (Enriquez vs. Gimenez, supra).

Government agencies were admonished not to reject the services of the Solicitor General, or otherwise fail or refuse to forward the papers of a case to the OSG for appropriate action. (Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission, supra).

The fee of the lawyer who rendered legal service to the government in lieu of the OSG or the OGCC is the personal liability of the government official who hired his services without the prior written conformity of the OSG or the OGCC, as the case may be. (Polloso vs. Gangan, 390 Phil. 1101 (2000).

The Solicitor General is thus expected to be the official who would best uphold and protect the legal interests of the government. His non-representation of the government is dangerous and should not be allowed.

GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658

FACTS: Villaseñor is facing both criminal and administrative charges in connection with the Manor Hotel disaster. He was preventively suspended for a period of six months in the administrative case. During the pendency of the criminal case, the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension for a period of 90 days upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor. He questions the said suspension as the same was absorbed in the administrative case as both the criminal and administrative cases were anchored on the same set of facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the preventive suspension in an administrative proceeding a bar for a preventive suspension in a criminal case on the same facts and circumstances.

HELD: NO. It is well-settled preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory. There are three kinds of remedies that are available against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

It is clear that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters. Verily, administrative case may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.

PRUDENCIO QUIMBO vs. DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN GERVACIO
G.R. No. 155620, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 277

FACTS: Quimbo was placed under preventive suspension without pay for a period of two (2) months and seventeen (17) days. The Deputy Ombudsman found him guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended from office for a period of eight (8) months. On appeal, the appellate court modified the decision and reduced the penalty for a period of two (2) months suspension without pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the service of preventive suspension of 2 months and 17 days be credited as service of penalty of 2 months suspension without pay.

HELD: NO. Preventive suspension is not a penalty but merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his service to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty.

DR. DEMETRIO BEROÑA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 142456, July 27, 2004, 435 SCRA 303

FACTS: Dr. Beroña was the Provincial Health Officer when he was charged for violation of RA 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. During the pendency of the proceeding, he resigned from the Health Office and he ran and won as Municipal Mayor of Pilar, Abra. After the arraignment, Sandiganbayan suspended him from office for 90 days. Dr. Beroña claims that preventive suspension would no longer applicable to him as he no longer occupying the position when he was charged under RA 3019.

ISSUE: Whether or not suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be currently holding.

HELD: YES. The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information. The term “office” in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the officer might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in relation to which he is charged.

Preventive suspension is mandatory and there are no “ifs” and “buts” about it.

GUALBERTO CASTRO vs. HON. RICARDO GLORIA
G.R. No. 132174, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 417

FACTS: Castro was found guilty of immorality by the DECS Regional Office and was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. He impugns the correctness of the penalty of dismissal from the service and seeks the payment of back salaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not Castro is entitled for reduction of his penalty of dismissal, reinstatement and payment of back salaries.

HELD: YES so far as the reduction of penalty of dismissal from the service and reinstatement are concerned. Inasmuch as the present charge of immorality constitutes the first charge of this nature, the Supreme Court reduced the penalty of dismissal imposed to one (1) year suspension from office without pay. In view of the length of time he has been out of the service, the penalty of suspension to have been fully served. He was ordered to be reinstated to office immediately.

The issue regarding payment of back salaries during the period that a member of the civil service is out of work, but subsequently ordered reinstated is settled in our jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges. However, if the employee is not completely exonerated of the charges such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would not be entitled to the payment of his back salaries.

UPON DEATH OF RESPONDENT - DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS PRECLUDES ADMINISTRATIVE CASE

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. CAROLINA P. JUEN
G.R. No. 200577, August 17, 2016, 800 SCRA 646

FACTS: In an administrative case, respondent Carolina, Budget Officer I, was adjudged guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, when she allegedly paid someone to take the December 20, 1996 Civil Service Professional Examinations on her behalf. Carolina denied the allegations and claimed that she personally took the examinations.

On appeal, Carolina argued that she was denied of her right to due process and of her right to be informed of the cause of accusations against her.

On the other hand, CSORO V claims that Carolina was given an opportunity to present her case. It stated that although it was true that the notice for the September 3, 2003 hearing was only received by Carolina on the same day, her counsel received the notice of hearing for November 13, 2003 two days prior to the scheduled hearing or on November 11, 2003.

However, during the pendency of her appeal to the CA, Carolina died from ovarian cancer. The counsel manifested that the Carolina’s heirs are very much interested on the outcome of the petition as they stand to benefit from whatever claims and benefits Carolina may be entitled should a favorable judgment be rendered.

ISSUE

Whether Carolina was denied of her right to due process for CSC’s failure to notify her of the hearing.

RULING

YES. Carolina was denied of her right to due process for CSC’s failure to notify her of the hearing.

As a general rule, the death of a respondent does not preclude the finding of administrative case, except in cases when: (a) due process may be subverted (b) equitable and humanitarian cases and (c) the penalty imposed or imposable would render the proceeding useless. The Court finds that first exception applies.

Here, the case was pending appeal with the CA when the respondent Carolina passed away. The CA was duty bound to render a ruling on the issue of whether or not the respondent was indeed administratively liable of the alleged infraction. However, in its decision, the CA found that the respondent Carolina was deprived of her right to due process.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the CA when it found that the respondent was deprived of her right to due process. The Court noted that Carolina’s non-appearance cannot be attributed to her. As Carolina’s counsel was in Cebu City and the hearing was to be conducted in Legazpi City, it would be impossible for Carolina to attend the hearing. Also, Carolina and her counsel were not given enough time to attend the scheduled hearing, As such, she was deprived of her right to adduce evidence.

MERE MISDECLARATION OF SALN IS NOT DISHONESTY

ATTY. AMADO Q. NAVARRO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016, 801 SCRA 46

FACTS: Navarro, a CPA-Lawyer, was employed by the BIR as chief revenue officer IV.

Subsequently, DOF-RIPS found that Navarro, based on his SALN, amassed landholdings in Baguio since he became the Revenue District Officer there and had already constructed three structures on these lands. The DOF-RIPS came to the conclusion that Navarro’s substantial real property ownership is manifestly out of proportion to his lawful income.

Afterwards, the Ombudsman found Navarro guilty of the charges against him.

Navarro submits that he accomplished his annual SALN in accordance with the prescribed format by the CSC, the details of which. to the best of his knowledge and belief, were generally accepted in the government service and was in substantial compliance with the provisions of law. He could not have declared other assets or exclusively his as he co-owns these properties with his siblings.

ISSUE

Whether Navarro’s failure to declare in detail his assets and business interests in his SALN sufficient to hold him administratively liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct.

RULING

NO. Dishonesty implies that the person intends to lie, cheat, deceive, betray, or defraud.

Misconduct, on the other hand, is the intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. The misconduct must relate to or be connected with the performance of the public officer’s duties for it to be considered an administrative offense.

In this case, the Court believes that Navarro’s lumping of his properties in his SALN does not automatically amount to making an untruthful statement. The mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not automatically amount to dishonesty except in cases where public employee’s wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the income without sufficient explanation. Also Navarro cannot be said to have committed simple negligence for improper accomplishment of SALNs, as he was not given the opportunity to correct the entries in his SALNs.

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE INVALIDLY DISMISSED IS ENTITLED FOR BACKWAGES AND REINSTATEMENT

JULIUS B. CAMPOL vs. MAYOR RONALD S. BALAO-AS et. al.
G.R. No. 197634, November 28, 2016, 810 SCRA 501

FACTS: Campol served as Secretary of the Sanggunian Bayan (SB) of the Municipality of Baliney, Abra since 1999.

During the 2004 elections, Balao-as and Sianen won as mayor and vice mayor, respectively. Thereafter their assumption to office, The SB passed a resolution terminating Campol as SB Secretary on the ground that he was absent without approved leave from August 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004.

Campol challenged his dismissal before the CSC-CAR which ruled in his favor, however, Vice Mayor Sianen issued a Memorandum dropping Campol from the rolls.

The CSC granted his appeal and ruled that Campol was properly dropped from the rolls.

The CA ruled that Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls, however, it refused his reinstatement as he was gainfully employed with the PAO since October 2005. He was awarded backwages only from the time of his dismissal until October 2005, prior to his employment with another government agency.

ISSUES

1) Whether Campol is entitled to reinstatement.

2) Whether Campol should be awarded backwages only for the period covering his illegal dismissal until his new employment with the PAO.

RULINGS

1) YES, Campol should be reinstated to his position as SB Secretary.

In the event that another person has already been appointed to his post, that person has to give way to the employee whose right to the office has been recognized by the competent authorities.

In the eyes of the law, the position never became vacant since Campol was illegally dropped from the rolls.

2) NO. Campol is entitled to the payment of backwages from the time of his illegal dismissal until he is reinstated to his position. The CA erred in ruling that the backwages should only cover the period of his illegal dismissal until his new employment with the PAO.

An employee of the civil service who is ordered reinstated is also entitled to the full payment of his backwages during the entire period that he was wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his position and from enjoying its benefits. This is necessarily so because, in the eyes of the law, the employee never truly left the office.

In cases like this, the twin award of reinstatement and payment of full backwages as dictated by the constitutional mandate to protect civil service employee’s right to security of tenure. Anything less that this fails short of the justice due to government employee unfairly removed from office.

14.    NATIONAL   EMERGENCY

RANDY DAVID   vs. GLORIA   MACAPAGAL   ARROYO
G.R. No.   171390, May 3,   2006, 489   SCRA   160

*** DECLARATION OF A STATE OF REBELLION vs. DECLARATION OF A STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY.

- - - President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest.

- - - it is harmless, without legal significance and deemed not written. (Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004).

- - - In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution - - - a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (CALLING-OUT POWER).

- - - She also relied on Section 17, Article XII -- a provision on the state’s extra ordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest.

- - - Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power

- - Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance or not written, as in the case of declaration of a state of rebellion.

*** The DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW is a “warning to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not commit any acts which will any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).

*** Powers that can be exercised by the President as commander-in-chief where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus:

1. arrests and seizures without judicial warrants

2. ban on public assemblies

3. take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship

4. issuance of Presidential Decrees

*** “TAKE CARE” POWER

- - - the primary function of the President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws.

- - - he sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.

- - - we all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: “to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

- - - Upon the other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: “ to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.”

**** Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate “decrees”?

- - - - She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by former Pres. Marcos under PP 1081.

- - - - Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.

- - - the President is granted an Ordinance Power where she may issue any of the following:

1. Executive Order (EO)

2. Administrative Order (AO)

3. Proclamations (PP)

4. Memorandum Order (MO)

5. Memorandum Circular (MC)

6. General or Special Orders (GO or SO)

- - - President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances.

- - - The Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”

**** Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?

- - - With respect to “laws,” she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as custom laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like.

- - - She can only order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

*** POWER TO TAKE OVER

- - - President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” vs. authority to exercise emergency powers.

- - - President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

- - - But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter -- this requires delegation from Congress.

- - - Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.

- - - During grave emergencies, for possible or practical purposes, it is deemed wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

1. there must be a war or other emergency

2. the delegation must be for a limited period only.

3. the delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

4. the emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

- - - Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause and that power refers to Congress, not the president.

- - - the taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.

- - - “tsunami,” “typhoon,” “hurricane” and “similar occurrences” are limited view of “emergency.”

- - - “Emergency” as contemplated in our Constitution may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportion or effect.

- - - Legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised, remains in Congress even in times of crisis. (Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

- while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

- - - Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.

- - - in short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article XII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

**** “AS APPLIED CHALLENGE”

- - - the rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the right against warrantless arrest, and the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greater blow

**** Can the Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

- - - Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and misabused and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.

- - - the validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case.

- - - PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the President’s calling-out power but there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizen’s constitutional rights.

- - - the Court cannot adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementation committed illegal acts.

- - - the criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power and not a mere incidental result arising from its execution.

- - - the absence of a law defining “acts of terrorism” may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military and therefore the Court declares that the “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

- - - there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizes the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise such acts are considered illegal.

- - - “Assembly” means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech.

- - - As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

- - - Like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship.

- - - it may not be conditional upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from the governmental authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

- - - the ringing truth is that petitioner David et. al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right.

- - - Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meeting cannot be branded as criminals on that score.

- - - the dispersal and arrest of the members of the KMU was done merely on the basis of Malacañang directives canceling all permits previously issued by local government unit is arbitrary - - - the wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.

- - - Under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permit after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of clear and present danger.

- - - while admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties.

- - - the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship.

15. ELECTION LAW

COMELEC JURISDICTION vs. HRET JURISDICTION

REGINA    ONGSIAKO   REYES    vs.    COMMISSION    ON   ELECTIONS
G.R.   No.   207264,    June   25,    2013,    699   SCRA   522
G.R.   No.   207264,   October   22,   2013,   709   SCRA   197

FACTS: On 31 October 2012, Joseph Tan filed before the Comelec a petition to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Regina Reyes on the ground of material representations specifically among others that she is not a Filipino citizen but rather an American citizen.

During the course of the proceedings, Joseph Tan presented a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that Regina O. Reyes is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport which she used in the various travels abroad.

On 27 March 2013, the Comelec First Division found that, contrary to the declarations she made in her COC, Regina O. Reyes is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with requirements of RA 9225 or the Citizenship Re-acquisition and Retention Act of 2003 namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer to administer an oath. In addition, the Comelec ruled that she did not have the one year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

On 8 April 2013, Reyes filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport.

On 14 May 2013, the Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution denying Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, Regina Reyes was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 elections.

On 5 June 2013, the Comelec en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring its 14 May 2013 Resolution final and executory.

On same day, Regina Reyes took her oath of office before Speaker Belmonte of the House of Representatives.

Reyes has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.

ISSUES: (1) Who has jurisdiction over the case?

(2) When is a candidate considered a Member of the House of

Representatives?

HELD: (1) The Comelec retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of Reyes’ qualifications, as well as over the assailed Comelec Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a member of the House of Representatives as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c) assumption of office.

The Court has invariably hold that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the Comelec jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualification ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office as the term of office begins only at noon on the 30th day of June next following their election. Thus, until such time, the Comelec retains jurisdiction.

Disqualified Candidate cannot be voted upon

REV. FR. NARDO B. CAYAT vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23

FACTS: Cayat and Palileng were the only candidates for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet, in the 10 May 2004 local elections. Palileng filed a petition for disqualification against Cayat. Palileng’s petition alleged that: Cayat is not eligible to run as Mayor having been convicted by final judgment for a criminal offense for the Crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. In fact, Cayat is still under probation at the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy.

COMELEC cancelled Cayat’s COC. In the local elections held on 10 May 2004, Cayat’s name remained on the COMELEC’s list of candidates. Cayat received the highest number of votes. Cayat was thus proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Cayat took his oath of office on 17 May 2004.

Palileng moved for the execution of COMELEC’s order canceling the certificate of candidacy of Cayat. The latter thereby, annulled the proclamation of petitioner Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat. The new MBOC proclaimed Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. Palileng took his oath of office on the same day.

ISSUE: Whether or not the orders canceling Cayat’s COC, nullifying Cayat’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet, and declaring Palileng as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet are valid.

HELD: YES. There is no doubt as to the propriety of Palileng’s proclamation. The COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 canceling Cayat’s certificate of candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004 when Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days before Election Day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng was not a second placer. On the contrary, Palileng

was the sole and only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.

Cayat’s proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying him had already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of Cayat’s disqualification when they cast their votes on Election Day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes “shall not be counted.” There is no disenfranchisement of the 8,164 voters. Rather, the 8,164 voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus their votes are stray and shall not be counted.

          Valid    Substitution    to     non-age    Candidate

JOY CHRISMA   B.    LUNA    vs.    COMELEC
G.R. No.   165983,   April   24,   2007,   522   SCRA   107

FACTS: On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her COC for the position of vice-mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on the same date. The name of Hans Roger was removed from the list of candidates and was replaced by the name of Luna.

Private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna alleging that Luna’s COC was not validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid due to the fact that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day and therefore, was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna.

The COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid COC and therefore, is not a valid candidate who could be substituted by Luna.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.

HELD: YES. The substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was valid. When a candidate files his COC, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt pursuant to Sec. 76 of the Election Code. Since Hans Roger withdrew his COC and the COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna may validly substitute for Hans Roger.

The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez vs. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his COC, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such COC under Section 78 of the Election Code.

UNDER    AGE    CANDIDATE     VALIDLY    SUBSTITUTED

OLIVIA   DA    SILVA    CERAFICA    vs.    COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS
G.R.   No. 205136,   December   2,   2014,   743   SCRA   426

FACTS: On 1 October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for councilor of Taguig City for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty three (23) years of age on the day of election.

As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification.

Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC on 17 December 2012. Olivia, who belongs to and is certified by the same political party filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through.

However, the Comelec Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. This recommendation was affirmed by Comelec.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC was proper.

(2) Whether Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution.

RULINGS

(1) NO. The Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipts of COCs.

Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs and its duty to give due course to COCs in due form is ministerial in character.

While the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face.

The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec.

As such, the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC was not proper.

(2) YES. Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of BP Bldg. 881, not just any person, but only “an official candidate of a registered or accreditated political party may be substituted.

In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party, thus, she can be validly substituted.

All the foregoing requisites were complied with in the case at bar. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly COC after the last day for the filing of COCs. Second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.

Therefore, Olivia can substitute Kimberly.

No valid Substitution - Material Representation

SILVERIO TAGOLINO vs. COMELEC & LUCY TORRES GOMEZ
G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013, 693 SCRA 574

FACTS: Richard Gomez filed his COC with Comelec for congressman of Leyte for May 2010 elections. A petition was filed before the Comelec to cancel COC of Richard Gomez for his failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement. The Comelec granted the petition without qualification stating that Richard Gomez is disqualified. Thereafter, Richard’s wife, Lucy Torres filed her COC as official substitute candidate of Richard Gomez with the party’s endorsement. Comelec allowed the substitution.

When the elections were conducted, Richard Gomez, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered the highest number of votes. In view of substitution, Lucy Torres was proclaimed the winner.

ISSUE: Whether Lucy Torres validly substituted Richard Gomez as a congressional candidate in the said election.

HELD: NO. The substitution is invalid. Considering that section 77 of the OEC requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid COC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person’s COC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid COC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.

Moreover, Section 77 expressly enumerates that substitution is permissible when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party “dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause.” Noticeably, material representation cases are not included and therefore cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

Richard Gomez’ failure to comply with the residency requirement constitutes a material representation of one’s qualification which is a ground for the denial to and/or cancellation of his COC and not for disqualification. This makes COC void ab initio. Consequently, his wife cannot validly substitute him as a candidate in the said election.

NUISANCE    CANDIDATE

JOSEPH   B.   TIMBOL    vs.   COMMISSION    ON    ELECTIONS
G.R.   No.   206004,     February    24,   2015,   751   SCRA   456

FACTS: On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a certificate of candidacy for councilor of the Second District of Caloocan City.

On January 15, 2013, Timbol was ordered to appear before the Comelec for a clarificatory hearing in connection with his certificate of candidacy.

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer Valencia. During the clarificatory hearing, Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate and contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eight among all the candidates who ran for councilors in the second district. He allegedly had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign.

The clarificatory panel assured him that his name would be deleted from the list of nuisance candidates and that his certificate of candidacy would be given due course.

Despite Election Officer Valencia’s favorable recommendation, Timbol’s name was not removed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the Comelec website.

With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February 2, 2013, a petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates.

In the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, the Comelec denied the petition for being moot considering that the printing of ballots had already begun.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether Timbol was denied due process for being considered a nuisance candidate.

(2) Who are nuisance candidates?

(3) When is a case moot and academics and what are the recognized exceptions.

HELD: (1) YES. The opportunity to be heard is a chance “to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.

To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificate of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by Comelec. This denial or cancellation may be “moto propio or upon a verified petition of an interested party subject to an opportunity to be heard.

(2) Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificate of candidacy “to put the election process in mockery or disrespect or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the name of the registered candidates or other circumstances or acts clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and, thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

(3) A case is moot and academic, if it “ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.

When a case is moot and academic, court generally declines jurisdiction over it. There are recognized exceptions to this rule:

(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution.

(2) the case involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest.

(3) the issues raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public, and

(4)    the     case     was     capable    of     repetition    yet      evading     review.

16.   PUBLIC   INTERNATIONAL LAW - Prospective   Extraditee is   entitled   to
                                                                     the    grant    of     bail

GOVERNMENT OF   HONGKONG vs.    HON.   FELIXBERTO OLALIA, JR.
G.R.   No.    153675,     April   19,    2007,   521    SCRA   470

While the Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a re-examination of the Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.

First, the Court noted that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondent, in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. The Court had admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings.

In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings (e.g. deportation proceedings) taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

Finally, while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. A new standard which is termed “clear and convincing evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. This standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence.

EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ vs. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC BRANCH 17 of MANILA
G.R. No. 157977, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290

In Purganan case, the Court said that a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest. But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the trial court find that he is no-flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no-flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release. Considering, therefore, that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her right to due process.

NON - SIGNATORY TO UNCLOS

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, et. al. vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT et. al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, 735 SCRA 102

FACTS: On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian while transiting the Sulu Sea ran aground on the shoal of Tubbataha Reefs which caused environmental damage.

On April 17, 2013, the above-named petitioners, including minors or generations yet unborn filed a petition against the U.S. military officers involved, President Pinoy and officials of the Philippine government involved in military exercise and environmental protection for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.

The U.S. government invoked the doctrine of immunity from suit and being a non-signatory to the treaty of UNCLOS.

ISSUES

(1) Whether the minors petitioners have personality to sue on behalf of generations yet unborn.

(2) Whether the acts of U.S. respondents are governed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

3) Whether the non-membership in the UNCLOS of U.S. would disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.

RULINGS

(1) YES. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Such right is based on “rhythm and harmony of nature” indispensably include the judicious disposition, utilization and conservation of country’s natural resources.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

(2) YES. The U.S. respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the U.S. Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.

The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the Tubbataha Reefs was committed while they were performing military duty.

Considering that the satisfaction of the judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the U.S. government, the suit is deemed to be one against the U.S. itself.

The principle of State Sovereign Immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction of our Supreme Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

(3) NO. The non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the U.S. will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.

The U.S. government has to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adverse affected the Tabbataha reefs.

The rationale of U.S. refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining which considers the ocean and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind and has nothing to do with the U.S. acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.

CONDUCT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS BY THE EXECUTIVE

- PACTA SUNT SERVANDA

ISABELITA C. VINUYA et. al. vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA 596

FACTS: Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider the April 28, 2010 decision and declare (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion

in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women and for an apology, legal compensation and other forms of reparation from Japan.

ISSUE: Whether the public respondents can be compelled to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

HELD: NO. The Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines whether or not to espouse petitioners’ claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department.

The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.

The Waiver Clause in the Treaty of Peace with Japan bound the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international law principle of pacta sunt servanda. The validity of the Treaty of Peace was the result of the ratification by two consenting parties.

Consequently, the obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be carried out in accordance with the common and real intention of the parties at the time the treaty was concluded.

17. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1

Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The compelling state interest test involves a three-step process. The Court explained this process in detail, by showing the questions which must be answered in each step, viz:

First, “Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?” The court often looks into the sincerity of the religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its truth.

Second, the court asks: “Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious society?” In this step, the government has to establish that its purposes are legitimate for the state and that they are compelling.

Third, the court asks: “Has the state in achieving its legitimate purposes used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state?” The analysis requires the state to show that the means in which it is achieving its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.

18. QUALIFICATION OF SENATORIAL CANDIDATES

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410

ISSUE: May RA 9165 add drug testing as a requirement for candidacy for Senator?

HELD: NO. The Constitution expressly limits the qualifications of a person to run and become a Senator as those that are limited to the following matters:

(1) citizenship

(2) voter registration

(3) age

(4) residency.

Congress’ power to legislate while given broad recognition must not overflow the bounds set by the Constitution. Where the Constitution has expressly set out the qualification, these are exclusive and may not be broadened nor circumscribed by legislative fiat.

19. REMOVAL OF AN ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL

SANGGUNIANG   BARANGAY   OF   BARANGAY DON   MARIANO MARCOS vs.   MARTINEZ
G.R.   No. 170626,     March   3,     2008,    547    SCRA   416

ISSUE:     May    the     Sangguniang    Bayan    remove    an     elective    official     from    office?

HELD: NO. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds provided by law only by order of the proper court.

20.   POWER   OF   EMINENT   DOMAIN

FORFORM   DEVELOPMENT   CORPORATION   vs.   P N R
G.R.   No.   124795,    December     10,     2008,     573     SCRA     350

FACTS: The San Pedro - Carmona Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances to serve the squatters’ resettlement areas. The properties of Forform were traversed as right-of-way and the PNR occupied the Forform properties without previous condemnation proceedings and payment of just compensation.

ISSUES

1. Whether Forform can recover possession of its property because PNR failed to file any expropriation case and just compensation.

2. Whether leasing out of portion of the property to third person is beyond the scope of public use.

HELD

1. NO. The owner of the land, who stands by, without objection, and sees as public railroad constructed over it, cannot, after the road is completed, or large expenditures have been made thereon upon the faith of his apparent acquiescence, reclaim the land, or enjoin its use by the railroad company.

In such a case, there can only remain to the owner a right of compensation.

2. NO. The public use requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.

At present, it may be amiss to state that whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The term “public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare,” and “public convenience.” Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

REPUBLIC vs. SPOUSES AGUSTIN & IMELDA CANCIO
G.R. No. 170147, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 346

- The payment of the provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment of just compensation for the expropriated property.

- While the provisional value is based on the current zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.

HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO vs. JOVITO M. LUIS
G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009, 603 SCRA 576

FACTS: The City of Pasig had taken the parcel of land of Luis and used the same as municipal road now known as Sandoval Avenue. After 16 years, Mayor Eusebio informed Luis that Pasig City cannot pay him more than the amount set by the Appraisal Committee. Thereafter, Luis filed an action for reconveyance. Mayor Eusebio contended that Luis’ action for just compensation for the property taken for public use is already barred by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether Luis’ action to claim just compensation for the property taken for public use is already barred by prescription.

HELD: NO. Where private property is taken by the government for public use without first acquiring title either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. SANTA LORO VDA. DE CAPIN
G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 648

- Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right of way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”

21.    RIGHT    TO    TRAVEL

REV. FR.   ROBERT   REYES   vs. RAUL   M. GONZALEZ
G.R.   No. 182161,   December    3,    2009,    606    SCRA   58

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

HELD: NO. The right to travel refers to the right to move one place to another. Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Fr. Reyes failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal resource or remedy.

The direct recourse to the Supreme Court is inappropriate considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule of the Writ of Amparo which states that “when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.

22.    CREATION   OF   LEGISLATIVE   DISTRICT

SEN.   BENIGNO C. AQUINO III   vs.   COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS
G.R.   No.   189793,   April   7,   2010,   617   SCRA   623

FACTS: RA 9716 created an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.

Sen. Aquino contends that the reapportionment run afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district and RA 9716 is unconstitutional because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE: Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD: NO. Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

BAI SANDRA SEMA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 700

FACTS: ARMM Regional Assembly exercised its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

ISSUES

1. Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly can create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

2. Whether Congress can validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives.

3, Whether Sharif Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution.

RULINGS

1. NO. A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

2. NO, the power to create a province or a city with a population of 250,000 or more requires also the power to create a legislative district exclusively vested in Congress.

3. NO. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies.

23.     MIDNIGHT    APPOINTMENT

IN RE:   APPOINTMENT   DATED    MARCH    30,    1998   OF    JUDGES   MATEO   VALENZUELA     AND    PLACIDO   VALLARTA
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC,   November   9,   1998,   298   SCRA   408

FACTS: President Ramos appointed Judges Mateo Valenzuela and Placido Vallarta as RTC Judges on March 30, 1998 during the election ban and the said appointment was transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 1998. Both Judges took their oath of office and entered upon the performance of their duties on the basis of the appointment documents coming from Malacañang.

ISSUE: Whether the president can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of an election ban in the interest of public service.

HELD: NO. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban.

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL & BAR COUNCIL
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

- the appointment of Justice Renato Corona as the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during the election ban as successor to retiring Chief Justice Reynato Puno is valid under the principle of pro hac vice.

24. JURISDICTION IN ELECTION CASES

Contests involving SK Officials

INDIRA R. FERNANDEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 176296, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 765

- The 1987 Constitution vests in the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

- Construed in relation to the provision in RA 7160 that includes in the enumeration of barangay officials the SK Chairman, the constitutional provision indeed sanctions the appellate review by the COMELEC of election protests involving the position of SK Chairman.

Intra Party Disputes

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010, 612 SCRA 761

- The COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute in a proper case brought about it as an incident of its power to register political parties.

Validity of Voter’s Registration

JAMELA SALIC MARUHOM vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 179430, July 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 108

- It must be underscored that in addition to the express jurisdiction of COMELEC over petition for cancellation of COCs on the ground of false material representations, under Section 78 of the OEC, the Constitution also extends to COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

Interlocutory Order

EDDIE T. PANLILIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009, 593 SCRA 139

- Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc.

- Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution mandates that only motion for reconsideration of final decision shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc.

Jurisdiction of the PET and the SET

BANAT PARTY LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477

- The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed.

- Under Section 37, Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass. Congress and COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential and senatorial candidates.

HRET Jurisdiction over Party-List Representatives

CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN vs. H R E T
G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 375

- Since party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualification.

25. AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS

SEVERINO B. VERGARA vs. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 174567, March 12, 2009, 580 SCRA 693

- When the local chief executive enters into contracts, the law speaks of prior authorization or authority from the Sangguniang Panlunsod and not ratification.

- It cannot be denied that the City Council issued Resolution No. 280 authorizing Mayor Lajara to purchase the subject lots. As aptly pointed out by the Ombudsman, ratification by the City Council is not a condition sine qua non for Mayor Lajara to enter into contracts.

26. CONCURRENCE OF SANGGUNIAN

MELANIE MONTUERTO vs. MAYOR ROLANDO TY
G.R. No. 177736, October 6, 2008, 567 SCRA 670

- The verbal concurrence allegedly given by the Sanggunian is not the concurrence required and envisioned under RA 7160. The Sanggunian, as a body, acts through a resolution or an ordinance.

27. PROHIBITION TO HOLD ANY OTHER OFFICE

DENNIS FUNA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 308

FACTS: President Gloria M. Arroyo appointed Maria Elena H. Bautista as undersecretary of DOTC. Upon the resignation of MARINA Administrator, Bautista was designated as OIC Administrator of MARINA in concurrent capacity as DOTC undersecretary.

ISSUE: Whether the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA and concurrently DOTC undersecretary violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for cabinet members and their deputies and assistants.

HELD: YES. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office and not the nature of the appointment or designation. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same or “to be in possession and administration” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the function and duties of the office.

DENNIS A.B. FUNA vs. ACTING DOJ SECRETARY ALBERTO C. AGRA
G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, 691 SCRA 196

FACTS: Agra was the Government Corporate Counsel when he was designated as Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of Justice when Agnes Devanadera resigned in order to run for Congress in the May 2010 elections. He relinquished the position as Government Corporate Counsel and assumed the positions of Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General in concurrent capacity.

ISSUE: Whether the designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, violates the constitutional prohibition against dual or multiple offices for the members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.

HELD: YES. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the l987 Constitution.

It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.

To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

The language of Section 13 makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.

28. DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACTS

The doctrine of operative facts means that before a law was declared unconstitutional, its actual existence must be taken into account and whatever was done while the law was in operation should be recognized as valid.

CLAUDIO   S.   YAP   vs.   THENAMARIS   SHIP’S   MANAGEMENT
AND    INTERMARE   MARITIME   AGENCIES,   INC.
G.R.   No.   179532, May 30,   2011,   649 SCRA   369

FACTS: Claudio was employed by Vulture Shipping as electrician for a vessel. The contract was for a duration of 12 months. On the 3rd month, he was illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeal awarded him salaries for three months, however, on appeal, the clause “for three months for every year of the unexpired term under Section 10 of RA 8042 was declared unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of OFWs to equal protection of the law.

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of unconstitutionality of Section 10 of RA 8042 applies retroactive to the present case.

HELD: NO. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. An exception to this is the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, if it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

MIRALLOSA vs. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 194538, November 27, 2013, 711 SCRA 30

FACTS: Carmel was the registered owner of Pangarap Village with a total land area of 156 hectares. On October 14, 1973, President Marcos issued PD 293 which invalidated the titles of Carmel and declared them open for disposition to the members of MHAI.

On the basis of PD 293, Juan, member of MHAI, occupied Lot 32 and subsequently built houses there.

On January 29, 1988, the Supreme Court declared PD 293 as unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its part in Tuason case.

Sometime in 1995, Juan executed an affidavit authorizing Mirallosa to occupy Lot 32 and built his structures on the premises.

In April 2002, Carmel made several oral & written demands on Mirallosa to vacate the premises but to no avail until Carmel filed a complaint for unlawful detainer.

Mirallosa claimed that Carmel has no cause of action against him under the doctrine of operative fact and he should not be prejudiced by Tuason case because he was not a party to the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mirallosa can avail of the Operative Fact Doctrine.

HELD: NO. The Operative Fact Doctrine is a rule in equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional laws produces no effects. The doctrine is applicable when

a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who relied on the invalid law but it can never be invoked, to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act.

Mirallosa merely anchored his right over the property to an Affidavit issued by Juan in 1995 or seven years after the Tuason case was promulgated. At the time he built the structures on the premises, he aught to have been aware of the binding effects of the Tuason case and the subsequent unconstitutionality of PD 293. These circumstances necessarily remove him from the ambit of the operation fact doctrine.

29.   CALLING-OUT   POWER

DATU   ZALDY   UY   AMPATUAN   vs.   HON.   RONALDO   PUNO
G.R.   No.   190259,    June   7,   2011,   651   SCRA   228

FACTS: After the Maguindanao Massacre, PGMA issued Proclamation 1946 placing Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.

ISSUE: Whether then President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she ordered the deployment of the AFP and PNP.

HELD: NO. Such deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President under Section 18, Article VII, and to suppress or prevent violence springs from the power vested in her as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP.

30. CITIZENSHIP - NATURALIZATION AND NATURAL-

BORN CITIZEN

RENALD    F.    VILANDO    vs.     HOUSE     OF
REPRESENTATIVE   ELECTORAL      TRIBUNAL
G.R.   No. 192147   &   192149,    August   23,   2011,   656   SCRA   17

FACTS: Limkalchong won as the Representative of Negros Oriental in the 2007 elections. Vilando, a losing candidate, filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET. The petition challenged the eligibility of Limkalchong asserting that she was a Chinese citizen, having been born to a father whose naturalization had not attained finality and to a mother also acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.

ISSUES

1. Whether the HRET has jurisdiction to rule on one’s citizenship.

2. Whether Limkalchong is a natural-born citizen.

RULINGS

(1) NO. The HRET has no authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization. To rule otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of Limkalchong’s father which is not

permissible. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity.

(2) YES. It was ruled that with Limkalchong’s father having been conferred the status as a naturalized Filipino, it follows that she is a naturalized Filipino born to a Filipino father. Even on the assumption that the naturalization proceeding and the subsequent issuance of certificate of naturalization were invalid, Limkalchong can still be considered a natural-born citizen, having been born to a Filipino mother and having impliedly elected Filipino citizenship when she reached majority age.

31. RULES ON SUCCESSION OF ELECTIVE OFFICERS

BARBARA TALAGA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197

FACTS: Mayor Ramon Talaga and Vice Mayor Castillo filed their respective Certificates of Candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in the scheduled May 10, 2010 elections.

Four (4) days later, Castillo filed with the Comelec a petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Talaga for having already served three (3) terms as a City Mayor of Lucena.

The Comelec declared Ramon Disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City. Three (3) days before the election, Barbara filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon.

On election day, Barbara garnered 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes.

Castillo promptly filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of Barbara with the Comelec where he alleged that Barbara could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course, and Barbara could not be considered a candidate because the Comelec en banc had approved her substitution three (3) days after the elections, hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.

ISSUES

(1) Was the substitution of Barbara as candidate valid in place of her husband Ramon?

(2) In case of permanent vacancy, who must succeed and assume the position of Mayor?

(3) When may a second placer be allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate?

RULINGS

(1) NO. The filing of a CoC within 60 days prior to the regular election is mandatory requirement to be a candidate in a national or local election. Since Barbara filed her own CoC three (3) days before the election, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code as she has no valid CoC to be considered a candidate.

(2) The duly elected Vice-Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office.

(3) The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified, and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realms of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes. In which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.

RENATO M. FEDERICO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013, 689 SCRA 134

FACTS: Edna Sanchez (Edna) and Maligaya were candidates for the position of Mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas in the May 2010 elections.

On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of Edna and gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Two days later, Edna withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of mayor and filed a new CoC for the position of Governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband.

On May 5, 2010, Renato filed his CoC as substitute candidate for Mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna.

On May 10, 2010, the day of elections, the name “SANCHEZ, Edna P.” was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas and garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya’s 22, 577 votes. A second print-out of the COCVP was issued by the MBOC crediting the votes garnered by Edna to Renato. Subsequently, Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Renato.

ISSUES

(1) Did Renato validly substitute Edna who withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position?

(2) Should Maligaya be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor?

RULINGS

(1) NO. When Edna withdrew her candidacy for Mayor on April 29, 2010, the deadline for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could substitute her as mayoralty candidate. Her substitution as the widow of her late husband in the gubernatorial race could not justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.

(2) Therefore, there being no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. Being the only candidate, Maligaya received the highest number of votes. Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

CASAN MAQUILING vs. COMELEC & ROMMEL ARNADO
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420

FACTS: Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. As a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as US citizen, he lost his Filipino citizenship. He applied for repartriation under RA 9225 and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 in San Francisco, California, USA.

On April 3, 2009, Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. He ran and won the mayoralty of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections. Casan Maquiling, placed second having garnered highest number of votes, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado or cancel his COC on the ground that Arnado’s nationality is USA - American as per certification of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). The Comelec En Banc granted the petition for disqualification of Arnado.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second placer eligible candidate be declared as the winner.

HELD: YES. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidate form part of that voice, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.

Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in

the vote count is actually the first placer among the qualified candidates. That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantial ground that existed prior to the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy void not only the COC but also the proclamation.

32.     THE   POWER   OF   REMOVAL   OF    THE   PRESIDENT

EMILIO   A.   GONZALES   III   vs.   OFFICE   OF   THE   PRESIDENT
G.R.   No.   196231,   September   4,   2012,   679   SCRA   614

FACTS: For finding Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, the Office of the President (OP) dismissed him from service.

Gonzales claims that the Office of the President (OP) has no jurisdiction over him considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which he belongs is clothed with constitutional independence thus necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

ISSUE: Does the Office of the President have a constitutional or valid statutory authority to subject Deputy Ombudsman to an administrative investigation and to thereafter order his removal from office?

HELD: YES. Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power.

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman simply laid down in express terms an authority that is implied from the President’s constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid official in the Office of the Ombudsman.

It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. While the Ombudsman’s authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective with the exception only of those officials removable only by impeachment, the members of Congress and the Judiciary, such authority is by no means exclusive. Gonzales cannot insist that he should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution which is by impeachment, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from the office of a Deputy Ombudsman for that matter.

33.   TERMINATION   OF   OFFICIAL   RELATION -   INACTION   OF   THE   COMMISSION    ON    APPOINTMENTS

EVALYN   I.   FETALINO   vs.   COMMISSION   ON   ELECTIONS
G.R.   No.   191890,   December   4,   2012,   686   SCRA   813

FACTS: On February 10, 1998, President Ramos extended an interim appointment to Fetalino and Calderon as Comelec Commissioners. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on midnight appointments later took effect and Fetalino and Calderon were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the two merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months.

Subsequently, Fetalino and Calderon applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec pursuant to RA 1568. However, the Comelec disapproved their claim for a lump sum benefit stating that they whose ad interim appointments were not acted upon by the

Commission on Appointments (CA) and who were subsequently, not reappointed, are not entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity because they did not complete in full the seven-year term of office.

ISSUE: Can ad interim appointments lapsed by the inaction of the CA be considered as a having served a “term of office” to entitle such appointees to benefits?

HELD: NO. While an ad interim appointment is characterized as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in

the Comelec without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

Therefore, based on these considerations, Fetalino and Calderon can never be considered to have retired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but more importantly because they did not serve a “term of office” as required by Section 1 of RA 1568, as amended.

34. WARRANTLESS ARREST

PEOPLE vs. NAZARENO VILLAREAL
G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549

FACTS: PO3 Renato de Leon was driving his motorcycle on his way home along 5th Avenue when he saw Nazareno from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a plastic sachet of shabu. Thus, PO3 de Leon alighted from his motorcycle and approached Nazareno whom he recognized as someone he had previously arrested from illegal drug possession. Upon seeing PO3 de Leon, Nazareno tried to escape but was quickly apprehended with the help of a tricycle driver. PO3 de Leon was able board Nazareno on to his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his possession.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.

HELD. NO. Nazareno’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 of Rule 113.

“Probable Cause” has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

UNCONSUMMATED   BUY-BUST    OPERATION   PRECLUDES   WARRANTLESS   SEARCH    AND    SEIZURE

PEOPLE    OF    THE    PHILIPPINES    vs.   OLIVER   RENATO   EDAÑO
G.R.   No.   188133,    July    7,    2014,    729    SCRA    255

FACTS: On the evening of August 6, 2002, member of Drug Enforcement Group together with a female informant went to the parking area of McDonalds to conduct an entrapment operation.

Edaño arrived at around 7:00 p.m. on board a space wagon. The informant approached Edaño and talked to him inside the vehicle.

Afterwards, the informant waived at PO3 Corbe who then approached Edaño. The latter went out of the vehicle and ran away.

PO3 Corbe was able to grab Edaño, causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a “knot-tied” transparent plastic bag from Edaño’s right hand.

ISSUES: Whether the search and seizure that followed warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD: NO, the warrantless arrest of Edaño was not valid. Consequently, the search and seizure that followed the warrantless arrest was likewise not valid.

In this case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to Edaño to rouse suspicion in the mind of the police that he had just committed, was actually committing or was attempting to commit a crime in their presence.

Informant and Edaño were just talking to each other, there was no exchange of money and drugs as the police approached the car.

Edaño is entitled to acquittal since the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

35.    SEARCHES    AND    SEIZURES    -   “STOP   AND   FRISK”

PEOPLE   OF    THE   PHILIPPINES    vs.   VICTOR   COGAED
G.R. No.   200334,    July    30,   2014,     731    SCRA    427

FACTS: An informant thru a text message told the police that a certain Marvin would be transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy.

The police organized checkpoints in order “to intercept the suspect.” A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to SPO1 Taracatas indicating a male passenger was carrying marijuana.

SPO1 Taracatas approached the male passenger who was identified as Victor who was carrying a blue bag. SPO1 Taracatas asked Victor about the contents of his bag and he said he did not know since he was transporting the bag as a favor to his barrio mate named Marvin.

After this exchange, Victor opened the blue bag revealing three bricks of marijuana. SPO1 arrested Victor and was brought to the police station.

The RTC and the CA found Victor guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA 9165 when Victor waived his right against warrantless searches “without prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, he voluntarily opened his bag.

ISSUE: Whether the search and seizure was illegal.

HELD: YES. “Stop and frisk” searches should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself in. Experienced police officers have personal experience dealing with criminal and criminal behavior.

Thus, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

In the case at bar, Victor was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding jeepney or carrying a bag. Hence, the search and seizure against the accused Victor is illegal because of the absence of the requisite of “suspiciousness.”

The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver who signaled to the police that Victor was “suspicious.”

The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

1. warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

2. seizure of evidence in “plain view”

3. search of moving vehicle

4. consented warrantless search

5. customs search

6. stop and frisk, and

7. exigent and emergency circumstances.

Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence.

“Stop and frisk” are conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. It’s object is either to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer to obtain more information.

There can be no valid waiver of Victor’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bag.

His silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search as it is a mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances created by the presence of the police officer and thus no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.

37.    RIGHT     AGAINST    SELF -    INCRIMINATION

JAIME   D.   DELA   CRUZ    vs.    PEOPLE   OF   THE   PHILIPPINES
G.R.   No.   200748,    July   23,    2014,    730    SCRA    655

FACTS: On January 31, 2006, the NBI Regional office received a complaint from Corazon and Charito that Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and son of Charito, was detained at the police station for selling drugs. In the said police station, they met PO1 James who demanded P40,000 in exchange for the release of Ariel.

A team was immediately formed to implement an entrapment operation which took place inside Jolibee where the nbi operatives were able to nab PO1 James by using a pre-marked 500 – peso bill dusted with fluorescent powder.

PO1 James was brought to the NBI forensic laboratory and was required to submit his urine for drug testing and it later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs.

Petitioner claimed that he refused the urine sample collection and requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine sample but to no avail.

The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165.

The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the drug test conducted upon the accused is legal.

HELD: NO. The drug test is illegal. It violates the constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination which proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.

First, the drug test in Sec. 15, Art. II of RA 9165 does not cover person apprehended or arrested for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Art. II of RA 9165.

Second, the drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The RTC and CA failed to see how a urine sample could be material to the charge of extortion.

Third and most importantly, the drug test was a violation of PO1 James’ right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. He refused and also asked for a lawyer prior to the urine test. However, all of his efforts proved futile because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing.

38.    STATE    IMMUNITY    FROM    SUIT

HEIRS   OF    DIOSDADO MENDOZA   vs.    DPWH
G.R.   No.   203834,    July   9,   2014,   729   SCRA   299

FACTS: Mendoza, who is doing business under the name and style Superior Builders, won in the biddings for the construction of roads in Benguet.

Due to delay in the construction, Superior Builders incurred negative spillage of 31.852% prompting the DPWH to order the forfeiture of the contract and rebidding and awarding the project to another contractor.

Mendoza filed with the RTC an action for specific performance and enjoining the DPWH from rebidding and awarding the project to another contractor.

DPWH claimed its contractual obligation was made in the exercise of its governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether the DPWH is immune from suit.

HELD: YES. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution: The State may not be sued without consent.

The DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit.

Hence, Mendoza cannot claim that there was an implied waiver by the DPWH simply entering into a contract. Thus, the DPWH enjoys immunity from suit and may not be sued without its consent.

HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING vs. TOLL REGULATORY BOARD
G.R. No. 167290, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA 395

FACTS: Hermano owned a parcel of land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX and the said parcel of land was bounded by the access fence along NLEX.

Hermano requested the TRB for the grant of an easement of right of way considering that it had been totally deprived of the enjoyment and possession property by the access fence that barred its entry into and exit from NLEX.

The TRB denied the Hermano’s request because it would have an adverse effect on the schedule rehabilitation and improvement of NLEX interchange.

Hermano sued the TRB and its officers for specific performance for the grant of right of way and damages. It impleaded PNCC and DPWH as indispensable parties.

TRB filed a motion to dismiss as the action could be considered as a suit against the state without its consent.

ISSUE: Whether TRB and DPWH can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

HELD: YES. The TRB and the DPWH perform purely an essentially government or public function. As such, they are invested with the inherent power of sovereignty.

Being unincorporated agencies or entities of the national government, they not be sued, otherwise the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated.

It appears that Hermano’s complaint principally sought to restrain TRB & DPWH from implementing an access fence on its property and to direct them to grant a right of way to NLEX.

Clearly, the reliefs being sought by Hermano were beyond the jurisdiction of the RTC because no court except the Supreme Court could issue an injunction against an infrastructure project of the government.

This is because PD 1818 issued on January 16, 1981 prohibited judges from issuing restraining order against government infrastructure projects.

39.   EXECUTIVE    CLEMENCY

ATTY. ALICIA R.   VIDAL    vs.    COMELEC &    JOSEPH   ESTRADA
G.R.   No. 206666,   January   21,   2015,   747   SCRA   210

FACTS: On September 22, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and sentenced him to suffer Reclusion Perpetua and an accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency by way of pardon to former President Estrada.

In the text of the said pardon especially in the whereas clause states that Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office, however, Joseph Estrada was granted executive clemency of pardon and restored his civil and political rights.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Manila.

ISSUES: (1) Whether Erap Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted.

(2) What are the instances in which the President may not extend pardon?

HELD: (1) YES. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.

The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous and unqualified.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and his accessory penalties are included in the pardon.

(2) The instances in which the President may not extend pardon are the following:

a) impeachment cases.

b) cases that have yet resulted in a final conviction.

c) cases involving violation of election laws, rules and regulation in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the Comelec.

40.    MARITIME   REGIMES   UNDER    UNCLOS

            1)    Internal   water    is     12     nautical     miles    from     the     shore    to   the      baseline.

          2)    Territorial   sea    is     12     nautical    miles      from     the    baseline.

3) Contiguous zone is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea. The maximum limit is 24 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea.

4. The Exclusive Economic Zone extends no farther than 200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea.

5. The Continental Shelf gives the coastal state rights to explore and exploit the resources of the shelf by operation of law.

41.   NATIONAL   PATRIMONY
PROHIBITION TO FOREIGNER   TO   ACQUIRE   LAND

TAINA   MANIGQUE – STONE   vs.   CATTLEYA   LAND, INC.
G.R. No. 195975,   September   5, 2016,   802   SCRA   173

FACTS: On November 6, 1992, Cattleya entered into a Contract of Conditional Sale with the Tecson spouses covering nine parcels of land, including the subject property.

However, while following up the registration of the August 30, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale at the Office of the Register of Deeds, Cattleya learned that the owner’s copy of the title to the land in question was with Taina.

The subject land had apparently been sold to Taina’s common-law husband, Michael Stone, by Spouses Tecson in 1985, but the title was placed in Taina’s name as Stone was a foreigner.

Cattleya instituted a civil action for quieting of title and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title.

Taina posits that while Michael’s legal capacity to own or acquire real property in the Philippines was not entirely unassailable, there was nevertheless no actual violation of the constitutional prohibition, because in this case no real transfer of ownership had been effected in favor of Michael from Col. Tecson. Taina claimed that she was not exactly dummy Michael’s dummy at all but his active partner.

Cattleya counters that the sale between Col. Tecson and Michael was absolutely null and void, as this was a flagrant violation of the constitutional provision barring or prohibiting aliens or foreigners from acquiring or purchasing land in the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether the sale of land by Spouses Tecson to Michael Stone, a foreigner although ostensibly made in Taina’s name, was valid, despite the constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners.

RULING

NO, the sale is null and void by reason of the constitutional prohibition against the sale of lands in the Philippines to foreigners or aliens.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been held that “aliens, whether individual or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.

In the case at bench, Taina admitted that it was Michael who paid with his own funds the subject lot, hence, Michael Stone was its real purchaser or buyer. More than that, it bears stressing that if the deed of sale proclaimed that she was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject property was placed under her name, it was simply because she and Michael wanted to skirt or circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens from acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines.

42 PRESIDENT DUTERTE’S DECISION OF MARCOS REMAINS TO BE INTERRED AT LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI IS A POLITICAL QUESTION

SATURNINO   C.   OCAMPO   et.   al.    vs.    Rear     Admiral
ERNESTO   C.     ENRIQUEZ,   et.   al.
G.R.   No.   225973,   November   8,   2016,   807   SCRA   223

FACTS: During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB).

Duterte won the election and thereafter formally assumed his office. The Secretary of the National Defense issued a memorandum to the AFP regarding the interment of Marcos to the LNMB.

Petitions were filed alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the President for reasons that Marcos is not qualified to be interred at the LNMB on the ground that he was dishonorably discharged when he was ousted from power by the 1986 February Revolution. They likewise alleged that he committed offenses involving moral turpitude for his gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption and dubious military records. By going into exile, he deliberately evaded liability for his actions.

It was further contended that in 1992, the government and the Marcos family entered into an agreement that the body of President Marcos would be interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. Hence, the contention that he should not be buried at the LMNB.

ISSUES

1) Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

2) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcos and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former president to the interment at the LNMB.

3) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the government as for the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back and interred in the Philippines.

RULINGS

1) NO, President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question.

In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shine purposes.

President Duterte decided a question of policy based on the wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. Presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty prevails over the petitioners’ highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of exercise,

a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses.

2) NO. For his alleged human right abuses and corrupt practices, the Court may disregard Marcos as a President and a Commander-in-chief, but the Court cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held or the awards he received. Despite all the ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the person shall not be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process.

At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMG is located from the use it was originally interred by the past presidents. In the absence of any executive issuances or law to the contrary, the AFP regulation remains to be the sole

authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the LNMB. Interestingly, even they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon Aquino and Benigno Simeon Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB.

3) NO, it was not waived.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing provisions of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation nor may its exercise be limited, much less be withdrawn by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte.

43 QUO WARRANTO CASE AGAINST CJ SERENO

REPUBLIC vs. MARIA LOURDES SERENO
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General Calida, filed a Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of Quo Warranto to declare void respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom for her failure to submit SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by law.

ISSUES

1) Whether the Supreme Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent Sereno who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has already filed with the House of Representatives.

2) Whether respondent Sereno is an impeachable officer and such that quo warranto petition cannot prosper.

3) Whether there is a forum shopping.

4) Whether impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an impeachable official may be removed from office.

5) Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription.

6) Whether respondent’s failure to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by law voids the nomination and appointment of respondent Sereno as Chief Justice.

7) Whether respondent Sereno is a de jure or de facto officer.

RULINGS

1) YES, SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto.

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this case is justified considering that the qualification of a member of the Court is in question, and the issue is of public concern.

2) NO. The Court held that the origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different.

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings materially differ.

At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

3) There is NO forum shopping because quo warranto and impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously as they differ as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds (3) applicable rules pertaining to institution, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocably different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense.

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding.

4) YES. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointee or invariably elected impeachable official may be removed from office.

Even the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition on impeachable officer. In the case of Estrada vs. Macapagal Arroyo where the SC took cognizance of quo warranto petition against former President Macapagal Arroyo whether the former President Estrada’s act of resignation ended his official status as President.

5) NO. Prescription does not lie against the State.

The one-year limitation is not applicable when the Petition is not mere private individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking a relief for a public wrong and suing for public interest.

In the three instances enumerated by Rules of Court, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must”

As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. In effect, when the government is the real party and is proceeding mainly to assert its right, there can be no defense on the grounds of laches or prescription.

6) YES. Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately relates to a person’s integrity. Contrary to respondent Sereno’s postulation that the filing of SALN bears no relation to the requirement of integrity, the filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory requirement.

7) DE FACTO OFFICER. The effect of a finding that person appointed to an office is ineligible therefore is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title that confers to him the status of a de facto officer.

For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, respondent Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from office other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

“GODSPEED”

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